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CHARLES S. PEIRCE’S CONSERVATIVE PROGRESSIVISM 
Yael Levin Hungerford 
Advisor: Nasser Behnegar 
 
My dissertation explores the epistemological and political thought of Charles S. 
Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. In contrast to the pragmatists who followed, 
Peirce defends a realist notion of truth. He seeks to provide a framework for 
understanding the nature of knowledge that does justice to our commonsense experience 
of things. Similarly in contrast to his fellow pragmatists, Peirce has a conservative 
practical teaching: he warns against combining theory and practice out of concern that 
each will corrupt the other.  
 The first three chapters of this dissertation examine Peirce’s pragmatism and 
related features of his thought: his Critical Common-Sensism, Scholastic Realism, 
semeiotics, and a part of his metaphysical or cosmological musings. The fourth chapter 
explores Peirce’s warning that theory and practice ought to be kept separate. The fifth 
chapter aims to shed light on Peirce’s practical conservatism by exploring the liberal arts 
education he recommends for educating future statesmen.  
 This dissertation makes clear that Peirce was not a crude utilitarian or simply 
concerned with “what works.” He was, moreover, not anti-metaphysical. Peirce has much 
to instruct contemporary thinkers. His is an anti-skeptical but modest theory of reality 
that remains valuable to contemporary readers. His message of caution in the practical 
realm is sound. Finally, his call for what a university ought to be and the liberal arts 
education that will best groom students for a life of action is still an important message.
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INTRODUCTION 
Charles Peirce is the founder of American pragmatism (see, e.g., James 1898/2011, 
p. 66), “America’s homegrown philosophy” (Misak 2008, p. 197). Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim, from his 1878 essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” is generally cited as the 
defining maxim of pragmatism: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object. (1878, EP1 p. 132)  
Some other key characteristics of Peirce’s pragmatism are that truth is an intelligible 
concept, a social concept, and is that to which philosophic and scientific investigation 
approaches; truth is established when inquiry has been exhausted. What results from this 
is an attitude of, in Peirce’s term, “fallibalism”: that every conclusion that survives a step 
of investigation must be recognized as tentative and must be thrown overboard if it 
doesn’t withstand future inquiry. In other words, investigators must hold that no scientific 
proposition is sacred. Finally, philosophic and scientific investigation must start where 
men actually are; no man approaches the world, or genuinely approaches investigation, 
with complete doubt. If philosophic investigation is going to be fruitful, it must be 
motivated by real doubt and not be led off-track by self-delusions of doubt.   
Hilary Putnam explains that “American pragmatism (at its best) avoided both the 
illusions of metaphysics and the pitfalls of skepticism” (Putnam 1990/2011, p. 331). 
Through thinkers like John Dewey pragmatism became associated with progressive 
politics and influenced educational theory. Through Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., it played 
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a role in transforming jurisprudential thought (see, e.g., Jacobsohn 1977). Richard Rorty 
changed our understanding about the theoretical foundations—or lack thereof—upon 
which liberal democracy rests.1  
The pragmatism of thinkers like Dewey and Rorty, and of James to a lesser extent, 
differ in significant ways from that of Peirce. As opposed to these thinkers, Peirce’s 
pragmatism aims at defending scholastic realism2 in the wake of the skepticism about the 
certainty of our knowledge injected in modern thought by Kant and Hegel. Peirce 
understood that knowledge needed metaphysical foundations.3 He sought to provide a 
framework to understand the nature of the knowledge it seems we do have and continue 
to uncover, and that does justice to our commonsense experience of things. Peirce 
moreover warns against combining theory and practice out of fear that theory will be 
                                                
1 Peirce’s influence on twentieth century thought goes further: He was “one of the founders of 
the quantificational logic which is the staple of contemporary textbooks in the subject” (Hookway 
1985, p. 1); he similarly made important contributions in such fields as mathematics, semeiotics, 
methods in the study of geology, and the philosophy of science (see, e.g., Fisch 1983). 
2 “Scholastic realism” refers to the realism of such scholastic thinkers as Duns Scotus. As 
Peirce explains it, this entails recognizing the reality of general concepts, and that there is more 
than simply sense data that the mind uses to create its own (potentially arbitrary) order of the 
world (see, e.g., 1868b, EP1 p. 51–53). This will be discussed further in the third chapter of this 
dissertation. 
3 Hookway (1985) explains that Richard Rorty’s characterization—meant by Rorty as an 
insult—of Peirce as a “traditional philosopher” is largely correct. Peirce was a “systematic 
philosopher concerned with the sorts of problems about science, truth and knowledge which 
exercised Descartes and Kant” (p. 3). One of Peirce’s chief goals was to provide philosophical 
foundations to justify science—to explain how objective truth was possible (ibid.). To do so, he 
sought to transform “how the [traditional philosophical] problems arose” and then use “his new 
logic and claims about meaning to resolve them” (ibid.). He attempted, for example, to 
“undermine . . . mistaken beliefs about reality . . . which had disfigured the discussions of earlier 
philosophers” (ibid.).  
Skagestad (1981), on the other hand, does not see the desire to refute skepticism as the motive 
behind Peirce’s work, but understands Peirce rather to be motivated by the desire to defend 
science against “those who would make science subservient either to religious dogmas or to 
technological or political goals” (p. 200). 
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used simply to serve practice, and be thereby corrupted. The differences between Peirce’s 
pragmatism and that of these others—especially his defense of a realist conception of 
truth in the face of extreme skepticism—has led some democratic theorists to turn to 
Peirce for a defense of liberal democracy that will resonate in our post-modern times.  
It is because of the differences between Peirce and the other pragmatists that this 
dissertation aims to better understand Peirce’s thought. His fallibalism—the humble 
recognition that any part of our knowledge might be wrong—along with his defense of a 
realist understanding of truth and knowledge put him in the modern philosophical 
tradition. Indeed, he appears to be a late and determined defender of modern 
philosophy—aiming to defend what is best about modern philosophy, while undermining 
and discarding what is worst about it. He attacks Descartes’s method of beginning from 
complete doubt, for example, as well as the notion that universal enlightenment was a 
possible and worthwhile goal. There appear to be important things to learn—especially 
about the nature of philosophic truth and its metaphysical foundations—in Peirce’s 
attempts to save the philosophic project of uncovering truth. In the realm of practical 
matters, Peirce expresses a modest conservatism that is still relevant today. What he says 
about practical matters raises questions and concerns that are worth working through.  
The interpretation of Peirce offered here takes the general approach to 
understanding Peirce of Christopher Hookway (1985). Hookway looks to understand 
Peirce’s thought as a whole and to reconcile the scientific and metaphysical aspects of 
Peirce’s work (Hookway 1985, p. 2–3). This is in contrast to the approaches taken by 
Murray G. Murphey (1961), who understands there to be at least four distinct and 
irreconcilable philosophical systems present in Peirce’s thought; and Peter Skagestad 
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(1981), who argues that Peirce’s work ought to be understood piecemeal and not as a 
comprehensive whole. 
 The remainder of this introduction seeks to situate Peirce’s thought among fellow 
thinkers in order to provide appropriate context for understanding his thought. We look at 
some of the ways Peirce was influenced by Immanuel Kant, whom he calls the “king of 
modern thought” (1885a/1998, CP 1.369). We briefly examine the thought of other 
pragmatists—William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam—to 
understand Peircean influences on their thought, as well as where their thought and 
Peirce’s diverge. We also look at the appeal to Peirce by democratic theorists, among 
them Jurgen Habermas, and evaluate their appropriation of his thought. Finally, we 
review some different interpretations of Peirce’s epistemology, from scholars who 
understand Peirce to defend epistemological realism to those who see him as a post-
modern thinker akin to Rorty. 
I. Peirce’s Kantian Influence  
There were several important philosophical influences on Peirce; among those he 
cites in several publications are Aristotle, medieval scholastics like William of Ockham 
and Duns Scotus, Berkeley, and Spinoza. It was Kant, though, in whose shadow he was 
most clearly writing.4 A comparison between Peirce and Kant with regard to key features 
of Peirce’s thought will help frame and provide context to Peirce’s philosophical project.  
                                                
4 See, e.g., Hookway (1985), p. 12. Hookway also rightly notes other important influences on 
Peirce’s thought: Aristotle, Ockham, Scotus, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hegel, Thomas Reid. Short 
(2004) explains: “Peirce’s philosophical studies began with Kant and centered around the Kantian 
problem of knowledge” (p. 215). Young (1952) remarks: “Kant was the earliest and most 
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Peirce calls Kant the “king of modern thought” (1885a/1998, CP 1.369). It was 
through Kant, Peirce explains, that he was introduced to philosophy: “I . . . had come 
upon the threshing-floor of philosophy through the doorway of Kant” (1907/1998 p. 400). 
He explains that the skepticism raised by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason—“perhaps, the 
greatest work of the human intellect”—profoundly affected all subsequent thought 
(1863/1958 p. 7–8). The name “pragmatism” in fact comes from Kant’s first Critique 
(1905c/1998 p. 333). Peirce’s diagnosis of the problems of the philosophy of his day 
appears to be lifted directly out of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals—
though his answer to these problems differs from that of Kant. Peirce similarly parts ways 
with Kant by separating theory and practice, though he does so in a way that similarly 
shows Kant’s influence; Peirce’s presentation of philosophy as man’s “highest 
occupation” (1898, CP 1.673), in fact, appears to be an inverse of Kant’s philosophy. 
Other features of Peirce’s thought that bespeak Kant’s influence include Peirce’s use of 
regulative hopes; Peirce’s concern for self-control, though with regard to thought rather 
than moral action5; his attempt to identify categories that can account for all our 
knowledge; and his identification of the three normative sciences—logic, ethics, and 
esthetics—and their relation to one another and to knowledge in general.6   
                                                                                                                                            
persistent influence in [Peirce’s] development, with Schelling and Hegel running close seconds” 
(p. 275). 
5 In an essay from 1905, Peirce explains that “logical self-control is a perfect mirror of ethical 
self-control” (1905c/1998, p. 337), and refers to the pragmatic maxim a “principle of 
terminological ethics” (ibid., p. 342). 
6 These latter matters are largely beyond the scope of this dissertation, though much has been 
written about the connection between Kant’s and Peirce’s thought in these regards: e.g., Friedman 
1995; Gava 2014; Hookway 1985; Kaag 2005; Kiryushchenko 2011; Levine 2004; Murphey 
1968; Nordmann 2006; Potter 1967; and Rosenthal 2002. 
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Self-consciously writing in response to Kant, Peirce’s philosophy can largely be 
seen as an inversion of that of his teacher. Kant’s pure philosophy aimed to delineate the 
limitations of human knowledge and subordinate science to moral things; starting from 
Kant’s diagnosis of the problems of modern philosophy, Peirce instead tries to salvage 
the traditional philosophical project of uncovering the cosmos. Peirce follows the 
traditional philosophical position that pure inquiry is superior to practical matters, and 
moreover that pure inquiry ought to be kept distinct from practical concerns. The 
relationship between Kant’s and Peirce’s philosophies will be fleshed out below; and 
Peirce’s response to Kant will be on display throughout the five chapters of this 
dissertation. A question that lies behind much of this examination, especially chapters 4 
and 5, is whether Peirce adequately responded to Kant’s subordinating theory to moral 
matters. Understanding Peirce’s relationship to the progressive appropriation of his 
doctrine depends, it seems, on understanding his response to Kant in this regard. This 
question will be revisited in the dissertation’s conclusion.   
With his background in chemistry and mathematics, Peirce explains that he was 
first pulled into philosophy—and affected thereafter—by his reading of Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason as a teenager. He poured over the text so carefully and often that he 
“almost knew [it] by heart” (1907, EP2 p. 424). He also dissected its arguments with his 
father: “my father, who was an eminent mathematician, pointed out to me lacunae in 
Kant’s reasoning which I should probably not otherwise have discovered” (ibid., p. 423).  
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Peirce explains that his doctrine of pragmatism is a product of his study of Kant7 
combined with his experience in experimental science8 (1905c/1998 p. 332). The name 
“pragmatism” comes from Kant’s distinction between pragmatisch and praktisch (ibid., 
p. 333). In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains that the purview of praktisch is the 
moral: it refers to “everything that is possible through freedom,” and it is the “practical 
employment of reason” that yields “us laws that are pure and determined completely a 
priori” (Kant 1781/1787: A800/B828; 2003 p. 632). Under the purview of pragmatisch, 
in contrast, are the empirical laws and the “attainment of those ends which are 
commanded to us by the senses” (ibid.). Praktisch beliefs, derived by a priori reason, are 
necessary; pragmatisch beliefs, derived empirically—like a doctor’s diagnosis based on 
his observation of symptoms—are “merely contingent” and subject to improvement 
(ibid., A823–824/B851–852, p. 647–648).  
                                                
7 Peirce explains that as a “laboratory-[man],” he found kindred thought in “the [metaphysical] 
writings of some philosophers, especially Kant, Berkeley, and Spinoza,” to the extent that “he felt 
he might trust to them” to better understand “methods of thinking” (1905c/1998 p. 332). 
8 One steeped in experimental science has “his mind molded by his life in the laboratory” 
(1905c/1998 p. 331). He comes to understand propositions as meaning that a certain effect will be 
observed if a certain effort is made: 
You will find that whatever assertion you make to [the typical experimentalist], he will 
either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and 
ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he will see 
no sense at all in what you say. (ibid., p. 332) 
The experimentalist is “color-blind” to “ontological” claims that aim to say more than this; the 
claim, for example, that the physicist’s “‘object is a physical reality’ unrevealed in experiments, 
and that the existence of such non-experiential reality ‘is the unalterable faith of science’” (ibid., 
p. 332). (Peirce attributes this latter view to Arthur James Balfour, as articulated in his 
presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, August 17, 1904 
(1905c/1998 p. 332; and editor’s note 1, 1998 p. 539).) 
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As Peirce sees it, whereas “no mind of the experimentalist type” can make sense of 
the praktisch, pragmatisch expresses “relation to some definite human purpose” 
(1905c/1998 p. 333). With his laboratory experience and especially Kantian influence, 
Peirce 
Framed the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other 
expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life; so 
that, since obviously nothing that might not result from experiment can have any 
direct bearing upon conduct, if one can define accurately all the conceivable 
experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, 
one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely 
nothing more in it. (ibid., p. 332; emphasis in the original) 
“Pragmatism” is a fitting name, as the doctrine’s “most striking feature” is “its 
recognition of an inseparable connection between rational cognition and rational 
purpose” (ibid., p. 333). Peirce explains elsewhere that he was a “pure Kantist” until he 
thought through matters and “was forced by successive steps” into pragmatism 
(1905b/1998 p. 353). In fact, Peirce understands the pragmatist to be a “Kantist” purified 
of hope of in any way conceiving a thing-in-itself: 
The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a 
thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of 
Kant’s doctrine, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-
Sensist.9 (ibid., p. 353–354) 
                                                
9 Peirce’s doctrine of Critical Common-Sensism is a consequence of his variant of pragmatism 
(1905b, EP2 p. 346). It will be more fully explored in chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. 
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Among other things, the discussion of Peirce’s epistemology in the first three chapters 
will aim to shed light on Peirce’s understanding of knowledge and reality, and how he 
thinks he was able to undermine, or get around, the desire to know a thing-it-iself. 
Peirce’s diagnosis of the problems of modern philosophy seems to come right out 
of Kant’s preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. As we will see, 
Peirce explains that the lack of consensus in modern metaphysics indicates that the study 
has been on the wrong path. It was indeed the lack of consensus among philosophers that 
earlier motivated Descartes in his philosophical project: 
Philosophy . . . has been cultivated for many centuries by the most excellent minds 
that have ever lived and . . . nevertheless, there still is nothing in it about which 
there is not some dispute, and consequently nothing that is not doubtful. (Descartes 
1637/1998, I.8, p. 5)  
Peirce’s explanation for the lack of consensus is the a priori character of Cartesian 
philosophy, entirely divorced from man’s experience. In his characterization of the study 
of metaphysics and his criticism about the lack of consensus, Peirce appears to be 
repeating Kant. Kant defines metaphysics, for example, as completely speculative:  
Metaphysics is a completely isolated speculative science of reason, which soars far 
above the teachings of experience, and in which reason is indeed meant to be its 
own pupil. (Kant 1787: Bxiv; 2003 p. 21) 
Kant moreover laments that metaphysics has yet to enter upon a secure path: 
Though it is older than all other science . . . it has not yet had the good fortune to 
enter upon the secure path of a science. For in it reason is perpetually being brought 
to a stand, even when the laws into which it is seeking to have, as it professes, an a 
priori insight are those that are confirmed by our most common experiences. (ibid.) 
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There is no consensus among its students, and no obvious winner; rather, disagreements 
are exercises in “mock combats” (ibid., Bxv, p. 21). The lack of consensus indicates that 
metaphysics has so far failed: 
This shows, beyond all questioning, that the procedure of metaphysics has hitherto 
been a merely random groping, and, what is worst of all, a groping among mere 
concepts. (ibid.) 
In contrast, mathematics and natural science have had a good deal of success. Kant 
thus suggests that metaphysics would benefit by imitating these more successful 
sciences’ methods; as we will see, this is precisely what Peirce also suggests.  
The examples of mathematics and natural science, which by a single and sudden 
revolution have become what they now are, seem to me sufficiently remarkable to 
suggest our considering what may have been the essential features in the changed 
point of view by which they have so greatly benefited. . . . Their success should 
incline us, at least by way of experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as the 
analogy which, as species of rational knowledge, they bear to metaphysics may 
permit. (ibid., Bxv–xvi, p. 21–22)  
It is here, though, that Kant and Peirce part ways—at least on the surface. Kant suggests 
that, instead of assuming that our knowledge conforms with objects, we should start by 
assuming that objects conform to our mind; “A similar experiment [to Copernicus’s] can 
be tried in metaphysics, as regards the intuition of objects” (ibid., Bxvi–xvii, p. 22). In 
contrast, against Kant’s “nominalism,” Peirce has as his mission the recovery of 
scholastic realism.  
Peirce also parts ways from Kant by separating theory and practice and ranking 
theoretical matters over moral ones. In doing so, however, Peirce quietly references 
Kantian arguments and claims, and in fact presents an inverse of the Kantian position. 
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Kant explains in the Groundwork, in an apparent attack on Lockean thought, that reason 
is not well fit to govern practical matters like man’s welfare and preservation:  
Now in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its 
preservation, its welfare, in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a 
very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this 
purpose. For all the actions that the creature has to perform for this purpose, and the 
whole rule of its conduct, would be marked out for it far more accurately by 
instinct, and that end would have thereby been attained much more surely than it 
ever can be by reason. (Kant 1785: 4:395; 1996 p. 50–51). 
Moreover, Kant explains, the more cultivated the reason, the worse one is at promoting 
one’s happiness: 
In fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason purposely occupies itself with the 
enjoyment of life and with happiness, so much the further does one get away from 
true satisfaction. (ibid., p. 51) 
Employing reason to experiment on these matters turns out even worse: 
From this there arises in many, and indeed in those who have experimented most 
with this use of reason . . . a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason; 
for, after calculating all the advantages they draw—I do not say from the invention 
of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them 
to be, at bottom, only a luxury of the understanding)—they find that they have in 
fact only brought more trouble upon themselves instead of gaining in happiness. 
(ibid., p. 51) 
Men with cultivated reason thus “finally envy . . . the more common run of people, who 
are closer to the guidance of mere natural instinct and do not allow their reason much 
influence on their behavior” (ibid., 4:396, p. 51). Rather than satisfying “all our needs,” 
reason to “some extent even multiplies” them (ibid., p. 52).  
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Instead, Kant explains, reason is “properly destined” to a “far worthier purpose” 
(ibid., p. 51); it is here that Peirce and Kant diverge, although Peirce does so with a 
Kantian flavor. Kant explains that reason is “given to us” to “influence the will”—in 
other words, as a “practical faculty” (ibid., p. 52). Given that “nature has everywhere 
gone to work purposively in distributing its capacities,” reason’s “true vocation . . . must 
be to produce a will that is good”; this good will must be “good in itself” rather than “as a 
means” to some other end, and thus it must be the “highest good” (ibid., p. 52). While it 
might not be the “sole and complete good,” it is that to which the “cultivation of reason” 
aims, and the “condition of every other” good, including happiness (ibid.). That a “good 
will” alone is “good without limitation” we know from our experience in the world (ibid., 
4:393, p. 49). The “highest practical vocation” of reason, then, is of a moral nature: to 
establish a good will, in other words to “[fulfill] an end which” it itself “determines” 
(ibid., 4:396, p. 52). “Duty” derives from “the necessity of my action from pure respect 
for the practical law,” and the worth of the good will “surpasses all else” (ibid., 4:403, p. 
58). It is acting according to the law one gives oneself that constitutes the “dignity of 
human nature and of every rational nature” (ibid., 4:436, p. 85). 
Though self-legislation might be reason’s highest vocation, there is still a need for 
science in Kant’s framework: namely, to protect wisdom from being “easily seduced” 
(ibid., 4:405, p. 59). He explains that because the “commands of duty” are often 
counterbalanced by man’s inclination, man has a “propensity to rationalize against those 
strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity” (ibid., p. 59–60). As there are 
limits to the abilities of pure reason to understand nature—as Kant showed in the Critique 
of Pure Reason—so there are limits to pure practical reason:  
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It is . . . a reproach that must be brought against human reason in general, that it 
cannot make comprehensible as regards its absolute necessity an unconditional 
practical law. . . . We do not indeed comprehend the practical unconditional 
necessity of the moral imperative, but we nevertheless comprehend its 
incomprehensibility; and this is all that can fairly be required of a philosophy that 
strives in its principles to the very boundary of human reason (ibid., 4:463, p. 108). 
Thus the role for philosophy is not to seek an understanding of the whole, but to 
understand the limits of reason and to serve morality.  
In discussing the connection between philosophy and practical matters, Peirce 
echoes Kant’s point that it is often better for practical matters to be guided by instinct 
rather than reason (e.g., 1898, lecture 1, p. 110). Elsewhere Peirce similarly explains that 
pleasure can not be achieved if that is one’s motivating aim: 
All motives that are directed toward pleasure or self-satisfaction, of however high a 
type, will be pronounced by every experienced person to be inevitably destined to 
miss the satisfaction at which they aim. (1901, EP2 p. 60) 
A significant difference between Peirce and Kant concerns the nature of the practical 
matters each thinks is best left to instinct. For Kant, instinct appears to do a far better job 
at pointing men in the direction of happiness when it governs their behavior. As we saw, 
though, reason also has a “practical vocation” for Kant: namely, to govern morality. 
Reason indeed dictates what morality requires. Peirce, by contrast, explains that all 
practical matters, including morality, ought to be under the purview of instinct; for 
Peirce, morality is indeed the product of instinct and culture.  
In contrast, the proper role for reason, Peirce insists, is pure theoretical study. It is 
this—and not the good will—which is desirable in itself: The only thing “which is quite 
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satisfactory in itself without any ulterior reason for desiring it, is the reasonable itself” 
(1901, EP2 p. 60). This is an “experiential truth,” to which all true scientists can attest 
(ibid.). Once one understands the greatness of the task of reason of uncovering the 
“Eternal” and becomes “inflated with that idea,” matters of “vital importance” will seem 
of “a very low kind of importance, indeed” (1898, lecture 1, p. 121; emphasis in original). 
And, as such, it is the pursuit of pure knowledge that makes up the “dignity of man” 
(1878, EP2 p. 141).  
Peirce thus turns Kant’s claim about our awareness of our moral sense on its head, 
and instead tries to, once more, subordinate practical matters to the theoretical pursuit of 
pure knowledge. This he does by setting about to reframe our understanding of the nature 
of pure inquiry and the subject matter of pure philosophy. This dissertation’s goal is to 
shed light on and critically examine Peirce’s project.  
II. Other Pragmatists 
This section provides a brief overview of the views on epistemology and political 
theory of four prominent pragmatists: William James, John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and 
Hilary Putnam. What is widely understood to be the meaning of pragmatism comes from 
the thoughts of these thinkers more than it does from Peirce’s thought. All four thinkers 
do away with efforts to provide foundations for knowledge. James, Dewey, and Rorty 
understand the nature of man, society, and knowledge to be products of history and 
evolution. As such, they each display varying degrees of epistemological relativism. 
Dewey, Rorty, and Putnam are strong supporters of democracy, with Rorty and Putnam 
each claiming to put forth a formulation of a Deweyan understanding of democracy. The 
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following presentation of each of their views will seek to bring out the ways in which 
each thinker both converges and diverges from Peirce’s thought.10  
William James’s pragmatism mixes a psychological account of understanding truth 
and reality, with a humanistic concern for the welfare of society. It was James who 
introduced the term “pragmatism” in public for the first time, in a paper delivered in 1898 
to the University of California (Berkeley) Philosophical Union entitled “Philosophical 
Conceptions and Practical Results.” In this paper, he credits Peirce—“one of the most 
original” of his contemporaries—with having set him upon the direction of the pragmatic 
“trail of truth” (James 1898/2011, p. 66).11 He explains in the talk that Peirce’s 1878 
                                                
10 Smith (1978) agrees that there are significant differences in Peirce’s, James’s, and Dewey’s 
understanding of truth and knowledge (p. 51). Putnam (1990/2011) explains that Peirce 
“repudiated” much that is associated with James’s and Dewey’s pragmatism (p. 336). Hookway 
(1985) explains Peirce was much “much closer to the ambitions of traditional philosophy” than 
were pragmatists like James (p. 9). It was because of Peirce’s continued attachment to the 
“traditional problems and aspirations of philosophy,” in contrast to James and Dewey, that Rorty 
does not understand Peirce as a pragmatist (p. 2–3). Haack (1993, 1998) argues that Rorty’s 
pragmatism is a vulgar corruption of Peirce’s. Misak (2000) and Talisse (2005) both explain that 
it is because of the differences between Rorty’s and Peirce’s understanding of truth that they turn 
to Peirce for guidance. Pihlstrom (2004) explains that Rorty and Putnam have been influenced 
more by James and Dewey than by Peirce, though Putnam is more appreciative of Peirce’s role as 
a founder of pragmatism than is Rorty (p. 47–48). 
Others try to diminish the differences between Peirce and James and Dewey. Pihlstrom (2004) 
acknowledges that there are differences between Peirce’s, James’s, and Dewey’s theories of truth, 
but argues that despite apparent differences, Peirce’s and James’s are ultimately closer than they 
might appear (p. 29–31); Dewey’s theory, on the other hand, differs greatly from Peirce’s (p. 43). 
Pihlstrom readily admits that Peirce diverges greatly from James and Dewey on practical matters 
by calling for the separation of theory and practice, though to many interested in pragmatism 
today, this makes what Peirce says on these matters irrelevant (p. 49). Haack (1976) argues that 
Peirce’s, James’s, and Dewey’s theories of truth are more similar than at first appear, such that it 
is intelligible to say that there is one pragmatist theory of truth. C. Anderson (1990) emphasizes 
more continuity than differences among the classical pragmatists. 
11 James and Peirce had a life-long friendship, dating to their youths in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. It is well known that James and Peirce—along with others like Henry James and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.—participated together in the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge in the 
1870s (Brent 1993, p. 83). James was a strong supporter of Peirce throughout his life, arranging 
for him to deliver several sets of lectures in Cambridge and at Harvard, helping him secure 
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essay “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” introduces and lays out the principles of 
pragmatism, namely, that the purpose of thought is the attainment of beliefs, which are 
rules for action (ibid.). Thus the meaning of a thought is simply its practical 
consequences—what conduct it will elicit (ibid.).  
James explains that he thinks the principle of pragmatism “should be expressed 
more broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it” (ibid., p. 67). One implication of pragmatism, 
in James’s view, is that every metaphysical question must involve a practical 
consideration for it to be a legitimate question (ibid., p. 69). James understands a 
consequence of pragmatism to be recognizing that “no difference” exists between two 
propositions if  
By supposing the truth of the one, you can foresee no conceivable practical 
consequence to anybody at any time or place, which is different from what you 
would foresee if you supposed the truth of the other. (ibid., p. 67) 
The only difference between such propositions is a “specious and verbal difference, 
unworthy of further contention” (ibid.). The principle of pragmatism thus promises to 
help clear up many age-old philosophical disagreements (ibid., p. 76).  
In “The Will to Believe,”12 James elaborates on the nature of belief, providing the 
psychological account that lies at the root of his philosophy. He explains that we are 
                                                                                                                                            
publishers, and appealing to several universities around the country for academic positions for 
Peirce after he was fired from Johns Hopkins (an action largely attributed to the impropriety of 
his second marriage) (ibid., p. 150–152, chapters 4–5).  
 
12 “The Will to Believe” was first delivered as an address to the Philosophical Clubs of Yale 
and Brown Universities and published in a larger volume in 1896. It was then republished later as 
a book (Wilshire 1971, p. 309). James dedicated the book to Peirce, his “Old friend . . . to whose 
philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in recent years I owe more 
incitement and help than I can express or repay” (James as quoted in Brent 1993, p. 259). 
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constrained in what we can believe—we can not simply believe something at will (James 
1896/1971, p. 309–311). He disagrees, for example, that one can simply reason oneself 
into religious faith by the reasoning of Pascal’s wager (ibid., p. 311). Whether we are 
open to belief or not is constrained by the cultural context in which we exist, as well as 
our passions and prejudices—this is true of both religious beliefs, as well as our views on 
science (ibid., p. 309, 312–315). In other words, our scientific views are not merely the 
products of reason (ibid., p. 313). 
There is thus good reason to “give up the doctrine of objective certitude” with 
regard to one’s beliefs (ibid., p. 317). This does not mean, though, that we should “give 
up the quest or hope of truth itself” (ibid.): “we still pin our faith on its existence, and still 
believe that we gain an ever better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll 
up experiences and think” (ibid.). Truth can be understood as that which “the total drift of 
thinking continues to confirm” (ibid.).  
Truth about nature is not formed but found:  
In our dealings with objective nature we obviously are recorders, not makers, of the 
truth; . . . Throughout the breadth of physical nature facts are what they are quite 
independently of us. (ibid., p. 319) 
In such matters, it is best to withhold judgment, given the possibility of mistake and the 
fact that only very rarely does a decision one way or the other need to be made: 
Seldom is there any such hurry about them that the risks of being duped by 
believing a premature theory need be faced. The questions here are always trivial 
options, the hypotheses are hardly living (at any rate not living for us spectators), 
the choice between believing truth or falsehood is seldom forced. (ibid.) 
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Thus such matters are viewed with a healthy amount of skepticism (ibid.). That said, 
science often benefits from individual scientists’ passionate attachment to their theories, 
though “the most useful investigator” will balance his eagerness “by an equally keen 
nervousness lest he become deceived” (ibid., p. 320). 
 When faced with a moral dilemma, however, there is no room for suspending 
judgment; a decision must be made (ibid., p. 321). Reason, moreover, can not convince a 
person one way or the other in such matters (ibid.). Rather, it is our heart that should 
guide us in such things:  
Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and 
of what does not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. 
(ibid.) 
Morality indeed depends on everyone doing his part, with a trust that everyone else will 
similarly be doing his (ibid., p. 322). 
In his 1907 book Pragmatism and in his 1909 book The Meaning of Truth, James 
connects his psychological doctrine of the nature of truth and belief with humanistic 
concerns that bespeak an understanding of man’s evolutionary nature (James 1909/1971, 
p. 262). In these later writings on pragmatism, James also goes further in the direction of 
relativism—of presenting truth about nature as being constructed and resting ultimately 
on usefulness. James explains that truth is not an end in itself, but like “wealth and 
health” (James 1907/2011, p. 89) is desired because it is useful for “other vital 
satisfaction” (ibid., 80). For example, if one is lost in the woods and starving, it matters 
whether one correctly deduces a cow path that will lead to human habitation (ibid.). 
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The practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical 
importance of their objects to us. . . . You can say of it then either that “it is useful 
because it is true” or that “it is true because it is useful.” Both these phrases mean 
exactly the same thing, namely, that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be 
verified. (ibid., p. 81) 
True beliefs are “the opposite of whatever is instable, of whatever is practically 
disappointing, of whatever is useless, of whatever is lying and unreliable,” and thus save 
us from such a world (James 1909/1971, p. 270). “Truth” and “usefulness” thus seem to 
point to the same thing: stable beliefs. An idea is useful if it fits well with our experiences 
and our other ideas; because it is useful, it is understood as being true. It is with this 
desire to be useful that pragmatism looks to the future (James 1907/2011, p. 87).  
James explains that the “concrete benefits” of true beliefs oblige us to pursue them 
(James 1907/2011, p. 89). While he is not perfectly clear as to exactly what he means by 
“benefit,” he leaves many clues as to the types of ends highest on his list. Foreseeing 
future experience and aiding man’s social existence—especially through 
communication—seem to be among James’s chief concerns (James 1909/1971, p. 265). 
James also remarks that we call “true” those beliefs that “facilitate our mental or physical 
activities,” thereby bringing “us outer power and inner peace” (ibid., p. 266). In an earlier 
talk, James similarly praises that which provides “energy and endurance” for “handling 
life’s evils,” as such qualities allow one to “outwear” others and thus succeed in the 
“battle-field of human history” (James 1891/1971, p. 307–308). Thus to varying degrees 
it appears James’s primary concern is with men’s evolutionary fitness and chances for 
historical success. He would like to see men develop in the direction of powerful and 
 
 
20 
 
 
satisfied creatures with the inner strength to endure life’s obstacles, and it is to this end 
that “benefit” ought to be understood. 
James continues to acknowledge that we are constrained by our experiences: “Woe 
to him whose beliefs play fast and loose with the order which realities follow in his 
experience: They will lead him nowhere or else make false connections” (James 
1907/2011, p. 81). Similarly, the “very structure of our thinking”––which it seems is 
made up of the mutually reinforcing abstract relations our minds have constructed based 
on our experiences in the world––provide the “ideal framework” with which we make 
sense of our experience (ibid., p. 83). This framework acts as a constraint on us:  
We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so 
with our sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently, 
whether or not we like the results. (ibid.)  
Experience will continually check our ideas and theories for understanding the world, as 
it “has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas” (ibid., p. 87).  
If we are to be consistent and satisfied, our minds must adhere to the “coercions of 
the sensible order and those of the ideal order” (ibid., p. 83). James sees a psychological 
need for consistency among our “judgments, objects, and habits of reacting” (James 
1909/1971, p. 278). It is this need that accounts for our developing “mental habits” as a 
by-product of past experience, that helps us prepare for future experience (ibid.). We are 
similarly driven by our experiences and our context to develop particular understandings 
as we go about our lives; “there is a push, an urgency, within our very experience . . . 
which drives us in a direction that is the destiny of our belief” (ibid., p. 267). The notion 
of “truth” develops for us in this manner (ibid., p. 268). It is the external and necessary 
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character of this process that makes reality “independent” of us, beyond “our arbitrary 
control” (ibid., p. 267). 
Despite this, however, James also at times speaks in the vein of truth being 
constructed. He explains, for example, that truth is not inherent to an idea, it “happens to 
an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events”—events like the “valid-ation” process of 
the scientist (James 1907/2011, p. 80; emphasis in original). “Reality is an accumulation 
of our own intellectual inventions” (James 1909/1971, p. 266). We inherit many ideas, 
and continue to believe in them because “it works to do so” (James 1907/2011, p. 82). 
This is true of our knowledge of the existence of Japan (ibid.), as it is of the fact that 
“Moses wrote the Pentateuch,” for if Moses did not, “all our religious habits will have to 
be undone” (James 1909/1971, p. 274). Scientific formulas are “man-made,” and such 
things as “atoms” and “energy” do not “stand for anything ‘objective’” (James 
1907/2011, p. 84). That scientific theories have proliferated in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century belies the previously held notion that these theories were uncovering 
what was “literally objective” (James 1909/1971, p. 263). Theories should simply be 
accepted to the extent that they are useful, but no further (ibid., p. 263–264).  
James’s criteria for truth, it seems, is that an idea or a theory fit well with past 
theories and experience, as well as help prepare us for future experience (James 
1907/2011, p. 83–84).  
Our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. 
It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must 
lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. (ibid., p. 84–
85) 
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Most people are satisfied so long as there is no “violent clash between their usual 
thoughts and statements and the limited sphere of sense-perceptions in which their lives 
are cast” (James 1909/1971, p. 279).  
What is true is what is useful to these ends. These ends, in turn, greatly aid men’s 
experience in the world, most especially their social existence: 
True ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up 
to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human 
intercourse. They lead away from eccentricity and isolation, from foiled and barren 
thinking. (James 1907/2011, p. 84) 
 
Thus it is truth in understanding that we ought to pursue: “’the true,’ to put it very briefly, 
is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in 
the way of our behaving” (ibid., p. 86). What will not be altered or undermined by future 
experience is that which is ultimately considered to be “the ‘absolutely’ true” (ibid., p. 
87).  
There is the problem, of course, that no one can be certain whether one’s truth is 
indeed absolute. Moreover, the absolute truth about a given matter may remain illusive 
(ibid.). As such, we need to live today by truths that are expedient, and that we are 
willing to discard tomorrow as false (ibid.). Examples of previously held truths that have 
since been discarded in the development of human experience include “Ptolemaic 
astronomy, Euclidean space, Aristotelian logic, [and] scholastic metaphysics”; these 
theories are now only “relatively true,” but “’absolutely’” false (ibid.).  
The relative truths, or half-truths, that men make along the way contribute to the 
absolute truth that is ultimately made (ibid.). This path is fueled by a reciprocal 
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relationship between our experiences and our attempts to make sense of our experiences, 
in a process wherein there seems there is much that is accidental, with our experiences 
leading us to adopt certain truths, which then cause us to act in certain ways, which then 
lead to the creation of new truths (ibid.).  
So the whole coil and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double 
influence. Truths emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add 
to them; which facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is indifferent) and 
so on ad infinitum. (ibid.) 
We assimilate, reject, and rearrange our “mass of beliefs”––our half-truths of today––in 
order to reconcile our understanding with the “new material” experience “continually” 
forces us to “digest” (James 1909/1971, p. 264).  
This process of codetermination between our experience of sense data and our 
making sense of our experience is responsible for our evolution to modern men (James 
1907/2011, p. 88). Ideas like those of “one Time and one Space,” as well as “the concept 
of permanently existing things,” were “conquests” made by our historic ancestors in their 
attempts to make sense of and communicate about the disorder around them, “to get the 
chaos of their crude individual experiences in to a more shareable and manageable shape” 
(James 1909/1971, p. 264–265). Such notions have proven such helpful devices that they 
have developed into the structure of our mind (ibid., p. 265). These notions were not 
necessary—“some primeval genius might have struck into a different hypothesis” (ibid.). 
They are, however, by now so deeply entrenched in our minds that they frame all of our 
current experiences, and “no experience can upset them” (ibid.). These ideas now 
“work,” no matter the empiricist criticisms by the likes of Berkeley; “the category of 
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transperceptual reality is now one of the foundations of our life” (ibid.). For a thought to 
be considered reasonable or true, it must be in agreement with such notions (ibid.). 
Among those things useful to believe is the existence of the God. The notion of 
God enlivens our experience in the world, while the absence of this notion is deadening: 
Many of us, most of us, I think, now feel as if a terrible coldness and deadness 
would come over the world were we forced to believe that no informing spirit or 
purpose had to do with it, but it merely accidentally had come. . . . With the God, 
on the other hand, [the experienced details of fact] would grow solid, warm, and 
altogether full of real significance. (James 1907/2011, p. 68) 
While the notion of God might not have the clarity of mathematical notions, it is 
practically superior to such notions because “it guarantees an ideal order that shall be 
permanently preserved” (ibid., p. 71). Where God is believed, “tragedy is only 
provisional and partial” (ibid.). One of our “deepest needs” is that for “an eternal moral 
order” (ibid.). The pragmatic meaning of God, James argues, does not concern 
“abstractions about matter’s inner essence” or scholastic arguments concerning 
metaphysical attributes of God, but rather the “adjustments of our concrete attitudes of 
hope and expectation” that result from our belief (ibid., p. 72). Theism affirms “an eternal 
moral order” and provides hope (ibid.). Following the pragmatic principle of 
understanding a concept by its consequences, the “word ‘God’” thus simply means the 
“passive and active [spiritual] experiences” of one’s life (ibid., p. 74).  
As we shall see below, there is more affinity between James’s and Peirce’s thought 
than there is between Peirce’s thought and that of either Dewey or Rorty. Peirce’s 
writings on early pragmatism were, like James, also concerned with psychological 
elements of thought, though Peirce moved away from a psychological basis for truth and 
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knowledge in his later writings on pragmatism; we will explore these matters in chapters 
2 and 3. Like Peirce, James similarly expressed an understanding of fallibalism and of 
truth being a forward-looking concept, confirmed over time—though he was more eager 
to speak of taking up and then discarding truths than he was speaking of an attitude of 
philosophic modesty. It is in James’s relativism as well as connection of truth with utility 
wherein he diverges from Peirce most greatly. In contrast to James’s increasing 
relativism, Peirce was interested in preserving an objective view of truth and reality; this, 
as I will argue in the first three chapters, is what motivated his doctrine of pragmatism. 
As we will see in chapter 4, Peirce thinks that the role of philosophy is to promote 
understanding simply, and is concerned that an interest in utility will corrupt 
philosophy’s pursuit. At the same time, as we will further explore in chapter 4, both 
Peirce and James defend the commonplace moral experience, while at the same time 
acknowledging that growth is inevitable in such a realm. 
For Dewey, pragmatism entails turning away from epistemological concerns and 
instead focusing on the practical problems facing mankind (1946/1958 p. 11). He laments 
that the moral concerns of practical life—the search “for the ends and values that give 
direction to our collective human activities”—have been neglected by modern philosophy 
(ibid., p. 7, 11). This neglect “explains the popular discredit into which philosophy has 
progressively fallen” (ibid., p. 7). In contrast, Dewey explains, pragmatism does not seek 
to ground all knowledge or uncover eternal truths but instead to search for wisdom—a 
search aided by the scientific method: it is the “use of the methods and conclusions of our 
best knowledge, that called scientific,” that best aids our search, not the “grasp of eternal 
and universal Reality” (ibid., p. 11).  
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The new task of philosophy is to “help get rid of intellectual habits that now stand 
in the way” of reconciling the theoretical and the practical (1944b/1958 p. 159). Calls to 
separate philosophy from practical life and the social realm are simply “the philosophy of 
dogmatic rigidity and uniformity” (ibid., p. 158). The role for “New World” American 
philosophy is to work against such calls.  
The chief opportunity and chief responsibility of those who call themselves 
philosophers are to make clear the intrinsic kinship of democracy with the methods 
of directing change that have revolutionized science. (ibid.) 
Science ought to be directed to serving the higher goal of democracy: “science and 
technology may be rendered servants of the democratic hope and faith” (1944a/1958 p. 
33). This is what Dewey means when he explains that philosophy has the task to 
“humanize science” (ibid.).  
Dewey is interested in gaining knowledge so as to be able to control and 
manipulate. Dewey speaks of sparking a revolution in our understanding of social matters 
parallel to what occurred “three hundred years ago” in the “physical subjects” (1946/1958 
p. 17). What is needed, he explains, is a  
systematic and comprehensive criticism of current methods and habits and the same 
projection of generous hypotheses as . . . set going the revolution in physical 
knowledge. (ibid.)  
Such is required if democracy is to be maintained: 
Successful maintenance of democracy demands the utmost in use of the best 
available methods to procure a social knowledge that is reasonably commensurate 
with our physical knowledge, and the invention and use of forms of social 
engineering reasonably commensurate with our technological abilities in physical 
affairs. (1944a/1958 p. 33) 
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Dewey similarly speaks of “the prestige of science” deriving from “the use and 
enjoyment of the material power and material comforts that have resulted from its 
technical application” (1936/1958 p. 174). It seems Dewey appreciates science because 
of its power to manipulate; and that in the realm of the political its best use is to reshape, 
and thereby control, the social.   
Dewey lauds democracy because its cause is the “moral cause of the dignity and the 
worth of the individual” (1938/1958 p. 44). It provides for “mutual respect, mutual 
toleration” (ibid., p. 44–45). It is “the only method by which human beings can succeed 
in carrying on” the “greatest experiment of humanity”: of living together profitably such 
that each is able to build up his own individuality as well as help the development of that 
of others (ibid., p. 45). Democracy is, in other words, instrumental; it is a tool, a method. 
It applies the scientific method to the practical and social realm; democracy is the 
political institution whose methods most resemble those of scientific inquiry. The 
exchange of viewpoints that takes place in a democratic system acts as a dialectic that 
parallels the empirical experimentation and testing of science:  
The very heart of political democracy is adjudication of social differences by 
discussion and exchange of views. This method provides a rough approximation to 
the method of effecting change by means of experimental inquiry and test: the 
scientific method. (1944b/1958 p. 157) 
Democracy, Dewey explains, entails empirically testing hypotheses in order to affect 
social change:  
The very foundation of the democratic procedure is dependence upon experimental 
production of social change; an experimentation directed by working principles that 
are tested and developed in the very process of being tried out in action. (ibid.) 
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This is true not only with regard to determining the efficiency of an economic system—
whether a free market or socialist system is more desirable—but from such an 
examination, deriving the moral desirability of such systems (ibid., p. 158–159).  
A related virtue of democracy is that, like the good scientific method that it is, it 
enables the collection of information. In an arguable misreading13 of Abraham Lincoln’s 
political thought, Dewey quotes the president in support of his argument that democracy 
best allows each citizen to voice his needs: 
Lincoln . . . said that no man was good enough or wise enough to govern others 
without their consent; that is, without some expression on their part of their own 
needs, their own desires and their own conception of how social affairs should go 
on and social problems be handled. . . . That asking other people what they would 
like, what they need, what their ideas are, is an essential part of the democratic 
idea. (1938/1958 p. 35) 
Consulting the individual as to what it is that he needs is in fact the essence of 
democracy:  
Because it is the individual that knows his own troubles, even if he is not literate or 
sophisticated in other respects, the idea of democracy as opposed to any conception 
of aristocracy is that every individual must be consulted in such a way, actively not 
passively, that he himself becomes a part of the process of authority, or the process 
of social control. (1938/1958 p. 35; emphasis added)  
As we see, democracy, like science, is a tool for “social engineering” and “control.” The 
“realization of democracy” is the “putting together all of these individual expressions of 
ideas and wants” in order to ultimately arrive at the desired “social control”; to form, in 
                                                
13 Dewey reads into Lincoln’s remarks support for populism, whereas all Lincoln was saying 
was that a leader needs the consent of those whom he governs. 
 
 
29 
 
 
the aggregate, the “final social will” (ibid., p. 36). “Knowledge and understanding” are 
simply “the power of action” (ibid., p. 37). Democracy ultimately serves the “dignity and 
the worth of the individual” (ibid., p. 44), it seems, because it yields the best solution to a 
given situation, and this it does because its decision making process consists of weighing 
all its citizens’ wants and needs. Whether solutions to problems are measured by anything 
other than their having taken into account the various desires of a polity’s citizens—by its 
continuation of the democratic experiment, in other words—is unclear.  
There are elements of Dewey’s thought that come straight out of Peirce.14 Dewey 
explains that he follows Peirce’s presentation of truth as a forward-looking concept, 
toward which scientific investigation points:  
Over against the traditional view of truth as a fixed structure of eternal and 
unchanging principles already in our possession to which everything else should be 
made to conform, Peirce said that truth “is that concordance of an abstract 
statement with the ideal limit toward which endless investigation would tend to 
bring scientific belief.” (1944b/1958 p. 157) 
Like Peirce, Dewey explains that knowledge of matters—truth—is a humanly attainable 
and social concept:  
The initial step is to promote general recognition that knowing, including most 
emphatically scientific knowledge, is not outside social activity, but is itself a form 
of social behavior. . . . For it is something that human beings do, as they plow the 
earth and sail ships. (1946/1958 p. 17) 
Dewey moreover expresses the sentiment of Peirce’s fallibalism:  
                                                
14 Dewey was a student of Peirce’s at Johns Hopkins and participated in the university’s 
Metaphysical Club with him, circa 1882–1884 (Fisch and Cope 1952, p. 306).  
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Peirce said . . . this concordance may be possessed even now and here by a 
scientific belief in case there is “confession of its inaccuracy and one-sidedness,” 
since this “confession is an essential ingredient of truth.” (1944b/1958 p. 157) 
As we will explore in chapter 5, Dewey similarly voices Peircean advice about what a 
proper education entails: 
There has to be joined to aspiration and effort the free, wide-ranging, trained 
attitudes of observation and understanding such as incorporate within themselves, 
as a matter so habitual as to be unconscious, the vital principles of scientific 
method. (1944a/1958 p. 33; emphasis added) 
 
Despite these apparent agreements with Peirce, Dewey nonetheless applies his concepts 
in the opposite manner Peirce expressly intended them. 
Peirce warned against combining theory and practice out of concern that each 
would corrupt the other—that theory would corrupt practice and practice would corrupt 
theory—as we will explore in chapter 4; this position is of course in complete opposition 
with the thrust of Dewey’s philosophical project. Dewey’s philosophical project, which 
consciously subordinates philosophy and science to the needs of the democratic project, 
indeed bears out Peirce’s warning. Whereas Dewey was concerned with employing 
science to aid society, Peirce was interested in pursuing knowledge for the sake of 
understanding simply. For Peirce, as we will see in the first three chapters, pragmatism is 
a logical maxim that aims to clarify conceptual meaning; for Dewey, it is a tool aimed at 
action. While for Dewey pragmatism as a tool comports well with a democratic political 
order—indeed, prescribes such an order—Peirce’s pragmatism contains within it a clear 
anti-democratic understanding about the nature of truth, as I will make clear in chapter 2. 
 
 
31 
 
 
In chapter 5, we will explore the ways in which Dewey’s and Peirce’s theoretical 
differences translate into practical differences with regard to their views of the education 
fit for a modern society.  
Richard Rorty claims to be following Dewey—as well as late Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein15—in setting aside the philosophic project of attempting to justify claims to 
knowledge, and instead using philosophy to help man cope with his situation (Rorty 
1979/2009, p. 7). 
Each of the three, in his later work, broke free of the Kantian conception of 
philosophy as foundational, and spent his time warning us against those very 
temptations to which he himself had once succumbed. Thus their later work is 
therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather than systematic, designed to 
make the reader question his own motives for philosophizing rather than to supply 
him with a new philosophical program. (ibid., p. 5–6) 
The revolution in philosophy ushered in by these three thinkers did not seek to disprove 
foundational philosophy, but rather introduced “new maps of the terrain . . . which simply 
do not include those features which previously seemed to dominate” philosophical 
inquiry (ibid., p. 6–7). Rorty further explains his sympathy for James’s notion of truth 
being what is helpful to believe, rather than an “‘accurate representation of reality’” 
(ibid., p. 10).  
 In rejecting foundational philosophy and the goal of accurate representation, 
Rorty adopts instead a historicist approach to claims of knowledge. In place of 
                                                
15 Rorty calls Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey the “three most important philosophers of 
our century” (Rorty 1979/2009, p. 5).  
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“‘metaphysical comfort,’” Rorty clings to his fellow men and the world these men 
created: 
To accept the contingency of starting-points is to accept our inheritance from, and 
our conversation with, our fellow-humans as our only source of guidance. . . . Our 
identification with our community—our society, our political tradition, our 
intellectual heritage—is heightened when we see this community as ours rather 
than nature’s, shaped rather than found, one among many which men have made. 
(Rorty 1979/1982, p. 166; emphasis in original) 
Our attachment to our fellow men is more important than is getting things right: “In the 
end, the pragmatists tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging 
together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right” (ibid.). Rorty understands 
himself to be adhering to the pragmatism of Dewey and James in understanding the only 
“constraints on inquiry” to be “conversational ones” (ibid, p. 165). Indeed, it is 
conversation, and conversation alone, that supports “our culture, or purpose, or 
intuitions” (ibid., p. 167). What this of course means is that the only constraints that exist 
are community- and culture-dependent. Nonetheless, Rorty denies that he is a relativist, 
explaining that the charge is simply made by those who can not understand that 
philosophy can eschew attempts at grounding knowledge (ibid.).  
In explaining his philosophical and pragmatist influences, Rorty largely ignores 
Peirce and when he does mention him, it is with disdain. For example, Rorty names the 
first part of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, in which he talks about the invention of 
mind, “Our Glassy Essence.” Peirce famously used the image of a “glassy essence,” from 
Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, in his discussion of man’s identity as a sign that 
exists in a social and language-filled context (Peirce 1868, EP1 p. 55). One of the only 
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mentions of Peirce in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is in Rorty’s acknowledgment 
that “the phrase man’s glassy essence was first invoked in philosophy by C. S. Peirce”; 
he takes this opportunity, however, to take a dig at Peirce:  
Peirce strangely thought [the “molecular theory of protoplasm”] important in 
confirming the view that “a person is nothing but a symbol involving a general 
idea” and in establishing the existence of “group minds.” (Rorty 1979/2009, p. 42 
note 10)  
Rorty explains that Peirce first used the term in philosophy in an 1892 essay, “Man’s 
Glassy Essence” (ibid.). In fact, Peirce first quoted the lines from Measure for Measure 
in his far better-known 1868 article, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” By 
pointing instead to the 1892 essay, Rorty seems to be going out of his way to take a dig at 
Peirce because of his seemingly obscure interest in the molecular theory of protoplasm. 
This criticism is directly connected to the general view that Rorty was disdainful of 
Peirce because he understood him to be part of the classical philosophical project—as 
evident in his seeking foundations for knowledge, and maintaining the reality of 
universals, for example16—and not to be part of the Jamesian and Deweyan revolution to 
which he sees himself belonging (e.g., Hookway 1985). 
In his political views, Rorty similarly accepts the historicist criticism that there is 
no one right answer to moral questions, or a vantage point or understanding of the self 
that can exist outside of a historical context (Rorty 1990/2011, p. 382). He follows 
Dewey in eschewing the need to justify liberal democracy, and claims that John Rawls 
shows us that this is possible—“shows us how liberal democracy can get along without 
                                                
16 See, e.g., Diggins 1994, p. 11–12.  
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philosophical presuppositions” (ibid., p. 384). There is no need to provide justification for 
liberal democracy because we are products of the Enlightenment and thus already 
understand justice to be the “first virtue” (ibid., p. 386). Rorty explains that by giving up 
the goal of providing philosophical foundations for our politics and moral lives, Dewey’s 
approach to politics leaves us with more hope than does Heidegger’s (ibid., p. 394; 
1979/1982, p. 161).  
The role Rorty sees for political philosophy is not to justify democracy, but rather 
to provide it a “philosophical articulation”: the political philosopher “[puts] politics first 
and [tailors] a philosophy to suit” (Rorty 1990/2011, p. 384). To this end, Rorty sees in 
the communitarian thought of those like Charles Taylor a conception of the self—as 
constituted by the community—that “comport[s] well” with the liberal democratic order 
(ibid.). Whereas these communitarians think that liberal democracy needs to be justified 
by such a doctrine of the self, Rorty simply considers the conception they provide to be 
more useful than is that of the Enlightenment’s ahistorical conception (ibid.). While 
acknowledging his “philosophical superficiality and light-mindedness” on these matters, 
Rorty explains it is in the service to the moral goal of making the “world’s inhabitants 
more pragmatic, more tolerant, more liberal, more receptive to the appeal of instrumental 
rationality” (ibid., p. 393–394). Like Dewey, Rorty also puts politics ahead of 
philosophy, and forthrightly acknowledges what this means: “When the two come into 
conflict, democracy takes precedence over philosophy” (ibid., p. 392). It is the American 
way for theory to serve practice; our form of liberalism, moreover, is an experiment, and 
even if it fails, its memory will be worth having (ibid., p. 394–395). 
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Within this framework, Rorty explains that we, with Rawls, can dismiss as “mad” 
the opinions of those who do not accept the premises of the liberal political order (ibid., 
p. 389). This is not because the fanatic interferes with the search for truth, but because he 
threatens the freedom of others (ibid., p. 386–387). Of course, this is not “mad” in any 
objective sense, for such a vantage point is not possible—our own moral intuitions have 
been formed in our own particular historical community and context (ibid., p. 391). 
Rather, if there is a fanatic who would prefer to disrupt the liberal political order rather 
than reap its benefits, we recognize that his position is not our position, and thus that we 
do not have to take his position seriously (ibid.). It could also be the case, Rorty thinks, 
that someone with Nietzsche’s criticism of liberalism might nonetheless seek to follow 
the rules of the liberal society because he sees value in its protection of political freedom 
(ibid., p. 393). This is, Rorty explains, Dewey’s stance toward democracy (ibid., p. 394).  
With regard to his political theory, Rorty is circular in his argument, and seems to 
be both aware of this and unapologetic about it. In regard to both his epistemology and 
his political thought, there are elements of pragmatism evident in his thought: his 
understanding people’s beliefs as originating in their social context; related to this, his 
naturalistic understanding of the development of thought; his speaking of experiments 
and judging theory by its practical upshot. His eschewal of foundational questions is 
Deweyan, as is his attachment to the democratic political order for the sake of justice. 
Unlike Dewey, he does not tout the democratic political order because of its superiority 
as a method for decision making; he is both more modest and honest than is Dewey in 
this regard, explaining that his attachment is due to the fact that constitutional democracy 
is best aligned with his sense of justice, in that it seeks to protect political freedom. In the 
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ways in which Rorty follows Dewey he diverges from Peirce. Whereas Peirce understood 
that we develop our understanding of the world around us in a social context, influenced 
by the language and ideas of those around us, he also thought the role of philosophy was 
not simply to justify such ideas, but rather to purify them. Peirce touted the method of 
science because it—and it alone among the methods of settling doubt that have arisen—is 
able to purify our thought of that which is accidental to it, and home in on that which is 
not arbitrary, in other words, that which is true in it. His method of settling doubt fit into 
the scholastic realism he was trying to recover in the post-Kantian age. He understood 
that this recovery depended on metaphysical grounding as well as a logical doctrine. 
Rorty, by contrast, neither thinks that there is an objective reality to uncover, nor that 
metaphysical concerns are worth philosophers’ time anymore. 
Hilary Putnam agrees with Rorty that seeking foundations for knowledge is futile; 
he accepts this as a “fact of life” (Putnam 1992/2011, p. 321). He explains that he agrees 
with Rorty that metaphysical doctrines of realism are characterized by “philosophical 
fantasy” (ibid., p. 327). “Realism is an impossible attempt to view the world from 
Nowhere” (ibid., p. 329). We learn that Putnam means by this that conceiving any reality, 
such as that of a tree, occurs within a conceptual framework, including one’s language 
(ibid., p. 328–329). Putnam explains that he and Rorty disagree in their response to this 
acknowledgment. Putnam does not agree with Rorty that metaphysical failure means the 
failure of our culture and the need to alter ordinary ways of speaking and thinking; 
Putnam sounds like James when he explains that “ways of talking and thinking which 
have practical and spiritual weight” should not simply be abandoned (ibid., p. 322). In 
other words, usefulness replaces firm foundations for Putnam. Philosophy can aid culture 
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by illuminating illusions and judging the relative strengths of different ways of thinking 
(ibid., p. 322–323).  
While rejecting both “Realism” and “Relativism” that seek a vantage point outside 
of language and context, Putnam supports a small “r” “realism” (ibid., p. 327–329). This 
realism acknowledges that there can be standards and better and worse ways of thinking 
and justification that are independent of what any majority at any particular time may 
believe, but that are not independent of the norms and standards that have evolved in the 
history of a community (ibid., p. 323). These standards and norms can, moreover, be 
reformed—though they remain subject to being judged by a community’s “picture of the 
world” (ibid., p. 324–325, 327). By identifying independent standards in this way, 
Putnam is attempting to avoid the relativism of the historicist that accepts whatever 
standards and practices take hold; as well as Rorty’s similar position that deems 
warranted whatever best helps a community cope (ibid., p. 324–326).  
In his attempt to identify a standard for truth independent of what any particular 
group thinks at any particular time while nonetheless recognizing the historical nature of 
knowledge, Putnam seems to be invoking features of Peirce’s formulation of truth. He 
indeed thinks his position is aligned with that of Peirce (ibid., p. 323). We will see, 
however, that Peirce did not think that truth was culturally or communally determined or 
specific, as Putnam here indicates. Truth, for Peirce, is dependent only on the human 
mind in its experience of the world. 
Putnam admires Dewey’s attempts to both “produce a rationale for democratic 
institutions” as well as a “standpoint from which to criticize the failures of those 
institutions” (Putnam 1990/2011, p. 333). To—with Rorty—not attempt to justify liberal 
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democracy, to not think that liberal democracy is superior to non-liberal forms of 
government, is to be a relativist (ibid., p. 333–334). It is moreover paternalistic to not 
inform oppressed people of alternative ways of life; it is, Putnam cites Peirce in 
explaining, to “‘block the path of inquiry’” (ibid., p. 334–335). Putnam views Dewey’s 
democratic theory as superior to those of contemporary continental thinkers who look to 
pragmatism in their political theory, like Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, because 
whereas the continental thinkers look to pragmatism to shape their transcendental 
theories justifying democracy, Dewey’s democratic theory rests ultimately on empirical 
grounds:  
For Dewey, the justification of democracy rests at every point on arguments which 
are not at all transcendental, but which represent the fruit of our collective 
experience (ibid., p. 343). 
Putnam moreover admires Dewey for being an admitted democrat while not being 
partisan or an apologist: “his reflection on democracy never degenerates into mere 
propaganda for the democratic status quo” (ibid., p. 348).  
Whereas Putnam has general praise for Dewey’s democratic theory, he 
acknowledges problems with Dewey’s moral theory, which advocates using “intelligently 
guided experimentation in solving ethical problems” (ibid.) “Like all consequentialists,” 
Putnam explains, “Dewey has trouble doing justice to considerations of what is right” 
(ibid.). He identifies instead with James’s views on morality (ibid., p. 344–345).  
Though he acknowledges that Peirce eventually “repudiated both the label 
‘pragmatism’ and much that William James and Dewey associated with that word,” 
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Putnam finds helpful insights in Peirce’s famous 1877 and 1878 essays (ibid., p. 336). 
Putnam extols Peirce’s formulation of the scientific method:  
Testing one’s ideas in practice, and maintaining an attitude of fallibilism toward 
them. . . . More than any scientific philosopher of his time, Peirce stressed that 
scientific method is not just a matter of experimentation, but experimentation and 
testing remain crucial in the formation of rational beliefs about matters of fact. 
(ibid., p. 337) 
Putnam explains that “Peirce’s sense of fallibilism” requires that “one see 
experimentation, in the widest sense of that term, as the decisive element in rational 
paradigm change” (ibid.). Putnam also seems to agree with Peirce’s efforts to do away 
with sham doubts (ibid., p. 338). Putnam agrees with Dewey that democracy is the 
application of the scientific method to the political and social realm, utilizing the 
viewpoints and capacities of the citizens of a community (ibid.). He further admires 
Dewey’s insistence that we do not need a theory to prove everything—for example, that 
there indeed exist solutions that are better or worse than others (ibid., p. 338–339).  
By following Dewey and eagerly applying Peircean insights to the practical realm, 
Putnam falls into the same problem as does Dewey—about which Peirce warned—that 
scientific inquiry must take into consideration moral and political concerns:  
The decision that, for weighty moral reasons, we are better off not knowing certain 
things is at time perfectly justified. Indeed, someone who thought that we had an 
obligation to discover the most effective ways to torture people and a further 
obligation to publicize that knowledge would be a monster. (ibid., p. 341–342) 
It is on this ground that he criticizes Habermas’s attempt to provide an epistemological 
foundation for democracy based on the notion of a community of inquirers:  
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The problem with . . . Habermas[’s argument] . . . is that what is required for the 
optimal pursuit of truth may not be what is required for human flourishing or even 
for human survival. (ibid.) 
He similarly points out the objection I will make in the next section with regard to the 
efforts of those who want to use pragmatism to ground democratic theory, that there are 
plenty of people who will not be philosophical inquirers (as Peirce readily 
acknowledges): “Avoiding ‘pragmatic self-contradiction’ in this highly sophisticated 
sense can hardly be the supreme maxim governing human life!” (ibid., p. 342). In this 
discussion Putnam himself tries to draw a line of distinction between pure theoretical 
inquiry and inquiry into practical uses:  
I recognize that pursuing pure physics will undoubtedly lead to discoveries that can 
be used to make weapons. But the fact remains that there is a difference between 
trying to discover fundamental laws of nature and trying to discover specific 
engineering applications. (ibid., p. 341) 
In other words, like Rorty, he explicitly acknowledges what appears to be only implicit in 
Dewey’s thought on democracy: that in the practical realm, the good of the community 
must trump pure inquiry. Putnam is willing, then, to “block the path of inquiry” in certain 
cases. Given his acknowledgment that truth and what is good for society at times conflict, 
it is curious that Putnam does not take seriously Peirce’s concerns about not appropriately 
separating theory and practice; indeed, he dismisses these views as simply indicative of 
Peirce’s conservatism (Putnam 2013). 
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III. Peirce and Democratic Theory 
 For the second half of the twentieth century, pragmatism was chiefly associated 
with the Deweyan and Rortian variant of pragmatism. Under such leadership, pragmatism 
in the political realm came to mean a “radical democratic” politics17; the use of the 
scientific method with regard to social and political matters18; that there was nothing 
beyond the meaning humans give to the world19; that philosophy should focus on 
practical problems and stop searching for theoretical foundations20; and the two charges, 
in opposition with one another, that pragmatism is synonymous with progressive 
politics21 or that it acquiesces to “dominant social and cultural forces.”22 
There has been renewed interest in Peirce of late. This seems to be due to much that 
is attractive about him: he recognizes the fallibalistic nature of our knowledge, but tries to 
fight off extreme skepticism by articulating how truth could still be understood.23 In 
practical matters, at a time when the West is increasingly skeptical of—or unsure of how 
to defend—its own values or principles, scholars have turned to Peirce to articulate a 
defensible theory of ethics and political arrangement; most prominent among such 
scholars is Jurgen Habermas. In this section, we will look at three scholars’ recent turns 
to Peirce: those of Habermas, Cheryl Misak, and Robert B. Talisse. Habermas and Misak 
                                                
17 See, for example, Bernstein (1992); Knight and Johnson (1996); MacGilvray (2000).  
18 See, for example, Diggins (1994); Kaufman-Osborn (1992); MacGilvray (2000).  
19 C. Anderson (1990), p. 183; See, for example, Kaufman-Osborn (1992).  
20 MacGilvray (2000), p. 481.  
21 See, for example, Westbrook (1991); West (1989). 
22 MacGilvray (2000), p. 481–482; see, for example, Mumford (1926).  
23 In Hilary Putnam’s words: “that one can be both fallibalistic and antiskeptical is perhaps the 
unique insight of American pragmatism” (Putnam 1994, p. 152).  
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seek to use Peirce to ground a theory of ethics. Talisse takes this one step further and 
attempts to use Peircean thought to provide the grounds for a post-liberal democratic 
politics. In addition to these three efforts, we will look at another type of practical appeal 
to pragmatism in the political realm by Charles W. Anderson, who uses pragmatism as a 
political method to supplement liberalism. This section will examine each of these 
positions; in this examination, mention will be made about where my interpretation 
agrees with or disagrees with these scholars’ uses of Peirce. A fuller account of my 
interpretation will occur throughout the chapters of this dissertation; with regard to 
practical matters, especially in chapters 4 and 5. In this examination, we will proceed 
from the most overtly political invocation of Peirce, and thus start with Talisse.24 
 Talisse uses Peirce’s pragmatism as guidance in formulating a post-liberal theory 
of democracy. Talisse sees validity in the communitarian and civic republican criticisms 
of liberalism, though he finds their proposed solutions inadequate. He agrees with such 
critics that because of modern liberal democracy’s neutrality with regard to values, its 
rights and institutions that prioritize the individual over the community are not robust 
enough to provide meaning for political life; what results is weak communities, alienated 
individuals, and disengaged citizens (Talisse 2005, p. 2–7). Critics like Michael Sandel 
recommend that a democracy needs to “promote a particular moral conception”; cultivate 
civic virtue in its citizens; and “actively engage in building and sustaining proper 
communities,” which entails protecting “communities and their traditions” (Talisse 2005, 
                                                
24 Other recent examples of efforts to use pragmatism to provide foundations for participatory 
democracy include Kadlec (2007); MacGilvray (2000); MacGilvray (2004); and Talisse (2008). 
For a review of some of these efforts, see Festenstein (2010).  
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p. 7). While sympathetic to the communitarian criticism, Talisse also agrees with liberal 
critics who see in the communitarian recommendations reasons to be concerned that 
individual rights would not be protected in such a political order (ibid.).  
Liberal democracy is further suffering, Talisse argues, from confusion as to the 
nature of its rights and at what they aim. This confusion is particularly poignant when a 
tension within liberalism is recognized: on the one hand, liberalism prides itself on its 
neutrality that accommodates a pluralistic society; but on the other hand, it thinks it is 
superior to other forms of government, which is not in fact a neutral position and thus 
appears to conflict with the “social pluralism” of today (Talisse 2005, p. 8–9). Thus a 
conflict arises. To bypass this tension, what is needed is an account of democracy that 
can argue for its superiority as compared with other forms of government in a way that 
acknowledges, rather than conflicts with, its accommodation of pluralism (ibid., p. 9). 
Among other things, this account will provide a clear understanding of the nature and 
purpose of democratic rights.  
Talisse thus sets out to formulate a “fully deliberativist theory” of democracy that 
avoids the pitfalls of liberalism while holding on to key features of liberal rights and 
institutions (ibid., p. 10; p. 120). It similarly attempts to avoid the problems of 
communitarianism and accommodate pluralistic notions of the good, while being able to 
articulate why it is superior to other forms of government. Talisse’s deliberativist theory 
accomplishes this, he explains, by “insisting that the formative role of the state is 
epistemological and not moral” (ibid., p. 10). This means the state makes epistemological 
claims on its citizens—claims about the nature of knowledge and argument—and not 
moral claims. Talisse looks to Peirce for guidance on this deliberativist theory. In 
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Peirce’s thought, Talisse sees a “direct connection between proper inquiry and 
democratic politics” (ibid., p. 11).25 Specifically, he is attracted to the presentation of 
inquiry and belief in Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief,” and attempts to construct a 
political theory that builds off of it.  
Talisse reads “Fixation” to say that to hold a belief means one is open to justifying 
and defending that belief based on reason and argument (Talisse 2012, p. 118–119). By 
holding a belief, one is thus implicitly attached to reasonable public discourse (Talisse 
2005, p. 103; Talisse 2012, p. 119–120). Based on this understanding, Talisse argues that 
a democracy with liberal institutions and rights—a constitution that guarantees everyone 
is equal under the law, enables political participation, guarantees of rights of speech, 
assembly, and free press—best accommodates the notion that individuals are holders of 
belief, as well as promotes a robust public discourse in which those beliefs can be argued 
for and refined (Talisse 2005, p. 108; Talisse 2012, p. 120). Such a deliberative 
democracy will best be equipped to foster a public discourse that can utilize citizens’ 
myriad beliefs and arguments to come up with solutions to political problems (Talisse 
2005, p. 107). Indeed, cultivating its citizens’ deliberative faculties will be what the state 
understands as its primary function: “I contend that the state’s formative role is that of 
enabling and cultivating the intellectual habits requisite to competent deliberation” 
(Talisse 2005, p. 10). In addition to liberal institutions and the guarantee of liberal rights, 
                                                
25 Talisse makes clear in the earlier of the two books reviewed here that his proposal is 
inspired by Peircean pragmatism, but that his work in no way intends to be exegetical of Peirce’s 
thought or simply a restatement of anyone’s position (Talisse 2005, p. 11). In the later of the two 
books, Talisse goes so far as to say that he does not care if his understanding of Peirce is indeed 
accurate; if Peirce can not be read to support his deliberative pragmatist democracy, then that 
speaks poorly for Peirce (Talisse 2012, p. 118).  
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a public education and minimal welfare guarantee are similarly necessary to this end 
(Talisse 2005, p. 108; Talisse 2012, p. 120). 
Such a democracy will not understand itself to be neutral with regard to values. It 
will, instead, require that its citizens exhibit the virtues of public deliberation in order to 
be deliberating members (Talisse 2005, p. 111–113). While politically rich, these virtues 
are epistemologically neutral as they make no claims as to what is to be believed, only 
about what it means to have a belief (Talisse 2005, p. 111, 120; Talisse 2012, p. 120). It 
is in this way that Talisse’s pragmatist deliberativism hopes to navigate around the 
deficiencies plaguing both liberalism and the anti-liberal communitarianism (Talisse 
2005, p. 120). This theory of government offers individual protection against the 
majority, while at the same time recognizing that individuals are not isolated creatures 
but rather “sharers in a common socio-political world and the joint inheritors of political 
institutions, historical traditions, ideas, principles, conflicts, and problems” (Talisse 2005, 
p. 120). An added virtue of this political model is that the nature of political rights will be 
clearer than it is in the liberal model:  
Individual rights are instruments to political wisdom, tools for crafting a “republic 
of reasons,” not endowments or possessions granted from unknown or other 
worldly sources. (Talisse 2005, p. 121) 
Rights, in other words, will be understood as tools that help facilitate discourse and 
deliberation.  
Peirce’s pragmatism offers a better model upon which to base a deliberative 
political theory for a pluralistic society than does Deweyan democracy because the latter 
is “too philosophically committed” to be able to sufficiently “accommodate the fact of 
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reasonable pluralism” (Talisse 2012, p. 109–110). By “reasonable pluralism,” he means 
of a type that John Rawls observed a constitutional liberal democracy gives rise to (ibid., 
p. 113). Talisse notes some key features of Deweyan democracy: a democracy’s desire 
for its citizens to flourish; to be democratic as a way of life, not simply politically; to be 
highly engaged citizens who argue with and are persuaded by reason (ibid., p. 111–112). 
As I argue in chapter 5, the way of life Deweyan democracy aims to promote is itself 
determined non-democratically; Talisse puts it thus, “the democratic way of life is 
normatively prior to political democracy” (ibid., p. 113). The problem is, as Rawls points 
out, a political system that has as its premise “the truth of any comprehensive doctrine” is 
going to be oppressive in a pluralistic society; “it is oppressive because it would allow the 
coercion of citizens in the service of a comprehensive ideal that they could reasonably 
reject” (ibid., p. 114). It is for this reason that Deweyan democracy fails (ibid.).  
The Peircean epistemology at the heart of Talisse’s social epistemic liberalism, in 
contrast, makes only limited claims, and the claims it does make simply concern our 
nature as believing inquirers:  
It sees our cognitive lives in terms of a continuing struggle to arrive at beliefs that 
can survive the trial of ongoing experience. Moreover, it locates the motivation to 
inquire within the very phenomenon of belief. . . . Inquiry is . . . continuing, 
piecemeal, and fallible . . . [and] local.” (ibid., p. 122) 
Peircean epistemology, in other words, makes no moral claims about what a citizen is, 
and thus can accommodate a reasonable pluralism that Deweyan democracy cannot.  
 An analysis of Talisse’s arguments ought to begin by noting that he seems to be 
simply begging the question in favor of a liberal-flavored democracy. He more or less 
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acknowledges as much when he says that he seeks to keep liberal democratic institutions 
and rights while coming up with a new justificatory theory: 
We must disentangle liberalism as a series of political commitments from the 
various liberal theories that have been proposed as philosophical articulations and 
defenses of liberalism. Many of the political commitments of liberalism will be 
retained in some form or another, while liberal theory will be criticized and 
rejected. (Talisse 2005, p. 8) 
Aside from the dubiousness of this tactic in the abstract, Talisse’s argument proceeds 
along lines that raise doubt as to whether he is in fact able to accommodate the pluralism 
that is his stated goal. Talisse claims that his political arrangement assumes no 
metaphysical or moral truth, but only a nature of belief to which all believers implicitly 
assent (Talisse 2005, p. 106, 111; Talisse 2012, p. 120).  
If being a believer commits one to aspiring to truth, and if one aspires to truth by 
responding to reasons, then responsible believing calls us to the social enterprise of 
examining, exchanging, and challenging reasons. Hence one can satisfy one’s 
commitments qua believer only within a political context in which it is possible to 
inquire. (Talisse 2012, p. 120) 
Similarly: 
Democratic institutions and norms are modeled strictly in terms of a set of 
epistemic commitments that are internal to belief. . . . No matter what you believe 
about the good life, the nature of the self, or the purpose of human existence, you 
take yourself to believe those things responsibly; thus, you have a reason to endorse 
a democratic political order of the sort described above. The epistemic 
commitments that are internal to belief are sufficient. No moral doctrine is 
presupposed. (ibid.) 
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However, it seems very clear from observing the world that plenty of people hold 
convictions that they in no way feel the need to justify to others. “Reasons” and 
“argument” are of the realm of philosophy, and are irrelevant to the devoutly religious. In 
“Fixation,” Peirce himself noted that “the method of authority will always govern the 
mass of mankind” (1877/1992 p. 121).26 Talisse’s explanation that  
a plausible appeal to pluralism must admit to some constraints upon the kinds of 
moral, philosophical, and religious views that a democratic polity must 
accommodate and accordingly must allow for some appeal to. (Talisse 2005, p. 
116) 
merely highlights the problem rather than addressing it. 
In addition, Talisse entirely misreads Peirce and Peircean pragmatism. This is 
related to the above point; it seems Talisse strongly wants to argue for a certain way of 
viewing politics, so much so that he is not going to let something like the actual words in 
the text get in the way. Talisse reads Peirce as supporting the application of the scientific 
method in politics and to everyday affairs. He sees in Peirce’s examination about 
philosophic method a democratic understanding of what men are and how they should 
act. Moreover, he completely ignores Peirce’s calls for separating theory and practice, 
and in no way seeks to find any modest yet sound understanding in Peirce for the 
connection between philosophy and practice. This dissertation aims to provide a fuller 
                                                
26 Talisse attempts to acknowledge Peirce’s warning: “Peirce noted that when confronted with 
the inadequacy of the grounds of their beliefs, people often remain tenacious and refuse to revise 
their beliefs” (Talisse 2005, p. 109); yet he seems to read Peirce as meaning this is a problem that 
can be fixed rather than an intractable fact about man’s social condition, which, as I argue in 
chapter 2, is Peirce’s actual position.  
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analysis of Peirce’s actual positions with regard to philosophy and its connection to 
practical and political things.  
What Talisse in fact appears to argue for is a Deweyan-lite democracy—or, said in 
another way, he ultimately seems to want a Deweyan democracy that allows for greater 
pluralism. Like Dewey, Talisse thinks democracies ought to be tasked with cultivating 
the deliberative faculties of its citizens. Talisse similarly also views the political realm as 
analogous to the scientific and democracy as a tool for decision making, maintaining that 
political decisions will best be reached when citizens deliberate together. Talisse in facts 
admits that his political theory is after a progressive democratic politics like that of 
Dewey:  
When liberal theory is rejected but the key features of liberalism retained, the result 
is a theory that is “liberal” in the sense that was popular in the middle of the 
twentieth century and represented by figures such as Bertrand Russell, Morris 
Cohen, and John Dewey. A liberal in this sense is a political progressive who is 
committed to social democracy, self-realization, some mode of economic 
redistribution, and the free exercise of human intelligence in confronting social 
problems. (Talisse 2005, p. 8) 
Similarly: 
The social epistemic view I have sketched enables us to advocate more effectively 
on behalf of the progressive and radically democratic measure that pragmatists like 
Dewey have traditionally supported. (Talisse 2012, p. 125) 
 
Where Talisse differs from Dewey is in his desire to accommodate pluralistic conceptions 
of the good—including communities that are undemocratic—rather than simply one 
conception to which all citizens ought to conform. Moreover, whereas Dewey ultimately 
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supported democracy because he saw it as the only way that men could live together 
peacefully, matters of peace and security do not appear to concern Talisse; rather, Talisse 
is primarily interested in providing a theory for democracy that does justice to man’s 
nature as an inquiring believer. Talisse’s preference for progressive democratic politics 
seems to be at the root of the main problems identified here: his misreading of Peirce, as 
well as his attempt to accommodate pluralistic understandings of the good that can not in 
fact accommodate those who do not already accept philosophical premises. His 
preference, in other words, seems to have blinded him to the problems of his system—
and thus, moreover, to a fuller understanding of politics and its limits.27 
 Cheryl Misak looks to Peirce’s pragmatism to provide a framework for 
formulating a foundationless yet objective ethical and political theory. In doing so, she is 
more modest than is Talisse, both in her claims about Peirce as well as in her goals in 
general—a modesty that befits a Peircean. The problem Misak sees in the realm of 
political and moral theory is that it is assumed that there are no objective foundations 
upon which a view of ethics can be based that all could agree to:  
It is almost a philosophical commonplace these days to reject the idea that we 
might find a foundation for our principles of right belief and of right action in some 
infallible source—from God, from some special faculty of intuition, or from what 
is given to us with certainty by experience. (Misak 2000, p. 2) 
                                                
27 In regards to Talisse’s theoretical project in general and his taking issue with liberalism’s 
supposed neutrality: I agree with J. Judd Owen who recommends that those interested in 
understanding the commitments of liberalism look to the philosophy of John Locke (Owen 2001, 
p. 168-169). Lockean liberalism is in fact not neutral and has only modest, but attainable and 
impressive, aims with regard to the ends of the state and the toleration of minorities within it. 
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Rorty, for one, has done much to show that a foundationalist justification “cannot be had” 
(ibid., p. 5). What is problematic about Rorty’s views is that, in his rejection of “the 
dichotomy between an utterly secure grounding and an arbitrary grounding,” he does not 
provide us with a “positive view,” that is able to do justice to the way we think about 
matters of morality (ibid., p. 2).  
Our experience of morality suggests we implicitly assume there is such a thing as 
objectively right or wrong action or beliefs; morality is more than mere taste and more 
than merely subjective or relative. We think seriously about the reasons for our moral 
convictions and think it is possible to convince others of our moral positions (ibid., p. 3). 
We do not, moreover, think it would be sufficient if someone simply pretended to agree 
with our moral arguments; rather, we want to be able to genuinely convince others of our 
position (ibid.). We also acknowledge a difference between what we think is true and 
what is actually true—we do not hold what we think to be the case to be true simply by 
that fact (ibid.). In other words, our experience of morality demands to be taken more 
seriously than Rorty’s answer—that we “abandon the notions of truth and objectivity and 
somehow find it good enough to say that one belief happens to be best for us and an 
incompatible belief happens to be best for others” (ibid., p. 6)—can.  
The fact that our moral judgments come under such internal discipline is a mark of 
their objectivity. The above phenomena are indications that moral inquiry aims at 
truth. They are indications that the relativist or non-cognitivist thought is not the 
thought which should stand at the start of our moral theory. (ibid., p. 3) 
It is up to the political and moral theorist, Misak explains, to be able to articulate how we 
can still think of our morality as objective—in a manner, in other words, that fits with our 
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experience of morality—though we might abandon the hope to uncover foundations to 
undergird that morality (ibid., p. 2–3).  
 Misak looks to Peirce’s epistemology to provide guidance on how to formulate 
such a view of morality. She finds several features of Peirce’s pragmatism attractive, and 
to be a more promising framework than those provided by other pragmatists like James or 
Rorty (Misak 2000, p. 49): These principles include Peirce’s understanding that truth is 
that which has held up to inquiry from all sorts of angles, and which can not be improved 
upon by further inquiry (ibid.; Misak 2004b, p. 150); his fallibalism, which yields a 
healthy modesty with regard to one’s claims about truth (Misak 2004b, p. 152–153); and 
Peirce’s recognition that we come to inquiry with a “body of background beliefs” that we 
hold to be true until experience brings them into doubt (ibid., p. 153). The scientific 
method is Peirce’s preferred method for settling doubt because it best aims at truth—at 
those stable beliefs that will not be upset by future inquiry. By its nature, the scientific 
method also accommodates fallibalism as well as the piecemeal fashion in which truth is 
uncovered when beliefs are held to be true until they are unsettled by doubt (ibid., p. 
153–154). Misak explains, moreover, that as opposed to the logical positivists, Peirce 
also recognizes that truth can concern not only matters of outward experience, but also of 
inner experience; Peirce’s pragmatism is thus especially fit to be a guide for objective 
truth in moral matters, and thus an aid in combating moral relativism (Misak 2000, p. 1–
2; Misak 2004b, p. 154–158). 
What follows from Peirce’s pragmatism is the understanding that beliefs must 
continue to be “responsive to experience and to reasons” (Misak 2000, p. 102). Similarly, 
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having a belief means that one is “committed to giving reasons for that belief” (ibid.). 
This was, of course, Talisse’s take-away regarding Peirce’s philosophy, and where he 
sees his views converging with Misak’s (Talisse 2005, p. 103–107).28 Misak argues that a 
“methodological principle” comes out of Peirce’s notion of truth being that which holds 
up to all further inquiry: “the experience of others must be taken seriously” (Misak 2000, 
p. 6). The consequence of this principle in the “moral and political realm” is that 
everyone ought to be “given the chance to contribute to debate,” in other words, “it 
requires a democracy in inquiry” (ibid.). One will not be able to arrive at true beliefs if 
one categorically dismisses the beliefs of others based on their “gender, skin color, or 
sexual orientation” (ibid., p. 104). Expansive inclusion in political discourse is thus 
necessary if we want our political and moral decision making to aim at truth. Misak 
acknowledges that her pragmatist political theory relies on the assumption that we aim at 
truth in the political and moral arenas, but explains that this assumption is justified 
because “we are . . . hard pressed to find opponents in our moral and political lives who 
do not assert or believe or claim that their position is true, or best, or that which ought to 
be enforced” (ibid., p. 105). 
Misak’s methodological principle is intended as a guiding principle for political 
discourse; it in no way intends to provide an answer for all political and moral questions 
(ibid., p. 6–7). It will, moreover, not decide that the results of political discourse are true, 
                                                
28 As with Talisse, Misak here seems to be ultimately begging the question of what a 
legitimate belief is based on the terms of philosophy; there are plenty of people who would be 
happy to convince others of their position by the sword rather than by persuasive argument.  
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rather only that they are legitimate (ibid., p. 7). Based on the methodological principle, 
Misak offers some suggestions that seek to promote the aim of political inclusion.  
Deliberation must be encouraged and political institutions and mechanisms for 
decision-making must be as inclusive as is reasonably possible. The pragmatist 
voices the requirement that we try . . . to include rather than exclude others. This 
entails listening carefully to the marginalized in society. (ibid., p. 127) 
Misak commends, for example, Nelson Mandela’s inclusion of the “right wing Afrikaner 
nationalist group,” Freedom Front, “in his negotiations for the new structure of the 
country” (ibid., p. 127). Given that the pragmatist recognizes his own fallibility, he seeks 
to let each decide how best to conduct his or her private life:  
The pragmatist does not fail to see that lives tend to go better when governed from 
the inside—from the values and beliefs of the individual who is living that life. And 
the pragmatist does not fail to see that the good cannot be imposed on people, that 
discovering the good for oneself is vital to a good life. (ibid., p. 114–115)  
Thus the pragmatist would argue against laws against homosexuality because “they are 
oppressive and . . . claim a harm to individuals and to society where there is no harm” 
(ibid., p. 115). At the same time, Misak makes clear that her suggestions are merely 
suggestions, and are open to debate and revision (ibid., p. 7).  
Misak is clear throughout her examination that a true pragmatist must be modest in 
his claims (e.g., ibid., p. 155–156). A pragmatist in the political realm also must be 
careful to not beg the question in the favor of democracy. The democratic notion of the 
equality of all persons, for example, cannot simply be assumed (ibid., p. 7). With the 
limited claims that the epistemological principle will justify, a true Peircean will 
moreover recognize that there are different forms of “democratic political arrangements” 
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that are fit for different peoples, times, and places (ibid., p. 156). While Misak is more 
modest about what she thinks her political theory can justify than is Talisse, she similarly 
offers a political theory based on what the nature of belief is; a form of government that 
allows for inclusive debate is best because it is open to continuing examination and thus 
best aims at reaching those ideas that will withstand future inquiry. In other words, it best 
aims at the truth; and this consideration is what provides justification for a political order. 
An inclusive government will also have the benefit of likely moderating extreme 
positions by forcing their exponents to respond to the arguments of those on the other 
side (ibid., p. 127).  
In turning to Peirce, Misak is clear and open about the fact that there are aspects of 
Peirce’s thought that cut against her efforts—most especially his statements that 
theoretical inquiry and inquiry regarding vital matters ought to be kept separate, and his 
resulting conservatism (e.g., Misak 2000, p. 48; Misak 2004b, p. 159). She nonetheless 
argues that her use of his epistemology is justified and backs up her position with a 
thoughtful examination of a myriad of Peirce texts. Her desire to understand what Peirce 
really thinks as well as identify tension in his thought is admirable, as is her larger project 
of attempting to save morality from relativism. It seems to me she makes many 
persuasive arguments to defend her project. Nonetheless, by seeking to prove what she 
wants to in Peirce’s thought, she does not take seriously enough some of his key insights 
on the ways in which theoretical and practical things differ. 
How my interpretation of Peirce differs from Misak’s will be made clearer 
throughout this dissertation; for now, a few remarks will suffice. As is the case with my 
criticism of Talisse’s use of Peirce, in chapter 2 I will make clear that in “The Fixation of 
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Belief,” Peirce in no way advocates the scientific method be used by everyone, or that 
truth will best be arrived at the more individuals’ opinions are considered; in other words, 
including everybody in the “community of inquirers” would promise, in Peirce’s view, to 
obfuscate the search for truth rather than promote it. In chapter 3, I will make clear that 
pragmatism for Peirce is simply a logical maxim and not a metaphysical one. Among 
other reasons, this is important because Peirce did think that metaphysical foundations 
were important for knowledge to be possible, and moreover, that those foundations were 
separate from and not subject to his logical doctrine of pragmatism. In chapters 4 and 5, I 
examine Peirce’s call that theory and practice ought to be separate, with different virtues 
governing each realm. While Misak is probably ultimately justified by Peirce’s own 
thought, at least to some extent, in applying the pragmatic maxim to practical matters, she 
also loses an important part of his understanding of practical affairs by not taking more 
seriously his call for vital matters to be under the governance of instinct and tradition.  
Misak’s theory has an affinity with that of Jurgen Habermas (Misak 2000, p. 5). In 
Truth and Justification, Habermas claims to be a Kantian pragmatist (Habermas 2003, p. 
8). By this, he seems to mean that he largely adopts the epistemological framework of 
Charles S. Peirce—but one that takes into account the moral and legal norms of man’s 
lifeworld (ibid., p. 13–15).29 Habermas’s pragmatism recognizes the intersubjective 
nature of truth, as well as the capability for knowledge to grow and correct itself through 
                                                
29 To be sure, Habermas cites other philosophical influences in addition to Peirce, notably 
Wittgenstein and Husserl, as well as Kant, of course. The brief examination into Habermas’s 
thought here focuses on ways in which his thought is similar to Peirce’s, and ways in which it 
diverges from Peirce’s thought.  
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experience and conversation; Peirce’s semeiotics30 seems to have been a significant 
source of the former theory, and his writings on the nature of belief, doubt, and inquiry a 
significant source of the latter (e.g., ibid., p. 3, 26). As a Kantian pragmatist, Habermas 
applies Peirce’s detranscendentalized31 realism to the moral realm:  
Kantian pragmatism . . . relies on the transcendental fact that subjects capable of 
speech and action, who can be affected by reasons, can learn—and in the long run 
even “cannot not learn.” And they learn just as much in the moral-cognitive 
dimension of interacting with one another as they do in the cognitive dimension of 
interacting with the world. (ibid., p. 8) 
Moral claims that result from “these fallible learning processes” are to be understood to 
be, at most, “our insights,” dependent on “those ways of knowing that our sociocultural 
forms of life make available to us” (ibid., p. 9).  
Habermas uses an understanding of men as communicative beings to provide a 
framework that can legitimize a pluralistic democracy—in other words, to provide the 
sufficient reasons for citizens to “observe the democratic rules of the game,” and thereby 
                                                
30 A study of Peirce’s semeiotics is largely beyond the scope of this dissertation, though 
chapter 1 examines his early semiotic writings.  
31 It is detranscendentalized in that it recognizes that man’s cognitions result from his 
historical or evolutionary—and thus social—nature, and is one purified of a yearning to know the 
thing-in-itself. 
Empirical judgments are formed in learning processes and emerge from how problems are 
solved. It is therefore pointless to gauge the idea of the validity of judgments by the 
difference between reality and appearance, between what is “in itself” and what is given 
“for us”—as though knowledge of something that is presumed to be immediate had to be 
purified of any subjective contribution and intersubjective mediation. Rather, knowledge 
results from the cognitive function of these contributions and mediations. (Habermas 2003, 
p. 26–27) 
The “detranscendentalization” of “transcendental consciousness” means “the profane lifeworld 
[usurps] the transmundane place of the noumenal” (ibid., p. 17).  
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do justice to the “genuinely normative sense of the intuitive understanding of democracy” 
(Habermas 1996, p. 295–296). Habermas promotes a discourse theory that aims at 
justice—fair decision making—in a matter that can accommodate pluralistic conceptions 
of the good life (ibid., p. 314). His discourse theory replaces liberal rights and “the ethical 
substance of a specific community” with rules and procedures for enabling discourse 
aimed at promoting understanding; he thereby seeks to avoid the weaknesses of both 
Lockean liberalism and Rousseauan republicanism (ibid., p. 296–297). Among the 
consequences of his discourse theory is that some matters of citizens’ private lives will be 
open to public discussion and regulation, while it is at the same time recognized that an 
“intimate sphere must be protected from intrusive forces and the critical eyes of 
strangers” (ibid., p. 313).  
Like with Misak’s and Talisse’s recommendations, Habermas’s discourse theory 
seems fit for audiences already convinced of matters like egalitarianism, and that 
conflicts are best resolved through political channels rather than by violent means.  
Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class 
and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation 
can the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism fully develop. (ibid., p. 308) 
Indeed, he explains that it is the acceptance of the adjudication of disputes 
communicatively rather than by sheer force that might be the prime agreement that binds 
citizens in a secularized society.  
In a secularized society that has learned to deal with its complexity consciously and 
deliberately, the communicative mastery of . . . conflicts constitutes the sole source 
of solidarity among strangers—strangers who renounce violence and, in the 
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cooperative regulation of their common life, also concede one another the right to 
remain strangers. (ibid.) 
His theory seems fit for Western audiences, in other words, and to not be as 
accommodating of a real pluralism as it at first claims to be. The flip side of this coin is 
that his theory illustrates ways in which liberal democracies—or democracies that want in 
some way to protect liberal rights, or maintain liberal institutions—must be self-
consciously intolerant at times. This is a fact about liberalism that Locke acknowledges, 
though many twentieth century liberal thinkers do not seem to want to. 
 Unlike Misak and Talisse, Habermas is more modest in what he claims to be 
taking from Peirce. He self-consciously combines various aspects of the thought of 
several twentieth century thinkers, including Husserl. Indeed, his self-attributed title as a 
“Kantian pragmatist” seems apt. Whereas Peirce’s philosophy seems like an inverse of 
Kant’s, resulting in Peirce largely ignoring moral matters, Habermas utilizes Peirce’s 
epistemology in his focus on moral and political matters. 
Among recent scholarship that attempts to formulate a pragmatic political theory, at 
least one example applies pragmatism in a manner that is close, or closer, to my reading 
of Peirce. In Pragmatic Liberalism, Charles W. Anderson attempts to supplement liberal 
political theory with pragmatism, understood simply as a method of rationality; by itself, 
pragmatism has no “moral and political significance” (Anderson 1990, p. 2). Anderson 
appears to have a sound appreciation of Peirce’s pragmatism. He recognizes that Peirce, 
along with James and Dewey, was “grappling with the problem of truth” (ibid.). He 
explains that Peirce was both trying to defend reason—providing it with “sounder 
foundations by grounding it in the more commonplace processes of practical thought” 
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(ibid., p. 183–184)—while recognizing its limits (ibid., p. 185). He acknowledges, 
moreover, the important distinction that though Peirce mentions a community of 
inquirers, the real can never be understood as that which is agreed to by a group of men, 
but is rather “‘that whose characters are independent of what anyone may think of them’” 
(ibid.). 
Anderson’s use of pragmatism as a method of rationality fits well with Peirce’s 
understanding of it as a maxim, or tool, of logic. Anderson has a Peircean attitude in 
recognizing that we do not approach politics from a pre-political place, and moreover, 
that actual political dilemmas are not derived abstractly, but are those problems that arise 
in practice:  
We enter public life always in midstream, never at the beginning. We are seized 
with a particular project: the construction of a road, the location of a factory. (ibid., 
p. 5–6)  
Anderson also recognizes, like Peirce, that decisions in the political realm are not best 
governed by abstract theory, but rather require the practical judgment of statesmen—
judgment that takes into account the many factors that are important in a particular 
context, including the traditions and nature of a community:  
The art of judgment, of guiding the conduct of affairs in highly particular 
circumstances, is often said to depend on an experienced “feel” for the situation. 
(ibid., p. 6)  
Liberalism supplies us with principles; knowing when and how to apply those principles 
is an “act of judgment” (ibid., p. 9). Like Peirce, Anderson also explains that training is 
most needed when tradition and principle need to be applied to new circumstances:  
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Our public problems arise within a complex legacy of ideas and institutions, and 
the issues that call for deliberative action concern the fitting of that legacy to new 
contingencies and opportunities. (ibid., p. 5) 
Moreover, when it is necessary to derive political principles, it is best to look to 
experience to derive them, rather than to derive them in an a priori fashion and impose 
them on the political realm (ibid., p. 12–13).  
Anderson’s considerations seem to implicitly recognize Peirce’s insistence that 
theory and practice be separated and the conservatism that results. Anderson’s 
acknowledgment of the need for judgment and that particular circumstances need to be 
taken into account bespeak Peirce’s insight that decision making about vital matters is 
best guided by tradition, instinct, and the practical wisdom of the statesman. Anderson 
assumes principles of liberalism not, as with Talisse and Misak, based on epistemological 
grounds, but because this is the context in which we find ourselves (ibid., p. 186–189). 
While this historicist starting place seems at first problematic because it provides us with 
no overriding principle by which to order our concerns and inform our decisions, it does 
employ the Peircean understanding that a true ethics arises when our abstract ideals are 
tested in and influenced by our experience. It similarly recognizes that the matters of the 
political realm are not a science but an art, requiring myriad factors be taken into account 
and balanced based on the particular context (ibid., p. 180). Moreover, Anderson’s 
attempt to synthesize liberalism with pragmatism arguably fills in a gap in Peirce’s 
seemingly incomplete political thought, providing an abstract principle to guide Peirce’s 
conservatism; while a historicist could not say that this is the appropriate principle for all 
times and places, it is at least an appropriate principle to cite for our time and place. More 
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on how Anderson’s project fits in with Peirce’s thought will become clear in chapters 4 
and 5.  
It is important to point out that there are Deweyan aspects to Anderson’s project, 
most especially his viewing political matters as analogous to science and technology, and 
thus “subject to improvement through disciplined analysis” (ibid., p. 182). Anderson, in 
other words, adopts a Deweyan understanding of the political and social realm’s 
progressive potential:  
Pragmatic liberalism presupposes a progressively evolving social and political 
order, in which constant and universal values, of human freedom and the larger 
significance of the enterprise of reason, provide a consistent reference point for 
evaluation, interpretation, and action. . . . Liberalism, in any form, requires a 
commitment to an order that progressively refines a certain notion of human worth 
and excellence. (ibid., p. 186) 
Anderson identifies these progressive assumptions among the “idealist elements” of 
pragmatic thought (ibid., p. 185).  
While Peirce hopes for a progression in science and knowledge, in the union 
between nature and man’s mind,32 he holds out no hope for such improvement or 
progression in political matters. He certainly does not think that the mass of mankind will 
ever themselves approach the truth, or that political matters are at all analogous to 
scientific matters in terms of a progression toward greater truth. Peirce acknowledges that 
some decisions and judgments are better fits for certain situations, but not that we are, in 
these judgments, moving forward along any path of improvement. At most, Peirce 
recognizes that a true understanding of the whole will improve a man’s instincts. And, 
                                                
32 As Anderson correctly points out, C. Anderson 1990, p. 185. 
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moreover, that a man’s ideals will themselves be tempered, and in that sense improved, 
by his experiences in the world, so long as he is open to learning from those experiences. 
These matters will be further explored in the fourth and fifth chapters.  
Anderson’s synthesis of liberalism and pragmatism, as well as his incorporation of 
themes from both Peirce and Dewey, are well displayed in his concluding chapter on 
education—specifically the “political education that would be compatible with the basic 
presuppositions of pragmatism liberalism” (ibid., p. 196). In his interest in promoting a 
civic education, rather than an education that aims to cultivate critical thinking skills, 
Anderson’s interests are more like those of Dewey than they are like those of Peirce. 
However, his recommendations nonetheless reflect Peircean modesty, conservatism, and 
an appreciation of the artful judgment needed in practical decision making.  
Like Dewey, Anderson proposes an education not only for an elite, but rather for 
citizens simply, who “assume responsibility for deliberating and trying to resolve public 
issues” (ibid.). This is certainly understandable given that he is consciously operating 
within a liberal democratic system. Anderson recognizes a value in “interpret[ing] public 
issues from diverse points of view, from the perspectives of different representative 
persons” (ibid., p. 200). On the surface this sounds similar to the political views of 
Dewey, as well as Talisse and Misak. However, whereas Dewey and Talisse favor 
canvassing the many so as to reach the best policy decisions—for people best know what 
they need—Anderson’s recommendation sounds more similar to Peirce’s curricular 
recommendation for training men to think from different perspectives as part of their 
critical thinking development. Anderson’s recommendation is rooted not in the Deweyan 
point that individual men know what is best for them, but rather in the more Peircean 
 
 
64 
 
 
appreciation that a matter—in this case, a policy—is best understood if considered from 
the perspective of a diverse group of people (ibid.).  
Similarly like Peirce, Anderson tries to incorporate a conservative appreciation for 
existing traditions and institutions into his proposed education scheme, even though he 
recognizes that a critical examination might ultimately undermine or transform these 
existing institutions: 
Thorough understanding of the rationale of prevailing practice is a precondition for 
critical analysis. Granted, the fashionable pedagogy today is to encourage criticism 
before students have mastered the case for existing institutions and techniques, 
ideas and procedures. But this is putting the cart before the horse. For pragmatic 
liberalism, prevailing practice is the basing point for critical analysis. It is essential 
to understand why something was put there in the first place before one tries to 
change it or tear it down. (ibid., p. 197) 
Anderson suggests that institutions are best appreciated when examined from within the 
historical context in which they developed (ibid., p. 198–199). This suggestion is similar, 
in fact, to the suggestions I offer in chapter 5, which I argue are Peircean in nature and 
which aim to fill the gap left by Peirce’s own incomplete political thought. That said, in 
his suggestion, Anderson verges on running into the problem that Peirce was trying 
desperately to avoid in his neglect of including a civic component in his curricular 
recommendations: namely, of stifling free inquiry and thus critical and clear thinking.  
The dominant view [in political science today is] that, in the interest of neutrality, 
liberalism is to be construed only as an ideology, that the student, in the 
marketplace of ideas, once fully informed of the options . . . should be free to 
choose to be liberal, Marxist, Fascist, or whatever. Here, instead, we take liberalism 
to be the foundation of our system of political understanding. . . . Against the view 
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that the first function of political education is to cultivate critical reason, it is here 
understood that a thorough, constructive appreciation of the logic of liberalism 
should be demonstrated prior to induction into the systematic critique of it. (ibid., p. 
198) 
It is possible that Peirce’s move was justified when assuming the education only of a very 
elite few, whereas Anderson’s suggestion is more apt for the democratic masses. This 
issue will be taken up more extensively in chapter 5. 
IV. Peirce’s Epistemology 
Questions of epistemology—how do we know the things we know, what is the 
status of our knowledge—are arguably at the heart of all of Peirce’s philosophy; it is 
toward shedding light on these matters that his logic, theory of categories, work on 
statistics, and cosmology all aim (see, e.g., Hookway 1985, p. 2–3). Among scholars of 
Peirce, there has emerged a disagreement about how to understand Peirce’s 
epistemology. Some scholars understand him to be a realist who is interested in 
defending such a position amid post-Kantian skepticism, while others see him as an 
extreme skeptic of the Kuhnian variety, in line with Rorty’s variant of pragmatism. 
Below is a brief presentation of some of these different interpretations. As this 
dissertation’s chief concern is the political consequence of Peirce’s thought, we will not 
here be able to definitively treat the question of the ultimate status of knowledge for 
Peirce. The dissertation nonetheless hopes to shed some light on the debate, especially in 
its discussion of pragmatism in the first three chapters.  
John E. Smith (1978) understands Peirce as a realist seeking to explain the success 
of modern science. Peirce understands truth to conform with and be constrained by an 
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external reality (Smith 1978, p. 51–52). This is in contrast to Dewey’s “transform” theory 
of truth, which “rejects . . . antecedent reality” and instead  
emphasizes the problematic or indeterminate character of the situation wherein 
thought is operative and aims at transforming that situation into a settled or 
determinate affair. (ibid., p. 52)  
Smith explains that “the assumption” for Peirce is that  
“there is a true answer to whatever questions may be under discussion, which 
answer cannot be rendered false by anything that the disputants may say or think 
about it; and further, that the denial of that true answer is false.” (c.1901d/1998, CP 
8.126; quoted in Smith 1978, p. 53)  
Much of Peirce’s work aims to justify this assumption:  
[Peirce was] concerned to offer, in terms of his evolutionary cosmology, a theory of 
the nature of mind, matter and temporal pattern that would render intelligible the 
fact that man discovers some truth about the real through the light of reason. In 
other words, the successes of scientific inquiry are not left in their immediacy at the 
level of brute fact but must be understood as manifestations of patterns of 
development underlying the evolution of the entire universe. (Smith 1978, p. 55) 
Smith further notes that “reverberat[ing] throughout everything [Peirce] wrote” is the 
“firm conclusion” that “there is no escape from the criticism of ‘first principles’” (ibid., 
p. 127). This dissertation shares Smith’s view of Peirce as here presented, with the first 
three chapters aiming to defend and elaborate on points here brought up.  
Almeder (1975) and Hausman (1993) also understand Peirce to be an 
epistemological realist. Hookway (1985) acknowledges that Peirce’s pragmatism was 
intertwined with a realism view of the external world and external necessities: “Peirce 
took his pragmatism to be inextricably linked to his realism” (Hookway 1985, p. 244). 
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Peirce saw much evidence that there were “necessities governing things” (ibid., p. 243). 
Hookway explains that “what the pragmatist principle does is to articulate just how law 
mediates the succession of events that occurs” (ibid.). Peirce moreover thought that his 
“mathematical work . . . provided an adequate logical analysis of continuity” that could 
justify that generalizations apply to actual cases in addition to real cases (ibid., p. 244).  
Smith (1978) and Boler (2004) understand Peirce’s realism to be a form of 
“objective idealism” (Smith 1978, p. 18; Boler 2004, p. 76). Boler (2004) explains: “He 
seems to me all along to favor the broader sort of ‘objective idealism’ which argues not 
that the immediate object of knowledge is our own ideas but (roughly) that if knowledge 
is possible, the real as the object of knowledge must be idea-like” (Boler 2004, p. 76). 
Hookway (1985) explains that this is the “evident” understanding of Peirce’s position and 
explains that it is clear that Peirce is not a subjective idealist (Hookway 1985, p. 285–
286).  
He believes that we know about objects which are not just states of our own minds, 
and, through his theory of perception, holds that we are directly aware of external 
objects. Ordinary empirical objects are real, and their character is independent of 
the will or opinion of any agents or inquirers. (ibid., p. 285) 
However, Hookway also points out that Peirce’s ultimate understanding retains a 
Kantian, “transcendental idealist” flavor (ibid., p. 286–288), though Peirce’s metaphysics 
aimed to “assure us of a hoped-for attunement between our cognitive nature and reality” 
(ibid., p. 287).   
In contrast to Smith and Hookway, Sandra B. Rosenthal (1994) argues that Peirce 
accommodates a radical pluralism such that his thought is far more in line with that of 
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Thomas Kuhn than is ordinarily thought. She recognizes that the notion of an ultimate 
truth that inquirers will agree upon is “‘a regulative principle, an intellectual hope’” 
(Rosenthal 1994, p. 12; quoting Peirce 1887–1888/1992, p. 275). In interpreting Peirce’s 
intentions, she notes that he says he can not prove that this will indeed occur (ibid., p. 12; 
1896/1998, CP 3.432). From this she explains that it could well be the case that different 
paradigms and criteria for evaluating a theory could come about that jive with experience, 
and yet which are incommensurable with each other (ibid., p. 17). Rosenthal explains that 
as such, Peirce’s presentation of science accommodates a pluralism that is in line with 
Kuhn’s pluralism (ibid., p. 17–18). Rosenthal moreover argues that Peirce’s pluralism 
applies not only with regard to “divergent scientific worlds,” but also with regard to 
“divergent ways of life encompassing not just differing facts but differing goals, differing 
problems of importance, and differing criteria for resolving differences” (ibid.).  
In interpreting Peirce’s intentions with his regulative idea of a truth upon which all 
inquiry converses, Rosenthal does not sufficiently take into account that33 Peirce says that 
were there to be no truth upon which inquiry would converge, that this would lead to 
despair (1887–1888/1992, p. 275). It seems Rosenthal’s objective is to make Peirce more 
palatable to those persuaded by Kuhn’s thesis (ibid., p. 13). Rosenthal’s charge regarding 
Peirce is important and deserves a thoughtful and thorough response. Unfortunately, an 
adequate response to her with regard to the realism of Peirce’s philosophy of science is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. This dissertation aims, however, to at least address 
some of the themes crucial to her argument. A primary goal of the first three chapters is 
                                                
33 To be clear: Rosenthal does mention this (Rosenthal 1994, p. 12), but does not treat the 
point adequately. 
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to understand the nature of Peirce’s realism and his notion of truth and its role as a 
regulative hope. It will be argued that Peirce’s understanding of truth was his attempt to 
respond to the extreme skepticism he saw in the philosophical fallout of Kant and Hegel. 
His formulation was meant to motivate the sciences and philosophy to pursue the truth 
and understanding that—he hoped—is attainable by the human mind. As we will also 
see, Peirce made clear that he understood the precarious nature of his formulation, and 
attempted different ways to prove and metaphysically ground this interpretation.  
While this study will only be able to briefly treat the question of the nature of 
Peirce’s realism, it aims to more definitively treat Rosenthal’s argument about Peirce’s 
pluralism where it veers into more political terrain. On the one hand, in seeming 
agreement with one aspect of Rosenthal’s argument, Peirce in no way indicates that he 
expects that communities’ norms might ever be purified and reconciled—that such a 
thing is possible or desirable at the political or practical level. On the other hand, Peirce 
thinks that unbiased researchers will be able to work with one another’s ideas—across 
different times and places—to reach deeper understanding that aims at truth. Peirce 
clearly thought that philosophic truth was true for all humans, and was not dependent on 
time and place.  
In support of Rosenthal’s reading, Barbara Thyer-Bacon (2005) also sees a 
connection between Peirce’s thought and Kuhn’s (p. 323). In contrast, while Skagestad 
(1981) acknowledges some affinity between the thoughts of Peirce and Kuhn, he also 
sees an important difference. For both Peirce and Kuhn, Skagestad explains, the meaning 
of a particular scientific term at a particular time depends on the state of understanding of 
that time (Skagestad 1981, p. 127). On the essential point, though, Skagestad recognizes 
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that Peirce and Kuhn differ on the essential question of whether progress in science is 
arbitrary or rational.  
What is controversial is only whether . . . changes are progressive or arbitrary. . . . 
Peirce held that scientific terms grow more precise through the progress of 
knowledge, hence their changes of meaning have a definite direction, that of greater 
precision. . . . Kuhn appears to deny that meanings change in the direction of 
increased precision, and his conclusion seems to be that the meanings of scientific 
terms change in an essentially arbitrary manner. (ibid.) 
In other words, whereas Kuhn thought words change meaning arbitrarily, Peirce 
understood there to be a rational progression in scientific understanding (ibid.). This also 
appears to be Putnam’s understanding of the difference between Peirce and Kuhn 
(Putnam 1990/2011, p. 337).  
V. Dissertation Overview 
Now that Peirce’s thought has been given some context, we can proceed to 
examining his philosophy directly. The first three chapters of this dissertation examine 
Peirce’s epistemology and aspects of his metaphysics. These chapters cover some of 
Peirce’s early writings on semeiotics, his early writings on pragmatism, late writings on 
pragmatism, and an essay on cosmology. The fourth chapter of the dissertation examines 
Peirce’s warning that theory and practice must be separate. To shed further light on 
Peirce’s ultimate views about the relationship between philosophy and practice, the fifth 
chapter examines Peirce’s views on the role of the university and a liberal arts education 
in a free republic.   
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CHAPTER 1 
This chapter examines two of Peirce’s well-known early epistemological writings: 
“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” and “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities,” both published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1868. 
These essays explore the nature of knowledge, critique modern philosophy, and showcase 
Peirce’s early theory of semeiotics. Peirce explains that “modern science and modern 
logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from” that of Descartes, the 
“father of modern philosophy” (1868b/1992, p. 28). Peirce attempts to replace Cartesian 
philosophy with his own framework. In Peirce’s criticism of modern philosophy emerge 
key features of what will become known as pragmatism. It is worth closely examining 
these early works because they shed light on the nature of the problems that Peirce aimed 
for pragmatism to address.  
In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Peirce identifies key features of 
modern philosophy that are problematic and, by misleading inquirers into human 
knowledge, interfere with the pursuit of true understanding. To add further depth to the 
context, he contrasts these key features of modern philosophy with their scholastic 
counterparts—in other words, with those features of scholasticism that modern 
philosophy aimed to improve upon and replace. In his own project of undermining and 
replacing modern philosophy, Peirce does not return to scholastic philosophy, but his 
solutions take a turn in their direction. We see, in fact, something of a dialectical 
pendulum: problems with one school of thought yield solutions whose later problems 
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yield new solutions that swing closer to the original position in an improved way, and 
thus are closer to being able to home in on the truth of the matter. Let us explore the 
problems and solutions as Peirce presents them.   
I. Scholasticism, Modern Philosophy, and Peirce’s Proposal for a New Framework 
Peirce explains that modern philosophy34 aimed to “displace” scholasticism (ibid.). 
It begins with universal doubt35—in contrast with scholasticism, which “never questioned 
fundamentals” (ibid.). Whereas scholasticism pointed to external standards—ultimate 
certainty “rested on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church”—modern 
philosophy “teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual 
consciousness” (ibid.).36 It replaces the “multiform argumentation of the middle ages” 
                                                
34 In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce provides a clear description of Descartes’s 
philosophical project, as well as a criticism of that project:  
When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to 
(theoretically) permit skepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to 
authority as the ultimate source of truth. That done, he sought a more natural fountain of 
true principles, and professed to find it in the human mind; thus passing, in the directest 
way, from the method of authority to that of apriority. . . . Self-consciousness was to 
furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason. But 
since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of 
infallibility, that they must be clear. The distinction between an idea seeming clear and 
really being so, never occurred to him. (1878/1992, p. 125) 
35 See, e.g., Descartes 1637/1998 §2.13–14, p. 8:  
As regards all the opinions to which I had until now given credence, I could not do better 
than to try to get rid of them once and for all, in order to replace them later on. 
36 See, e.g., Descartes 1637/1998 §2.16, p. 9–10 :  
The majority opinion is worthless as a proof of truths that are at all difficult to discover, 
since it is much more likely that one man would have found them than a whole multitude 
of people. 
and 1641/1998 §4.62, p. 87:  
Those matters that the intellect clearly and distinctly discloses to it, it plainly cannot 
happen that I err. . . . The perception is most assuredly true. 
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with a “single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises” 
(ibid.).37 Finally, Cartesianism not only does not attempt to explain all facts, but even 
“renders” some “absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that ‘God makes them so’ is to be 
regarded as an explanation”38; scholasticism, in contrast, “had its mysteries of faith, but 
undertook to explain all created things” (ibid.). Peirce explains, “in some, or all of these 
respects, most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians” (ibid.). 
Peirce seeks to replace Descartes’s “four rules” for governing inquiry (Descartes 
1637/1998 §2.18, p. 11)—and thereby the “spirit” of modern philosophy—with four new 
pillars (1868b/1992, p. 28–29). (1) Philosophic inquiry can not begin with complete 
doubt. (2) Agreement among a community of philosophers must replace the individual 
conscience as the standard of truth. (3) “Philosophy ought to imitate” the methods of “the 
successful sciences”; it ought to “proceed only from tangible premises which can be 
subjected to careful scrutiny” and “trust rather to the multitude and variety of its 
arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one” (ibid., p. 29). (4) Lastly, philosophy 
ought not to assume that there is something in nature that is “absolutely inexplicable”—
                                                
37 See, e.g., Descartes 1637/1998 §2.18–19, p. 11: 
To conduct my thoughts in an orderly fashion, by commencing with those objects that are 
simplest and easiest to know, in order to ascend little by little, as by degrees, to the 
knowledge of the most composite things. . . . Those long chains of utterly simple and easy 
reasonings that geometers commonly use to arrive at their most difficult demonstrations 
had given me occasion to imagine that all the things that can fall within human knowledge 
follow from one another in the same way. 
38 See, e.g., Descartes 1641/1998 §4.55, p. 82: 
For since I know now that my nature is very weak and limited, whereas the nature of God 
is immense, incomprehensible, and infinite, this is sufficient for me also to know that he 
can make innumerable things whose causes escape me. For this reason alone the entire 
class of causes which people customarily derive from a thing’s “end,” I judge to be utterly 
useless in physics. 
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an “unanalyzable ultimate” (ibid.). These pillars follow from the epistemological 
examination of this essay and of the earlier “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” 
We will explore that examination below. Let us first notice, though, the evident spirit of 
scholasticism in Peirce’s pillars.  
Peirce’s call to return to analyzing the commonsense experience of the world—to 
approaching the world as humans experience it and moving away from the starting point 
of complete (and feigned) doubt—appears to be a return to the scholastic entry point to 
philosophy. (To this end, we will see that Peirce argues for scholastic realism—the reality 
of generals and potentiality as a mode of being—against the nominalism of modern 
philosophy.) It is also easy to see the similarity with scholasticism in Peirce’s desire for 
philosophy to, once again, aim at explaining all observed things, and to not retreat to the 
assumption that there is some “absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable ultimate” (ibid.). 
The spirit of scholasticism, as Peirce understands it, is similarly evident in his 
recommendation that conclusions be based on a “multitude and variety” of arguments 
that form “a cable whose fibres . . . are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected,” 
rather than “a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises” 
(ibid., p. 28–29). In these respects, Peirce is not only akin to the scholastics, as he seems 
to understand himself to be, but also to the ancients.  
Perhaps less obvious—or, at least, more surprising—is the similarity between 
Peirce’s characterization of the scholastic test of certainty and the one he proposes. For 
both, truth has a communal nature rather than a personal or individualistic one. Peirce 
explains that his proposed standard—agreement among the “disciplined and candid 
minds” of the “community of philosophers”—aims to correct the individualistic 
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“Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: ‘Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is 
true’” (ibid., p. 29). Peirce explains that a standard of truth “found in the individual 
consciousness” makes “single individuals absolute judges of truth” (ibid.). The result of 
this is a complete lack of consensus in the field: “metaphysicians will all agree that 
metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—
only they can agree upon nothing else” (ibid., p. 28–29).39 In other words, with the 
potential of many claims to truth, this method provides no guidance for determining an 
absolute claim to truth. That disputes abounded among those who investigate philosophy 
was one of the problems that prompted Descartes to embark on his philosophical project 
in the first place: 
Concerning philosophy I shall say only that, seeing that it has been cultivated for 
many centuries by the most excellent minds that have ever lived and that, 
nevertheless, there still is nothing in it about which there is not some dispute, and 
consequently nothing that is not doubtful, I was not at all so presumptuous as to 
hope to fare any better there than the others. (Descartes 1637/1998 §1.8, p. 5).  
Descartes’s project has thus not faired any better—according to its own criterion—than 
that which it sought to replace.  
Peirce’s proposed new standard—agreement among the “disciplined and candid 
minds” of the “community of philosophers” (1868b/1992, p. 29)—aims to correct the lack 
of consensus. Peirce claims to base his solution on the method of “the physical sciences,” 
where a theory is kept on “probation” until those in the science community reach 
agreement about it, after which point “the question of certainty becomes an idle one, 
                                                
39 As we saw in the introduction, Peirce shares this complaint about the lack of consensus in 
metaphysics with Kant (Kant 1787: Bxv; 2003 p. 21). 
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because there is no one left who doubts it” (ibid.). Truth then, is not decided by the 
individual alone, nor is it meant for the individual alone; the individual can only take part 
in the philosophic community’s search for truth. Peirce’s position here is an inversion of 
the Cartesian position that “it is much more likely that one man would have found 
[truths] than a whole multitude of people” (Descartes 1637/1998, §2.16, p. 10).  
While Peirce claims to base his proposed method on that of the physical sciences, 
there are important parallels between his method and that of the scholastics. For the 
scholastics, as Peirce explains it, the test of certainty was also of a communal nature—it 
“rested on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church” (1868b/1992, p. 28). In 
other words, for the scholastics truth also consciously rested on claims and testimony of 
others; it was not derived, or determined, by the individual alone. In a subsequent essay, 
which we will explore more fully in the next chapter, Peirce further makes clear the 
parallel between his standard and that of the scholastics. He explains there that the view 
that “there is a general drift in the history of human thought which will lead it to one 
general agreement, one catholic consent” is more in harmony with the notion of an 
“infallible Church” and would fit better in “the Middle Ages than in Protestant or 
positivist times” (1871/1992, p. 90).  
II. Epistemological Underpinnings of Peirce’s New Framework 
We will now turn to Peirce’s efforts to undermine Cartesian assumptions about 
man’s cognitive powers, and then trace out the consequences of his denials, to better 
understand how Peirce arrives at his new platform. At the heart of Descartes’s project is 
his claim that man has certain innate ideas—of his own existence and of the existence of 
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a perfect God (1641/1998 §4.51–52, p. 80). In “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties 
Claimed for Man,” Peirce explores how we acquire knowledge: whether our knowledge 
is rooted, ultimately, in our external experiences in the world; or whether we have a 
separate knowledge of our internal world, or power of intuition. Applying Occam’s razor 
to the questions at hand—in other words, discarding more complicated explanations 
when a simpler one will suffice—Peirce demonstrates that our knowledge is entirely built 
upon and comprised of thoughts we develop through our experience in the world; there is 
no justification for positing a separate, internal power of intuition. New thoughts build on 
previous thoughts and our continuing experiences. We can have no cognition about what 
is not experienced in the world—about the incognizable. 
From his exploration of the origins of our thoughts, Peirce also derives a suggestion 
about the purpose of thought. He concludes that the development of thoughts tells us 
about their function, their “essence”: to relay information about previous experience for 
the development of future thoughts. All thoughts, in other words, are signs.  
Peirce’s critical examination yields these probable propositions. He acknowledges 
in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” however, that he has not proved them to 
be “certain” (1868b/1992, p. 30). To strengthen their likelihood, Peirce proposes to 
“bring them to a further test” and “trace them out to their consequences” (ibid.). This 
second essay thus illustrates what Peirce has in mind when he calls for philosophy to 
“trust . . . to the multitude and variety of . . . arguments” (ibid., p. 29). A concern for the 
consequences of a proposition, moreover, seems similarly to be in the spirit of 
“imitat[ing] the successful sciences” (ibid.).  
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Perhaps also in a conscious attempt to imitate the successful sciences, Peirce’s 
arguments in both of these essays takes the form of a collection of multiple proofs, where 
each proof provides support to later proofs. In “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties 
Claimed for Man,” Peirce uses the metaphor of an inverted triangle being dipped into 
water to illustrate the process by which our knowledge of a thing increases. In fact, his 
writings—in these two essays especially—present their arguments by a similar process, 
with each layer of arguments following from what came before, and in turn providing 
support for the arguments of the layer that follows. Because of the mutually reinforcing 
and dependent nature of Peirce’s arguments, they do not lend well to simple, systematic 
reproduction. What follows is an attempt to home in on the key elements of Peirce’s 
arguments, while following his order of presentation. This allows us to see how Peirce 
builds the different layers of his proof.  
a. Faculty of Intuition 
In the first of these essays, Peirce begins undermining the notion of innate ideas by 
attacking the faculty of intuition—a type of cognition that is not itself determined by a 
previous cognition, but rather “determined directly by the transcendental object” 
(1868a/1992, p. 12). Peirce compares this claimed faculty with the external authority of 
the scholastics: both serve as absolute standards which themselves need no justification. 
In the middle ages, reason and external authority were regarded as two coordinate 
sources of knowledge, just as reason and the authority of intuition are now. . . . The 
credibility of authority was regarded by men of that time simply as an ultimate 
premise, as a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, 
or, in our terms, as an intuition. (ibid., p. 13) 
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Peirce raises the possibility that this internal authority might “meet the same fate, in the 
history of opinions, as that which external authority has met” (ibid.). 
In an effort to kill the authority of this claimed faculty, which he sees to be dying 
already—“Can that be said to be absolutely certain which many sane, well-informed, and 
thoughtful men already doubt?” (ibid.)—Peirce tries to undermine the evidence he sees 
for it. That evidence amounts to, simply, that we “we seem to feel that we have it” (ibid., 
p. 12). To raise doubts about this feeling, Peirce cites “a variety of facts” (ibid., p. 18) 
that illustrate how we do not have clear understanding of how our cognitions arise. The 
quick hands and the crafty words of magicians easily deceive us, for example (ibid., p. 
14). We have a blind spot on the retina that we are unaware of, as our intelligence fills in 
the holes it leave us (ibid., p. 15). It feels to us that we immediately intuit two dimensions 
of space, when in fact what we immediately see is “not a continuous surface, but a 
collection of spots” (ibid.). Time is similarly not immediately intuited, for “in an instant 
there is no duration and hence no immediate feeling of duration” (ibid., p. 17). The 
“conception of time,” rather, is helpful in “reducing to mediate simplicity” the 
complexity of “all the images . . . of sense and memory” in an impression (ibid.).  
Peirce explains that these “variety of facts” are “most readily explained” by 
assuming that we have “no intuitive faculty of distinguishing intuitive from mediate 
cognitions” (ibid., p. 18). What he seems to mean is that things that appear to us as being 
directly perceived are actually mediated by the human brain, and only then, through a 
process of cognition, are they apprehended by the conscious mind. Moreover Peirce sees 
“no facts” that “require the supposition of the faculty in question” (ibid.). According to 
“the nature of proof,” it should thus be clear that “there are very strong reasons for 
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disbelieving the existence of this faculty” (ibid.). In other words, Peirce appears to be 
applying Occam’s razor to the matter at hand: because normal mental functioning can 
indeed account for the types of phenomenon here explored, there is no need to posit an 
additional cognitive function.  
Let us note that, on this question of the power of intuition, Peirce neither disproves 
its existence, nor even claims to disprove it. He simply explains that the evidence comes 
down against its existence, by the rules of logic. Let us moreover note that Peirce 
explains in a footnote that his understanding of man’s comprehension of time and space 
is more in line with Kant than it might first appear: while Kant “makes space and time 
intuitions,” he at the same time acknowledges that “the apprehension of space and time 
results . . . from a mental process” (ibid., p. 17). Peirce explains that his own “theory is 
merely an account of this synthesis” (ibid.). In other words, he agrees with Kant’s 
presentation of how man apprehends time and space; only, he feels the need to move 
away from calling this process an intuitive one, and instead emphasizes the mental 
processes at work in our perception.  
b. Intuitive Self-Consciousness 
Peirce next takes aim at the Cartesian supposition that man has an intuitive self-
consciousness: “a knowledge of . . . our personal selves . . . the recognition of my private 
self” (ibid., p. 18). Against Descartes, Peirce argues that man’s self-consciousness does 
not come before all his other knowledge, but rather rests on his experiences of the world. 
Self-consciousness is moreover a reflection of man’s ignorance rather than a bedrock of 
 
 
81 
 
 
knowledge. To reach this conclusion, Peirce sets out on a scientific examination of the 
matter, as guided by the rules of logic.  
A consequence of the proposition that we have no “intuitive power of 
distinguishing an intuition from a cognition determined by others” is that it would not be 
“self-evident that we have . . . an intuitive faculty” of self-consciousness (ibid.). Thus he 
must determine “upon evidence” whether “self-consciousness can be explained by the 
action of known faculties under conditions known to exist,” or whether “an unknown 
cause for this cognition” must be supposed, and if so, whether “an intuitive faculty of 
self-consciousness is the most probable cause which can be supposed” (ibid.). Peirce thus 
appears once again to approach the question according to the demands of a logical 
proof—but one which, like modern science, takes into account probability in reaching its 
conclusions.  
Peirce first points to the observation that young children do not appear to have self-
consciousness. Kant observed that children do not use the word “I” until relatively late in 
their development, which “indicates an imperfect self-consciousness in them” (ibid.). 
Peirce argues that this observation points—to the extent that “it is admissible for us to 
draw any conclusion” on the matter—to the conclusion that younger children do not have 
self-consciousness (ibid., p. 18–19). Adding this hypothesis to the observation that 
“children manifest powers of thought” at a “much earlier” age (ibid., p. 19)—when they 
are aware of their bodies and begin to develop language, which they learn from other 
people—Peirce proposes the hypothesis that a child first develops self-consciousness by 
being made aware by others that his understanding of something was wrong.  
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He explains his hypothesis thus: When learning language, a child learns to yield to 
the opinion of those around him. “He begins to find that what these people about him say 
is the very best evidence of fact” (ibid.). This is so much the case that “testimony is even 
a stronger mark of fact than the facts themselves” (ibid.). By being made aware of his 
ignorance through his experiences, he learns to trust the testimony of others. Peirce gives 
the following example to illustrate what he has in mind: 
A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that 
central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he 
touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes 
aware of his ignorance. (ibid., p. 20) 
Peirce suggests that it is through his awareness of his ignorance that the child becomes 
aware of his “self”—a self that is ignorant (ibid.). And thus, “testimony gives the first 
dawning of self-consciousness,” and it is error that helps a man recognize himself from 
others (ibid.). “Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the 
absolute ego of pure apperception” (ibid.). Man’s self-consciousness would thus not be a 
sign of certainty, but would be rooted in his awareness that he was in error, and 
moreover, that a community of men—those who corrected him of his error—would be 
his first acknowledged standard of certainty. 
 It is worth noting here the potential strength and problems that result from 
Peirce’s observation that “testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than the facts 
themselves” (ibid., p. 19). On the one hand, other people acting as a standard of our 
understanding can help move our understanding forward. It can also, as this remark 
suggests, act as a hindrance to our understanding of the world, of the facts. In the 
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“Fixation of Belief”—an essay that comes across as less democratic than does this 
essay—Peirce points out how strong of a grip others’ opinions have on one’s own 
opinions. He attempts, then, to entice those who care about truth and intellectual integrity 
to resist the “temptation to submit” their opinions to the authority of others (1877, EP 1 p. 
122). These efforts point to the fact that Peirce recognizes that, while community is 
necessary for knowledge, it can at the same time be a hindrance to knowledge. Peirce’s 
comment here about the testimony of others overwhelming one’s perception of the facts 
is evidence that Peirce is already aware of this problem in this early work. We will 
continue to explore this issue. 
With this, Peirce has presented a theory that accounts for the phenomenon using the 
existence of known faculties: “Thus we find that known faculties, acting under conditions 
known to exist, would rise to self-consciousness” (1868a/1992, p. 20). While Peirce does 
not claim to have proven that his theory is the true account of how self-consciousness 
arises in children, he does claim that his theory is far more likely than is “the supposition 
of a wholly peculiar faculty of the mind” (ibid.). Again, this seems to be so by the logic 
of Occam’s razor—that the simplest explanation is to be preferred over more complicated 
ones.  
To drive the nail into the Cartesian coffin, as it were, Peirce then goes on to 
examine critically “the only argument worth noticing for the existence of an intuitive 
self-consciousness,” namely, that  
We are more certain of our own existence than of any other fact; a premise cannot 
determine a conclusion to be more certain than it is itself; hence, our own existence 
cannot have been inferred from any other fact. (ibid.) 
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But this argument relies, according to Peirce, on “an exploded theory of logic”—
specifically with regard to the second premise (ibid.). A conclusion can indeed be more 
certain than any one of the facts that supports it (ibid.). To illustrate this point, Peirce 
explains that a belief that an event occurred based on the testimony of twelve men will be 
stronger than will the belief of the event’s occurrence based on the testimony of any one 
of the twelve men in particular (ibid., p. 20–21). Similarly, “to the developed mind of 
man, his own existence is supposed by every other fact, and is, therefore, incomparably 
more certain than any one of these facts” (ibid., p. 21).  
We see here that Peirce addresses the question at hand—whether or not man has an 
intuitive power of “self-consciousness”—from different angles. In this particular case, he 
sought to explore self-consciousness and see whether it could be explained by applying 
already accepted premises—in other words, by the “action of known faculties under 
conditions known to exist” (ibid., p. 18). For evidence, he used an observation already 
largely agreed upon—that children do not use the word “I” until relatively late. He then 
partakes in a phenomenological examination of the matter at hand, to hypothesize how 
indeed the conclusion we are after could be reached without positing extra premises. 
Finally, he sought to undermine the strongest argument he could find for the claimed 
faculty.  
With this multi-pronged argument, Peirce concludes that “there is no necessity of 
supposing an intuitive self-consciousness, since self-consciousness may easily be the 
result of inference” (ibid., p. 21). This method of argument thus seems to illustrate what 
Peirce has in mind in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” when he exhorts 
philosophy to “trust rather to the multitude and variety” of arguments rather “than to the 
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conclusiveness of any one”—in imitation of the “successful sciences in its methods” 
(1868b/1992, p. 29). By somewhat similar argument, Peirce next concludes that logic 
recommends that we presume against the existence of an “intuitive power of 
distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions” 
(1868a/1992, p. 21–22).  
c. Power of Introspection 
Continuing his attack against Descartes’s notion of innate ideas and his “clear and 
distinct” standard, Peirce then tackles the question of whether “we have any power of 
introspection, or whether our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived from the 
observation of external facts” (ibid., p. 22). Peirce acknowledges that the perception of 
color is “partly determined by internal conditions”: “the sensation of redness is as it is, 
owing to the constitution of the mind; and in this sense it is a sensation of something 
internal” (ibid.). The object that one sees as red, though, is external to the mind (ibid., p. 
23). Emotions, by contrast, appear to come about “not as predicates” of an external 
object, “and to be referable to the mind alone” (ibid.). Upon reflection, though, it seems 
emotions too are connected to external objects: 
If a man is angry, his anger implies, in general, no determinate and constant 
character in its object. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there 
is some relative character in the outward thing which makes him angry, and a little 
reflection will serve to show that his anger consists in his saying to himself, “this 
thing is vile, abominable, etc.,” and that it is rather a mark of returning reason to 
say, “I am angry.” In the same way any emotion is a predicate concerning some 
object. (ibid.) 
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Peirce extends this line of reasoning even further by comparing “the sense of beauty” and 
the “moral sense” with emotion in this respect: “Good and bad are feelings which first 
arise as predicates, and therefore are either predicates of the not-I” (ibid.). 
d. Volition 
 The last type of internal mental process Peirce thinks he needs to account for is 
the sense of volition. He explains that volition is really simply “a power of concentrating 
the attention, of abstracting” (ibid.). This, too, can be “inferred from abstract objects” 
(ibid.). Thus these psychological facts—subjective qualities like color, emotion, moral 
judgment, and volition—all presuppose the existence of external objects, and we have no 
knowledge or experience of these things without those external objects (ibid.). There is 
thus “no reason for supposing a power of introspection,” and in consequence, “the only 
way of investigating a psychological question is by inference from external facts” (ibid.). 
e. How We Do Think: Peirce’s Early Theory of Semeiotics  
 Peirce then moves from examining the mental functions men do not have, to 
trying to deduce how men in fact do think. In this deduction, the conclusions thus far 
reached act as supporting propositions. He begins by questioning whether men can think 
without signs. When we think about external facts, “the only cases of thought which we 
can find are of thought in signs” (ibid., p. 24). We have moreover just demonstrated that 
“only by external facts can thought be known at all” (ibid.). Thought can therefore only 
be cognized in signs (ibid.). If every thought is thus a sign, then “every thought must 
address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the essence of a 
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sign” (ibid.). Thus a long train of thought can be understood as a long train of signs 
interpreting and determining one another.  
 Peirce concludes, moreover, that because, as we have established, “all our 
conceptions are obtained by abstractions and combinations of cognitions first occurring 
in judgments of experience,” then there can be no conception—and thus no meaning—of 
something that does not occur in experience (ibid.). In other words, there can be no 
meaning to that which is “absolutely incognizable” (ibid). Similarly, when one has the 
wrong conception of something, that conception is a wrong combination of true 
conceptions: “ignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a real 
knowledge and truth, which latter are of the nature of cognitions” (ibid., p. 25). To any 
cognition is thus paired “an unknown but knowable reality” (ibid.). 
 From these propositions, Peirce reaches the metaphysical conclusion that what is 
ultimately understood about something (though not necessarily what we understand of 
something at any moment) is, in fact, the essence of its being: “cognizability (in its widest 
sense) and being are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms” 
(ibid.). This seems to be another way of saying that our knowledge can not go beyond a 
correct understanding of what we experience in the world. To speak of anything else—for 
example, of a thing-in-itself that exists beyond what we can encounter in our experience 
in the world—is simply to speak without meaning.  
 Peirce’s final task in his essay is to deny that there is any first cognition. He asks 
“whether there is any cognition not determined by a previous cognition” (ibid.). He uses 
the metaphor of an “inverted triangle . . . gradually dipped into water” to illustrate his 
main conclusion: that “cognition arises by a process of beginning,” rather than as an 
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absolute first cognition (ibid., p. 26–27). Like the inverted triangle becoming increasingly 
submerged as it is dipped into water, our knowledge of things deepens and becomes 
richer over time; our knowledge becomes exponentially greater over time. 
III. Consequences of Peirce’s Epistemological Framework  
 In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” as mentioned, Peirce tries to make 
more certain the probable propositions he has laid out. He proposes to trace out their 
consequences, treating each one as a “hypothetical premise” that builds on the others 
(1868b, p. 30). In his examination, Peirce quietly renames “propositions” to “principles” 
(ibid., p. 30 ff.), suggesting that the propositions that are to be examined have in fact 
already been proved. While he makes strong cases for his propositions, they are never 
proved in any fail-safe sense. Given Peirce’s admitted ambitions of replacing Cartesian 
philosophy with a new philosophical framework, such craftiness is not altogether 
surprising. In what follows, I attempt to make as much sense as I can of his multi-faceted 
arguments, but with a caution appropriate to understanding such an ambitious 
undertaking. 
a. Consequences of there Being No Power of Intuition 
 Peirce begins drawing out the consequences of his first two propositions: that “we 
have no power of Introspection,” but rather “all knowledge of the internal world is 
derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts”; and that “every 
cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions,” as “we have no power of 
Intuition” (ibid., p. 30). In other words, he wants to see what results from “put[ing] aside 
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all prejudices derived from a philosophy which bases our knowledge of the external 
world on our self-consciousness” (ibid.). Instead, he seeks to determine how much of our 
knowledge can be accounted for by assuming that all that passes within our mind derives 
from the hypotheses our mind unconsciously posits to make sense of what it observes in 
the external world (ibid.). 
 He explains he must determine the extent to which he can “reduce all mental 
action to the formula of . . . valid reasoning” (ibid.). This formula amounts to proceeding 
from premise A to conclude B “only if, as a matter of fact, such a proposition as B is 
always or usually true when such a proposition as A is true” (ibid.). We must determine 
the extent to which we can reduce mental action to this formula because this is the “class 
of modifications of consciousness” whose “existence is indubitable” and “whose laws are 
best known” (ibid.). Because its “knowledge comes from the outside,” it is also one that 
“closely follows external facts” (ibid.). If all mental action can be reduced in this way, 
then it is not logically necessary to assume any other mental faculties. Thus, by tracing 
out the consequences of a proposition, it appears Peirce means that he will seek to 
determine the extent for which his propositions can ultimately account. 
 In his claim that the existence of the mental process of valid inference is 
indubitable, Peirce is clear that he does not mean to suggest that the mind goes through a 
formal syllogistic process at all times that it takes in information. He explains that in fact 
he finds it “very doubtful” that a “conclusion—as something existing in the mind 
independently, like an image—suddenly displaces two premises existing in the mind in a 
similar way” (ibid., p. 30–31). He maintains, rather, that it is simply “a matter of constant 
experience” that if a man believes in certain premises—as evidenced by his willingness 
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to “act from them” and “say that they are true”—then “he will also be ready to act from 
the conclusion and to say that that is true” (ibid., p. 31). There is therefore something that 
seems to go on within man that is “equivalent to the syllogistic process” (ibid.). 
Experience thus provides strong evidence for the existence of this mental functioning, 
adding weight to the logical argument. 
 Continuing with his exploration of the formula of valid inference, Peirce identifies 
three types of inference that can account for all valid inference: deductive, inductive, or 
hypothetic (ibid., p. 33). The validity of a deductive inference “depends unconditionally 
upon the relation of the fact inferred to the facts posited in the premises” (ibid., p. 31). 
Induction and hypothetic reasoning fall under probable inference. Peirce describes 
induction as when “reasoning proceeds as though all the objects which have certain 
characters were known” (ibid., p. 32); or, in other words, which “assumes that that is true 
of a whole collection which is true of a number of instances taken from it at random” 
(ibid., p. 33). In the long run, this form of argument tends to yield “pretty correct 
conclusions from true premises” (ibid.). There is an inherent connection between 
induction and deduction: 
The central characteristic and key to induction is, that by taking the conclusion so 
reached as major premise of a syllogism, and the proposition stating that such and 
such objects are taken from the class in question as the minor premise, the other 
premise of the induction will follow from them deductively. (ibid.)  
 In this observation, Peirce claims kinship with Aristotle (ibid.).  
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 Hypothetic reasoning “proceeds as though all the characters requisite to the 
determination of a certain object or class were known” (ibid., p. 32). In other words, it 
can be understood as an argument that  
proceeds upon the assumption that a character which is known necessarily to 
involve a certain number of others, may be probably predicated of any object which 
has all the characters which this character is known to involve. (ibid., p. 33)  
It can be understood, in other words, as an inference of the minor premise from the major 
premise and conclusion of a deductive argument (ibid., p. 33–34); as reasoning “from 
consequent to antecedent” (ibid., p. 35).  
 All of this points to the fact that all inference “belongs to one genus” (ibid.). Each 
type ultimately consists of a conclusion that can be derived by arguments of two premises 
each, which imply no fact not asserted (ibid., p. 33–36). Thus an attempt to reduce all 
mental action to the form of valid reasoning amounts to an attempt to reduce all mental 
action to one single type: 
All valid reasoning, therefore, is of one general form; and in seeking to reduce all 
mental action to the formulae of valid inference, we seek to reduce it to one single 
type. (ibid., p. 37)  
That valid inference can be reduced to one general type apparently strengthens the 
proposition that we do not have a power of intuition because it seems that variations of 
one basic mental process can account for all that we know. In other words, one simple 
premise can account for all of our knowledge—a premise, moreover, for which there is 
much empirical support.  
 But men also reason falsely. Might other mental processes need to be posited to 
account for fallacious reasoning? Peirce identifies four classes of fallacious inferences: 
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(1) those that proceed from false premises; (2) those that are weak, though not 
illegitimate, inductions or hypotheses; (3) those that entail confusing one proposition with 
another; and (4) those that result from misapplying a rule of inference (ibid.). Any other 
type of false reasoning would have to result from a man drawing a completely irrelevant 
conclusion from true premises (ibid.). In the first of the types of fallacious inferences 
identified, either the reasoning proceeds validly from false premises, or its error is of one 
of the other three types (ibid., p. 38). The second type of fallacy, even if it results in a 
wrong conclusion, is still a “legitimate probable argument” and is therefore a valid 
inference (ibid.). The third type of fallacy would be due to a person reasoning that two 
types of things were alike in all respects because they were alike in some key respects; 
though this would be a weak argument, it is also a valid form of hypothetic probable 
thinking (ibid.). Fallacies of the fourth class are either fallacies of confusion—resulting 
from misunderstanding a rule of inference—or they result “from adopting a wrong rule of 
inference” (ibid.). In this case, the wrong rule of inference would in effect be a false 
premise, and therefore any conclusion that resulted would be a product of this false 
premise. Fallacious reasoning therefore does not pose a problem to Peirce’s theory that 
the process of valid reasoning can account for human knowledge, for even in such 
instances, we see that “the procedure of the mind conforms to the formula of valid 
inference” (ibid.). 
 In this discussion, Peirce makes another naturalistic argument in support of his 
reliance on syllogistic reasoning as being able to account for human knowledge. He 
explains that all men assent to the judgment of valid inference:  
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Experience shows that the calm and careful consideration of the same distinctly 
conceived premises (including prejudices) will insure the pronouncement of the 
same judgment by all men. (ibid.) 
Calm consideration aids man in avoiding fallacious reasoning because it can help him 
take all facts into account, as well as remain calm and unaffected by “a passion in 
inferring that to be true which we wish were true, or which we fear may be true” (ibid., p. 
37–38). Of the arguments in this essay, this naturalistic one appears to be the weakest. 
Certainly vast disagreements exist among a random sampling of the general population. 
Moreover, Peirce seems to be here substituting “calm and careful consideration” for the 
Cartesian “clear and distinct” standard; both standards are too vague to be helpful. 
Indeed, Peirce later backs away from this naturalistic argument, explaining that the truth 
of something is independent of what men are inclined to think—though not independent 
of what men are able to think.  
b. Peirce’s Early Theory of Semeiotics, Continued 
The next proposition whose consequences are to be drawn out is the third, that we 
can only think in signs: “whenever we think, we have present to the consciousness some 
feeling, image, conception, or other representation, which serves as a sign” (ibid., p. 38). 
A sign is a sign “to some thought which interprets it”; “for some object to which in that 
thought it is equivalent; and “in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection 
with its object” (ibid.) Peirce explains that we ourselves become a sign when we think 
(ibid.). He then traces out what it would mean if all thoughts indeed acted in this manner. 
When we think, our thoughts address themselves to our subsequent thoughts. 
Trains of thought follow “the law of mental association,” wherein “each former thought 
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suggests something to the thought which follows it” (ibid., p. 39). And while trains of 
thought may be interrupted, it does not mean they are ever “broken off altogether” (ibid.). 
When we combine this with our second principle—that there is no intuition or cognition 
not determined by previous cognitions—it follows that our understanding of a sign is 
never instantaneous but rather comes to “pass by a continuous process” (ibid.).  
The thought-sign thus always stands for its external object (ibid., p. 39–40). The 
“representative function” of a sign lies not in any “real relation to its object,” however, 
but rather in its relation to thought. Thought exists only in the mind, and different 
thoughts are separated by time in the mind (ibid., p. 40). If we understand two thoughts as 
similar, we do so because they have been brought together by the mind in an act of 
hypothesis or judgment (ibid., p. 41). 
We develop thoughts about metaphysical notions like “Being” and numbers by 
abstracting from the simple and immediate thoughts that pass before us. Comparison and 
negation are key to our ability to abstract.  
All determination is by negations; we can first recognize any character only by 
putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object which 
possesses it not. (ibid., p. 45) 
The conception of “Being” does not arise, then, by observing a quality universal to all 
things. Rather, it arises through reflection on signs—on words and thoughts. We reflect 
that each subject has some predicate attached to it. That a predicate is attached to a 
subject bespeaks something true of the subject: “we imagine that a subject has something 
true of it merely because a predicate (no matter what) is attached to it,—and that we call 
Being” (ibid., p. 45). Thus the conception of Being amounts to a conception of a sign 
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(ibid.). Peirce explains that his position that “metaphysical conceptions are primarily and 
at bottom thoughts about words, or thoughts about thoughts” is not a new doctrine, but is 
rather the same as that of Aristotle and Kant: Aristotle’s “categories are parts of speech” 
and Kant’s “categories are the characters of different kinds of propositions” (ibid., p. 45–
46). 
Abstraction, or what Peirce also refers to as “Attention,” is “the power by which 
thought at one time is connected with and made to relate to thought at another time” 
(ibid., p. 46). Through an “emphasis . . . put upon one of the objective elements of 
consciousness,” attention affects our memory and therefore subsequent thoughts (ibid.). 
Our attention is stirred when we notice similarities or patterns in the simple thoughts that 
pass before us: “Attention is roused when the same phenomenon presents itself 
repeatedly on different occasions, or the same predicate in different subjects” (ibid.). It is 
thus an act of induction (ibid.).  
The inductive conclusions of our attention affect our nervous system; they form 
“habits, or nervous associations” in us (ibid.).  
A habit arises, when, having had the sensation of performing a certain act, m, on 
several occasions a, b, c, we come to do it upon every occurrence of the general 
event, l, of which a, b, and c are special cases.  
Our voluntary actions result from our habits, just as our “instinctive actions result from 
our original nature” (ibid., p. 47). Implicit in this is a point that becomes a key feature of 
the pragmatism of Peirce’s 1878 essay, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”: our habits of 
acting contain information about our unconscious inductions, so that if we respond in the 
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same way to different thoughts, it means that our mind has in actuality understood those 
two thoughts in the same way. For now, Peirce only hints at this:  
The emotion is a sign and a predicate of the thing. When a thing resembling [a 
thing with which we have had experience and made judgments already] is 
presented to us, a similar emotion arises; hence, we immediately infer that the latter 
is like the former. (ibid., p. 51) 
In other words, our instinctive responses bespeak subconscious induction. 
c. Scholastic Realism 
From this understanding of the role abstraction plays in making sense of the 
immediate sensations experienced by the mind, Peirce makes his case for scholastic 
realism—which entails defending the existence of generals and denying that there is a 
“thing in itself” to which we do not have access—against the nominalism of modern 
philosophy. Peirce cites Berkeley, the “most eminent expounder of the doctrine” to 
illustrate the nominalist position (ibid., p. 47). Berkeley explains that we have no image 
of a general man, but rather of only a particular man:  
the image of a man “must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny; a straight, or 
a crooked; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man.” It must be of a man with his 
mouth open or his mouth shut, whose hair is precisely of such and such a shade, 
and whose figure has precisely such and such proportions. (ibid.; Berkeley 1710, 
section 10 of introduction) 
Peirce agrees that our image of a man has to be of a man with particular characteristics. 
He explains that similarly, contra Locke, an image of a triangle has to be “either of an 
obtuse-angled, right-angled, or acute-angled triangle” (1868b/1992, p. 47; in reference to 
Locke 1689, book IV, ch. 7, §9).  
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The key, though, is to recognize that the images in our minds are not “true” 
representations (1868b/1992, p. 47). To illustrate, he points out that in your memory of an 
object—a red book, for example—you will not be able to long hold on to the precise 
shade of red the book is, but you will “carry away . . . the consciousness that [you] could 
recognize it” (ibid., p. 47–48; emphasis in original). What this illustrates is that Hume’s 
position that memory is simply a weakened version of sight—that their difference lies in 
“‘degrees of force and vivacity’” (1868b/1992, p. 47; Hume 1748, sec. 2.)—is wrong. In 
fact, as we observe things, we are abstracting; we do not notice all of the details of a 
horse at any one time. Rather, we observe a horse in its entirety.  
The senses are abstracting mechanisms by nature. Sight can only determine colors 
and forms, but nothing of taste or sound (1868b/1992, p. 50). The images that we 
perceive are in fact judgments that we make. And they are connected in the mind as 
signs, according to the principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causality (ibid.). 
Generals are real (ibid., p. 53). Since “man” is true of something, that which “man” 
means is real (ibid.). The nominalist would have to admit that “man” is “truly applicable 
to something”; only, “he believes that there is beneath this a thing in itself, an 
incognizable reality” (ibid.). The nominalist’s best argument is that “there is no man 
unless there is some particular man” (ibid.). Peirce, however, agrees with Duns Scotus:  
Although there is no man of whom all further determination can be denied, yet 
there is a man, abstraction being made of all further determination. There is a real 
difference between man irrespective of what the other determinations may be, and 
man with this or that particular series of determinations. (ibid.) 
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This difference is of course only relative to the mind and not in the thing in itself. But 
insisting that there is a thing in itself, a la Occam (and Kant), in fact begs the question, 
for it assumes “that reality is something independent of representative relation” (ibid.). In 
fact, the scholastic realist maintains that there is “no more recondite reality than that 
which is represented in a true representation” (ibid.). Thus we see that a defense of 
scholastic realism follows from Peirce’s theory of signs.  
d. Reality and What Is Cognizable  
The last “principle” that Peirce explores the consequences of in this essay is his 
fourth: that the absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable. Because all words are 
signs that convey meaning for future action, a word that has no conception attached to 
it—in other words, the “absolutely incognizable”—has no meaning (ibid., p. 51–52). 
What is “’real’” must be “cognizable in some degree” (ibid., p. 52). Peirce goes on to 
explore the conception of “reality” that his propositions lead to.  
From what we have gathered from the examination thus far, we can say that the 
cognitions we have at any given time are products of our previous cognitions; they “have 
been logically derived by induction and hypothesis from previous cognitions which are 
less general, less distinct, and of which we have a less lively consciousness” (ibid.). 
These earlier cognitions were themselves derived from even earlier cognitions, “and so 
on back to the ideal first, which is quite singular, and quite out of consciousness” (ibid.). 
Herein lies the actual “thing-in-itself”—an impression of something that exists simply, 
before the mind worked its abstracting powers on it. Even this impression is still relative 
to the mind, of course, as it is dependent on the senses and the mind’s recognition (ibid.). 
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From this process of the development of cognitions—“this infinite series of inductions 
and hypotheses,” emerge cognitions that are true and those that are false, in other words 
those “whose objects are real and those whose objects are unreal” (ibid.).  
It seems for the reasons stated earlier that we can only have a notion of a concept 
through its negation. The conception of “the real” must have first occurred to a man when 
he “discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion,” and corrected himself (ibid.). The 
distinction here would be between a meaning “relative to private inward determinations” 
and one which “would stand in the long run” (ibid.). Reality, then, points away from 
one’s own private understandings, and to what will withstand examination and be 
assented to by all who inquire:  
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would 
finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. 
(ibid.) 
Thus, the very notion of reality “essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY” 
(ibid.). Reality is that “which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always 
continue to reaffirm,” while unreality is that “which, under the same conditions, will ever 
after be denied” (ibid.). By the same token, if the falsity of a proposition is not 
discoverable, then its error is in effect “incognizable,” which means that the proposition 
indeed contains “absolutely no error” (ibid.).  
 Reality, then, is “what may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of 
complete information”—a state ultimately determined by the agreement of “the 
community” (ibid., p. 54). Knowledge of reality is thus attainable:  
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There is nothing, then, to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, 
and it is most likely that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we 
can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any special case. (ibid., p. 52) 
Pointing to this future knowledge, thought—or signs—serves the purpose of addressing 
future thoughts and signs (ibid., p. 54). In a sense, then, thought has only “potential 
existence” as it is dependent “on what is to be hereafter . . . on the future thought of the 
community” (ibid., p. 54–55).  
e. Individual Identity 
Following the same theme of knowledge through negation, it is only through his 
being made aware of his own “ignorance and error” that the individual man is made 
aware of his existence as separate from that of his fellow men. The extent to which he is 
separate from his fellow men, in other words, is only merely as a negation (ibid., p. 55). 
Peirce concludes his essay by quoting Shakespeare: 
This is man, 
 proud man,  
 Most ignorant of what he’s most assured,  
 His glassy essence. (Shakespeare 1604, 2.2.117–20) 
Both essays thus conclude by emphasizing man’s ignorance and, when it comes to 
knowledge and understanding, his insignificance as an individual in contrast to the power 
of the body of men. 
Concluding his essay, Peirce explores in what the reality of mind consists. Man’s 
consciousness is comprised of signs resulting from inference, as we have seen (ibid.). 
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This is its “phenomenal manifestation” (ibid.). We must thus understand the mind to be a 
“sign developing according to the laws of inference” (ibid.). Man’s entire thought is thus 
what he himself is (ibid., p. 54). This is what is consistent about him, and thus in what his 
identity consists (ibid.). Man and words—both signs, ultimately—“reciprocally educate 
each other; each increase of a man’s information involves and is involved by, a 
corresponding increase of a word’s information” (ibid.). 
In summary, through his logical examination and exploration of the phenomenon of 
the development of knowledge, Peirce deduces the parameters of notions like “truth,” 
“reality,” and “Being.” Knowledge, and thus meaning, is inherently human—it can not go 
beyond or be outside of the human mind’s mediation. Thus to speak of something beyond 
the realm of human mediation is to speak in gibberish, for we could have no conception 
of what such a notion even means. The extent of what we can know is inherently limited 
by the mind’s mediation; the community of men, using their information and reasoning in 
the long run, is supposed to represent the limits which the human mind can reach. 
Thoughts, as signs, serve the purpose of informing future thoughts and signs; they are 
like steps on the ladder of knowledge. 
IV. Summary  
 Let us return to Peirce’s new philosophical platform and examine its connection 
to his epistemological investigation. Peirce’s first pillar is that “we cannot begin with 
complete doubt,” but rather we must approach the world as we actually experience it: 
“We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the 
study of philosophy” (1868b, p. 28–29). He explains Cartesian skepticism is “mere self-
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deception,” as our prejudices “are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned” 
(ibid., p. 29). Thus he exhorts his readers, “Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy 
what we do not doubt in our hearts” (ibid.).  
Now that we have explored Peirce’s epistemological examination, we see what is 
behind this position. Knowledge does not develop in a straight, clear manner; rather, it 
develops in a process of experiences—with the mind, often subconsciously, making 
increasing sense of the data encountered by the senses—and as bolstered by the opinions 
of others. Because of this process and the mutually dependent and reinforcing nature of 
our thoughts, there was never a time or point where a first or original thought occurred. 
We can therefore not imagine ourselves back to such a point—nor does it make sense to, 
considering the experiential and social nature of thought. Descartes’s project to “raze 
everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations” (Descartes 
1641/1998 §1.17, p. 59) is thus wholly misdirected.  
 Peirce’s second pillar is that the standard of certainty ought to be the consensus of 
the community of philosophers, and not individual consciousness (1868b, p. 28–29). In 
this suggestion Peirce explains he is explicitly taking the lead from modern science, 
where  
when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until . . . 
agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle 
one, because there is no one left who doubts it. (ibid., p. 29)  
Given the social nature of truth and inquiry, the individual, moreover, does not seek truth 
for himself, but rather for the community of philosophers: “We individually cannot 
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reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, 
therefore, for the community of philosophers” (ibid.).  
Peirce’s investigation into human knowledge supports this practice, for it reveals—
or, really, hypothesizes—that we come to understanding through necessarily social 
avenues. We develop notions of “the real,” and even our own selves, by recognizing the 
difference between our private opinions on a matter and those of other people, and the 
confirmation of the correct opinion through experience—for example, with a hot stove. 
The notions of reality and of a community of philosophers thus point to what is 
independent of the “vagaries” and prejudices of individuals, and rather toward what will 
be agreed upon by all men in the long term (ibid., p. 52). It is this community, thought of 
in the long run, which harnesses the powers of human understanding, and thus which can 
be understood as setting the limits of what is available to man’s understanding.  
All that said, Peirce seems a bit too relativistic in what he says about the 
conclusions of community here. Later on, he emphasizes the provisional nature of any 
scientific hypothesis or theory. He moreover makes clearer later that the notion of 
community is valuable because it points to a reality external to the individual, though not 
independent of all individuals or of the human mind. Here, Peirce makes it sound like a 
mere consensus in a group of scientists is sufficient to prove a theory: “After it is 
reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who 
doubts it” (ibid., p, 29). It is most likely the case that these excesses in Peirce’s treatment 
are rooted in his explicit desire to undermine Cartesianism, which was beset with idle 
doubts and moreover lacked a clear-cut standard for disregarding outlandish claims. 
These two concerns make sense of Peirce’s sanguinity with regard to the consensus of 
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scientists, as well as his conclusion of this discussion: that “if disciplined and candid 
minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the 
mind of the author of the theory himself” (ibid., p. 29). We will pay attention to Peirce’s 
continued treatment of the matter as we explore his later thought.  
 Peirce’s third pillar is that philosophy ought to imitate science in two further 
respects: its premises should be “tangible” and capable of being “subjected to careful 
scrutiny,” and moreover, philosophical inquiry ought to “trust rather to the multitude and 
variety of its arguments” rather than to the “conclusiveness of any one” (ibid.). These two 
points are linked to the reasons behind the first and second pillars discussed above. The 
multifaceted character of the roots of knowledge seems to be behind the latter point: our 
knowledge results from a mixture of our experiences, our mind’s interpretation of our 
experiences, and others’ opinions. A “multitude and variety” of arguments, then, would 
seem to have the most potential at uncovering reality because it will best imitate the 
process by which knowledge develops—though in a purified or improved way. Because 
knowledge does not develop in a clear and straight line, simple and straightforward 
arguments alone will not uncover true understanding. The first point of this pillar 
similarly seems connected to the fact that knowledge is rooted in experience as well as 
others’ opinions—only tangible premises, capable of being “subjected to careful 
scrutiny,” speak to the experiential and social nature of knowledge. Like with the first 
two pillars, both points come across as direct attacks on Descartes, whose “Meditations” 
are filled with single threads of thought that end in the “proof” of such matters as the 
existence of a perfect God (Descartes 1641/1998 §3.51, p. 80). Peirce’s epistemological 
investigation in these two essays does not so much prove the necessity of this premise, 
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but rather—with its many logical, empirical, and phenomenological arguments—seems 
to illustrate its implementation, while at the same time providing reasons for itself.   
Peirce’s last pillar, that no fact can be assumed to be “absolutely inexplicable,” is 
rooted in his treatment of signs. He explains that such an assumption can not be taken for 
granted but would have to be reasoned to:  
Every unidealistic philosophy supposes some absolutely inexplicable, unanalyzable 
ultimate; in short, something resulting from mediation itself not susceptible of 
mediation. Now that anything is thus inexplicable can only be known by reasoning 
from signs. But the only justification of an inference from signs is that the 
conclusion explains the fact. To suppose the fact absolutely inexplicable, is not to 
explain it, and hence this supposition is never allowable.  
This point also seems connected to our observations about how knowledge develops, and 
recognizing reality as that which the mind of man—through a community of 
philosophers—can ultimately uncover. Thus through these channels of logic and his 
realism does Peirce undermine this tenet of modern philosophy, and return to the 
scholastic (and classical) attempt to seek an explanation for all things.  
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CHAPTER 2 
In the epistemological examinations of 1868, Peirce begins setting the stage for a 
new philosophical foundation that will replace Cartesianism, as “modern science and 
modern logic require” (1868b/1992, p. 28). Of the pillars of the platform that he sets 
forth, the most important seem to be that philosophic inquiry can not start with complete 
doubt, but rather must approach the world as men actually approach it; and that truth can 
not be considered to be a private matter, but rather that universal truth must be available 
to all who investigate it (ibid., p. 28–29). The first of these pillars is supported by Peirce’s 
suggestion that knowledge develops as a result of a combination of our experience in the 
world and others’ testimony; there was never a time or point where a first or original 
thought occurred. There is no clear demarcation between us knowing something and us 
not knowing something; rather knowledge about concepts develops as a result of a 
gradual process, and continues to develop throughout our conscious lives. The second 
pillar is connected to this point: others’ testimony plays an integral role in the formation 
of our knowledge. Because knowledge is inherently communal, investigation ought to be 
a communal act, and claims must be persuasive to other men.  
Peirce’s investigation leaves us with many questions, chief among which are who 
comprises the community by which we judge what is true, as well as whether consensus 
among men is all that can be understood as the truth, or reality. In other words, does 
Peirce think—as James apparently does40—that truth is constructed? Or does he 
                                                
40 See, e.g., discussion of James 1907 and 1909 in Introduction. 
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understand truth to be uncovered? What is the nature of truth or reality in Peirce’s 
thought?  
We are also left with the question of the nature of the relationship Peirce 
understands science and philosophy to have. On the one hand, Peirce says modern 
science requires a new philosophical foundation. He then, however, proceeds to propose 
a philosophical platform that is itself based on modern science. Is Peirce suggesting that 
modern science needs philosophical validation, which Cartesian philosophy can not 
provide? Or is modern science sufficiently valid, only incapable of providing insight on 
all questions—specifically those in the terrain of philosophy? Is philosophy leading 
modern science or taking the lead from it; what does philosophy bring to the table? 
With this as the backdrop, we will examine Peirce’s continued epistemological 
development in his early articulations of pragmatism. In this chapter we will explore the 
following essays: “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of 
Four Incapacities” (1969); Peirce’s review of The Works of George Berkeley (1871); 
“The Fixation of Belief” (1877); and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). The themes 
that emerge from these essays are that our common sense perceptions are to be trusted; 
belief and doubt are the essential stages of inquiry, and bespeak the purpose of thought; 
reality ought to be understood alternately as that which the community ultimately agrees 
on, and that which is external to man; reality is an assumption crucial for rational inquiry, 
and therefore justified by reason; and the method of science is superior than alternative 
methods for uncovering reality, in other words, truth. Underlying these themes is the 
assumption or assertion that reason is an end in itself. Through our examination of these 
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themes, we will better understand Peirce’s philosophical project and the problems it aims 
to address.  
I. “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic” (1869) 
The “Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four 
Incapacities” (1969), like the two 1868 essays we looked at in the previous chapter, was 
published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. We are exploring it in this chapter 
rather than the previous one because its themes are more directly connected to those of 
the three other essays of this chapter than they are with the previous two essays. In the 
“Grounds of Validity,” Peirce addresses questions concerning the validity of logical 
argument, and what lays at the foundation of inductive reasoning. We will explore some 
of the essay’s key insights: a confirmation that logic’s validity lies in its ability to ensure 
consistency of meaning, and not in human psychology; an acknowledgement that logical 
proof can not yield conclusions that are “beyond the possibility of a doubt” (1869/1992, 
p. 60); induction and probable reasoning are not successful because nature is regular, 
because the matter is quite the opposite—nature is not regular; and finally, that an 
“infinite hope” lies at the bottom of our efforts to rational action (ibid., p. 82). We will 
briefly explore his points below. 
a. Logic, Epistemology, and Peirce’s Answer to Skepticism 
In the previous essays as well as in this essay, Peirce seems to interweave logical 
and naturalistic arguments to support the validity of syllogism. In this essay, though, 
Peirce at least differentiates the study of formal logic from that of psychology. Formal 
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logic is concerned with the syllogism, which elucidates “the relation of . . . different 
judgments concerning the same thing” (ibid., p. 63). In other words, it can tell us  
that if facts capable of expression in such and such forms of words are true, another 
fact whose expression is related in a certain way to the expression of these others is 
also true. (ibid.) 
It is not, in contrast, supposed to “represent the mind” (ibid.). It is constrained by its own 
rules, and is not influenced by how men generally think. Formal logic can tell us nothing 
about “the relation between syllogism and thought”; that is the purview of “psychology” 
(ibid.). The validity of logic can not rest on the grounds that Peirce suggested earlier—
that men tend to act in ways that suggest they agree with syllogistic reasoning. 
Consistency is its sole standard.  
Logical proof can furthermore not prove anything “beyond the possibility of a 
doubt” (ibid., p. 60). This is a “very ancient” criticism of logic, Peirce explains (ibid.). 
There is much that is taken for granted in a proof: A proof “rests on premises which 
themselves equally require proof, which again must rest on other premises, and so back to 
infinity” (ibid.). There is thus “no argument” that “could be legitimately used against an 
absolute sceptic” (ibid.). In other words, proofs do not promise absolute certainty.  
Nonetheless, Peirce does not think that such absolute skeptics really exist. He 
attacks those who claim that knowledge is not possible by explaining that their behavior 
reveals their true beliefs. Absolute skepticism would entail doubting every inference, but 
“every exercise of the mind consists in inference,” and there can be “no intelligent beings 
in that condition” (ibid., p. 56). In truth, “there are no such beings as absolute sceptics” 
(ibid.). The actions required for daily living belie any professed absolute skepticism; by 
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living in the world, a man shows that he does not live with complete doubt. Peirce 
explains that he intends to address men as they approach the world, not as “absolute 
sceptics” or “men in any state of fictitious doubt whatever” (ibid.). 
b. The Theory of Reality as the Key to Philosophy 
The possibility of inductive reasoning is a remarkable thing—how “we can know 
what we have not experienced!” (ibid., p. 75). Though “probable arguments sometimes 
fail,” “in the long run” inductive reasoning proves to be “approximately correct” (ibid., p. 
77). For over time, “our errors balance one another” (ibid.). It is “magical” that “by 
examining a part of a class we can know what is true of the whole of the class, and by 
study of the past can know the future” (ibid., p. 75).  
How is inductive reasoning possible? Natural selection may account for man’s 
ability to reason inductively; “it is absolutely essential to the preservation of so delicate 
an organism as man’s” (ibid.). This explanation, however, does not address the more 
fundamental question of how inductive or probable reasoning is even possible. This is not 
a question about the human mind, ultimately, but about nature (ibid.). This question is, 
moreover, “the lock upon the door of philosophy” (ibid., p. 78). It is antecedent to Kant’s 
question of the a priori possibility of synthetical judgments, which Kant considered the 
“central question of philosophy” (ibid.).  
 The “usual reply” to this question, Peirce explains, is John Stuart Mill’s answer 
that “nature is everywhere regular” (ibid., p. 75, 76–77). But, Peirce objects, nature is in 
fact not regular (ibid., p. 75–76). “It is true that the special laws and regularities are 
innumerable; but nobody thinks of the irregularities, which are infinitely more frequent” 
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(ibid., p. 75). True facts are indeed related to each other, but “the immense majority of 
these relations are fortuitous and irregular” (ibid.). Thus how can it be that we can think 
that regularity exists, and moreover, that man is likely to uncover it? 
 Peirce explains that “the validity of induction depends simply upon the fact that 
the parts make up and constitute the whole” (ibid., p. 79). What is required for induction 
to be valid, then, is simply for there to be a reality (ibid.). We have distinguished reality 
from unreality as that to which the community of men would agree to, in contrast to a 
matter apparent to you alone; this is connected to the communal nature of knowledge 
(1868b/1992, p. 52). Thus anything that “affects all men”—even an illusion—is real 
(1869/1992, p. 80). If anything at all exists, then there is reality (ibid.). After a long 
enough time, “a sufficiently long succession of inferences from parts to whole will lead 
men to knowledge of” the whole (ibid., p. 79). If there was no nature but rather an 
“unreality” whereby “the order of things (as they appear in experience), would . . . 
undergo a revolution” as men uncovered them—for example, by divine action—then 
such an unreality would also be able to be uncovered through induction (ibid., p. 79–80).  
 Peirce acknowledges though that there is no guarantee that the use of induction 
will ultimately yield true understanding. We have no reason to think that consciousness 
should survive for the sufficiently long term. 
There cannot be a scintilla of evidence to show that at some time all living beings 
shall not be annihilated at once, and that forever after there shall be throughout the 
universe any intelligence whatever. (ibid., p. 82)  
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Ultimately, our efforts to seek true understanding rest not on reason or knowledge 
therefore, but rather on an “infinite hope . . . of success” (ibid.).41 It is thus only a 
hypothesis to suppose that knowledge is possible. But it is a hypothesis “rigidly 
demanded by logic” and not contradicted by facts. It is justified because of “its 
indispensibleness for making any action rational” (ibid.). 
c. Analysis 
Even with this important acknowledgement that there is no guarantee behind our 
efforts at understanding nature—which is in line with Peirce’s epistemological modesty 
throughout—it still seems like Peirce is begging the question here. What he explains 
about the possibility of uncovering reality is circular: We are able to uncover “reality” 
simply because what we humans are ultimately able to uncover is termed “reality.” This 
apparent circularity reflects his desire to define truth as both humanly attainable and 
objective. In this essay, he leans more heavily on the first part of this definition.  
He claims he has answered the religious objection because any kind of pattern or 
connection between things—even the changing of a law of nature as soon as it is 
discovered—would ultimately be figured out, with sufficient time and investigation 
(ibid., p. 80). Given that reality is understood as men’s ultimate agreement, Peirce falls 
back on the point that even if there is no order or regularity in “nature,” if regularity 
appears to men’s minds and is bolstered by experience over time, then that regularity is 
indeed real. To speak of a nature outside of what can be known to men does not 
                                                
41 Others have noted Peirce’s use of a regulative hope of ultimate consensus in his theory of 
reality, though they argue that Peirce only begins to qualify his theory of reality with this 
acknowledgment of hope after 1880. See, e.g., Hookway 2004, Murphey 1961. 
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ultimately have meaning. Moreover, as to the religious objection, if men do uncover 
regularities that hold true over time, then regardless of their root cause, they are still to be 
understood as real.  
In other words, if regularity is indeed ultimately uncovered in the long run, then 
though Peirce’s theory seems circular, it would also be vindicated. Peirce appears to be 
trying to provide a framework to serve as a foundation for rational inquiry; given the 
limitations of man’s mental functioning, Peirce tries to make clear what assumptions are 
necessary to support inductive reasoning. I would like to propose that Peirce’s 
presentation of the nature of human knowledge is in fact well characterized by his 
conclusion to this essay: his is an “hypothesis uncontradicted by facts and justified by its 
indispensibleness for making any action rational” (ibid., p. 82). An important question is 
whether his framework ultimately supports this rational inquiry, or whether the 
framework might actually work to undermine rational inquiry because it uncovers the 
kinds of assumptions upon which the inquiry rests.  
Finally, let us note that Peirce assumes the possibility of knowledge for the sake of 
rationality (ibid.). Rationality is presented as an end in itself, in other words. Whether this 
is because rationality promises happiness or dignity Peirce has not yet made clear. What 
does seem to be the case, though, is that while certain knowledge is only attainable in the 
long run—and so not for the individual investigator—living rationally is an available goal 
for a man’s life. 
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II. Review of The Works of George Berkeley (1871) 
 Peirce’s 1871 review of The Works of George Berkeley is largely a review of the 
nominalistic and realist traditions, dating back to William of Ockham and Duns Scotus. 
Peirce explains that modern philosophy has been entirely nominalistic, with its 
materialism and extension of simple mechanical principles (1871/1992, p. 104). He 
presents the realism of Duns Scotus as an alternative to the nominalism of modern 
philosophy, one that he understands to be akin to his own understanding of reality. The 
conception of reality and truth Peirce promotes follows from the preceding examination, 
most especially what has been said about the nature of inductive reasoning, the 
communal nature of truth, and that there is a real external. In its contradistinction to the 
nominalism of modern philosophy, Peirce’s realism, as he explains it, is one of 
practicality and common-sense (ibid., p. 91). Peirce’s realism both recognizes that 
knowledge of the world is dependent on the human mind, and maintains there is an 
objective external real; as we shall see, this is a difficult line to walk. 
a. Peirce’s Realism 
As opposed to dreams and figments of the imagination, what is real, Peirce 
explains, has  
an existence independent of your mind or mine or that of any number of persons. 
The real is that which is not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected by 
what we may think of it. (ibid., p. 88) 
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We know there are real things because “we find our opinions constrained” (ibid.).42 There 
must therefore be something that “influences our thoughts, and is not created by them” 
(ibid.). 
We have, it is true, nothing immediately present to us but thoughts. Those thoughts, 
however, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are constrained by 
something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly influences 
sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is 
independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. (ibid.) 
For the realist, things really are as they first appear to us (ibid., p. 91). There is no “thing 
in itself” (ibid., p. 90): 
To make a distinction between the true conception of a thing and the thing itself is . 
. . only to regard one and the same thing from two different points of view; for the 
immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the reality. (ibid., p. 91)  
The “noumena” is the “intelligible [conception]” that is the “last [product] of the mental 
action which is set in motion by sensation” (ibid., p. 90). 
Peirce illustrates what his realism entails with a discussion of the nature of color. 
The white of a white thing, while dependent on man’s perception, is nonetheless real.  
It is a real which only exists by virtue of an act of thought knowing it, but that 
thought is not an arbitrary or accidental one dependent on any idiosyncrasies, but 
one which will hold in the final opinion. (ibid.) 
Traits are thus real so long as they are not dependent on an individual’s arbitrary or 
accidental mind or prejudices. Peirce explains that in this view, he is following Kant’s 
“realistic view of reality” (ibid., p. 91). 
                                                
42 Peirce explains that this “is one view of reality, a very familiar one” (p. 88). It also seems to 
be his view of reality because it is in line with the realism he promotes in his own voice, c.f. 
discussion p. 91. 
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Peirce explains further that the realist position is that while all human thought has 
arbitrary elements in it, in the long run, sufficient consideration of a matter purifies it of 
its accidental elements and yields truth (ibid., p. 89).  
Let any human being have enough information and exert enough thought upon any 
question, and the result will be that he will arrive at a certain definite conclusion, 
which is the same that any other mind will reach under sufficiently favorable 
circumstances. . . . There is, then, to every question a true answer, a final 
conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. (ibid.) 
Peirce provides an example of a blind man and a deaf man witnessing the same 
phenomenon—a murder—to illustrate his point. The sense data each takes in will be 
different: one hears evidence of the murder and the other sees the murder occurring. 
“Their final conclusions,” though, “will be identical and free from the one-sidedness of 
their idiosyncrasies” (ibid.). As sensations become thought, in other words, what is 
accidental in an observation yields to what is objective. This truth is here presented to be 
of an entirely democratic nature: it is available to “any human being”—presumably then 
all human beings43—with sufficient examination. 
Even if an individual man does not home in on the truth, his opinion is nonetheless 
“constantly gravitating” toward it (ibid.).  
He may for a time recede from it, but give him more experience and time for 
consideration, and he will finally approach it. The individual man may not live to 
reach the truth; there is a residuum of error in every individual’s opinions. No 
                                                
43 That Peirce thinks truth is available to all human beings is furthermore supported by his 
presentation in the beginning of the review, in which he speaks about various stages of history 
and their accompanying philosophies; he presents philosophy in an historicist manner, with the 
ideas of all men constrained by their specific times and places. 
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matter; it remains that there is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on 
the whole and in the long run, tending. (ibid.) 
There are already many questions on which man has reached the “final agreement,” and 
“on all it will be reached if time enough is given” (ibid.). While individuals’ accidental 
circumstances or “arbitrary will[s]” might influence the path toward the final agreement, 
these accidental elements will ultimately not be able to “affect what the character of that 
opinion shall be when it is reached” (ibid.). 
It seems any accidental elements of thought will be shed over a sufficiently long 
examination, and what will remain will be what is objective, in other words, the real. 
This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought in general, but of all 
that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I, or 
any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in 
the final opinion is real, and nothing else. (ibid.)  
In an essay with an already pronounced Hegelian influence,44 Peirce here seems to be 
presenting a dialectical understanding of truth—except, instead of a dialectic of reasoning 
taking shape in history, we have a dialectic of man’s understanding of truth, with its 
increasing homing in on the truth. In the previous essay we saw that induction reveals 
truth in the long term, as an increasing amount of the parts are known; it is not clear, 
however, how the process of inductive reasoning purges arbitrary elements, unless we 
assume the inductions of many men, purified through their comparisons with one another.  
Peirce’s realism thus recognizes that reality is the product of mental activity, but 
one purified of the arbitrary or accidental elements of any individual’s mind. Peirce’s 
                                                
44 His Hegelianism is similarly evident in the beginning of this essay with his remarks about 
the progression of philosophic history and what we can learn in its various stages. 
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realism thus takes seriously man’s commonsense experience in the world, as this 
experience is the product of man’s mind making sense of what it has encountered, and 
contains within it the objective elements that constitute the truth of the matter: “The 
realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense position” (ibid., p. 91). The 
realist will think that “the very same objects which are immediately present in our minds 
in experience really exist just as they are experienced out of the mind,” and he will not 
pretend to doubt that on which “universal agreement prevails” (ibid.). He will maintain 
that the “immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the reality,” and as such he 
will “believe in the objectivity of all necessary conceptions, space, time, relation, cause, 
and the like” (ibid.). In other words, it is nonsense to say these concepts only exist in the 
phenomena—as men experience them—but not in the “thing-in-itself”; because they are 
necessary components of man’s perception and making sense of the world, they are as 
real as anything is. 
While Peirce appears to have thus far been teetering between presenting reality as 
that which is external to man that constrains man’s opinion, and that which men 
ultimately agree upon, at this point he leans heavily toward the latter of these 
characterizations. He explains first that “idle and fictitious doubts” are not entertained 
because for the realist, “it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality” 
(ibid.). And then he goes so far as to say that what the realist wants is simply 
consensus—however it is achieved:  
What he wants . . . is to see questions put to rest. And if a general belief, which is 
perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way be produced, though it be by the 
fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in such belief is utterly absurd. (ibid.) 
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In “The Fixation of Belief,” we will see that Peirce does not think that torture can indeed 
permanently fix opinion—at least the opinion of everyone, though some form of control 
can certainly fix the opinions of many, even most, men. For the context of the present 
essay, however, let us note that the emphasis on consensus stated in this manner is in 
stark opposition to his earlier observation that there is a reality that constrains our 
opinion. This point seems furthermore to be in opposition to the notion that truth is 
reached by men in the long term. Articulated in the manner quoted above, it seems truth 
ought to be understood as that on which there is wide agreement at any point in time: that 
for a long period of time it would have been true that the sun revolved around the earth, 
and then it would have become true that the earth revolved around the sun.  
b. Logic and the Meaning of Our Conceptions 
Moreover, despite his ostensible realism throughout this review, Peirce also applies 
the razor of the nominalist Occam, it seems, when speaking about meaning. As was 
hinted at in the discussion in the previous chapter with regard to habits and effects and 
how we develop knowledge, Peirce explains here that we understand concepts by the 
effects they have—and that such effects are all we know of such concepts.  
What is the POWER of external things, to affect the senses? To say that people 
sleep after taking opium because it has a soporific power, is that to say anything in 
the world but that people sleep after taking opium because they sleep after taking 
opium? (ibid., p. 89)  
Saying something has a certain power is simply saying that you expect “a regularity in 
future events” relating to that thing, and that this expectation is wrapped up in “the 
conception of that thing” (ibid.). Thus, if two concepts fulfill the same end, they are in 
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fact the same: a “rule for avoiding the deceits of language is this: Do things fulfil (sic) the 
same function practically? Then let them be signified by the same word” (ibid., p. 102).  
c. Peirce’s Philosophical Project and the Relationship between Philosophy and Science 
Let us note that Peirce has phrased his conception of truth in such a way here that 
takes into account the hope that the sufficiently long run will indeed come about: “if time 
enough is given” (ibid., p. 89). He has not, however, acknowledged outright the 
hypothetical nature of his claim that agreement in the long run will be reached, but 
instead treats it as simply true. This manner of presentation suggests that Peirce has some 
agenda with his essay. He appears to be trying to persuade his readers to accept his 
hypothesis that examination conducted sufficiently far will yield agreement among 
examiners, and that this agreement is the only intelligible definition of “truth.” Below we 
will try to uncover the reason for this agenda.  
We also must ask why Peirce would want widespread acceptance of this 
hypothesis. Generally, hypotheses are confirmed or rejected through a test of their 
consequences. This raises the question we asked earlier regarding the relationship Peirce 
has in mind for philosophy and science, and why philosophy needs a new foundation. 
Thus we must ask: Does Peirce think that the widespread acceptance of this 
understanding will yield more information for man—even as science has more or less 
already been operating by a procedure in line with his hypothesis? Indeed, given that, if 
Peirce’s hypothesis was correct, science will eventually uncover the truth by itself, 
without any need of help from philosophy. What does philosophy, then, bring to the 
table? What is its role in uncovering knowledge? 
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In an obscure passage in this essay, Peirce seems to go so far as to admit that his 
presentation of truth and reality is ultimately merely an assertion. In the passage he 
explains that holding a position that is opposed to one he proposes would be no different 
from merely “asserting that there is a general drift in the history of human thought which 
will lead it to one general agreement, one catholic consent” (ibid., p. 89–90). But that 
seems to be precisely Peirce’s own position, and therefore perhaps an admission of what 
he is in fact doing. What he says next seems similarly to be his own position: “And any 
truth more perfect than this destined conclusion, any reality more absolute than what is 
thought in it, is a fiction of metaphysics” (ibid., p. 90). He explains that the understanding 
of truth laid out here “harmonizes with a belief in an infallible Church,” and thus would 
be “much more natural . . . in the Middle Ages than in Protestant or positivist times” 
(ibid.). This statement supports the observation we made in the previous chapter about 
the kinship between Peirce’s new philosophical foundations and scholasticism, as Peirce 
presents it in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.”  
There is reason to suspect, then, that Peirce’s ultimate aim is to provide a 
philosophical foundation that will motivate scientists to pursue knowledge—as the belief 
in god had motivated scholars in the Middle Ages. He explains the great motivating 
power a belief in god has had: 
If any one wishes to know what a scholastic commentary is like, and what the tone 
of thought in it is, he has only to contemplate a Gothic cathedral. The first quality 
of either is a religious devotion, truly heroic. One feels that the men who did these 
works did really believe in religion as we believe in nothing. (ibid., p. 86) 
The belief in god’s existence impelled the accomplishment of great feats.  
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The men of that time did fully believe and did think that, for the sake of giving 
themselves up absolutely to their great task of building or writing, it was well worth 
while to resign all the joys of life. Think of the spirit in which Duns Scotus must 
have worked, who wrote his thirteen volumes in folio, in a style as condensed as 
the most condensed parts of Aristotle, before the age of thirty-four. (ibid.) 
Thinkers were not burdened by concern for their own individuality, but instead with 
“universal truth” (ibid.), and matters were given careful and diligent consideration: 
Every part is worked out for itself as a separate problem, no matter how analogous 
it may be in general to another part. And no matter how small and hidden a detail 
may be, it has been conscientiously studied, as though it were intended for the eye 
of God. (ibid., p. 86–87)  
We thus see that Peirce acknowledges that the belief in God was a great motivator of 
scholarly pursuit. He acknowledges this at the same time he acknowledges that the 
“spirit” of the “ages of faith” was “not altogether admirable,” as “faith has its faults as a 
foundation for the intellectual character” (ibid., p. 86).  
Peirce’s assertion—that truth will converge in “one catholic consent” (ibid., p. 89–
90)—might then be an attempt to provide a sufficiently motivating goal to us men today 
who “believe in nothing” like the scholastics believed in God (ibid.). If this is the case, 
we should understand his chief concern to be that knowledge will not be sufficiently 
pursued in an age of skepticism, and his philosophical project to aim at explaining what 
truth is so as to continue to motivate men in its pursuit. The assertion that men’s opinions 
about reality will converge makes a sound intellectual foundation because—as we 
learned in “Grounds of Validity”—it is a hypothesis “rigidly demanded by logic,” not 
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contradicted by facts, and justified because of “its indispensibleness for making any 
action rational” (1869/1992, p. 82).  
Peirce’s philosophical project is thus best understood as twofold: an attempt to put 
philosophers or philosophical inquirers on firmer intellectual footing than they have 
before stood, as well as an effort to motivate them to work diligently toward uncovering 
the universally recognized truth—as the scholastics previously had been motivated. The 
pursuit of knowledge appears to be valued for its own sake, to be a good in and of itself; 
human reason considered man’s highest faculty, and truth as an end worth pursuing, 
simply. This is the position we suspected when exploring the “Grounds of Validity of the 
Laws of Logic.” The second of these goals points to the danger Peirce sees with Cartesian 
philosophy and the modern project: of leading to an extreme skepticism that produces a 
belief in “nothing,” sapping men’s motivation for philosophical pursuit and threatening 
the advance of knowledge. We will continue to explore Peirce’s underlying motivations 
and philosophical project. For now, let us turn to the heart of his articulations of his early 
pragmatism: “The Fixation of Belief” (1877) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” 
(1878). 
III. “The Fixation of Belief” 
“The Fixation of Belief” was written in 1877 as the first in a series of six papers on 
the logic of science (1877/1992, p. 109, note by the editors). This essay continues 
examining the nature of truth and how it is best uncovered. Whereas Peirce verged on 
sounding like a relativist in his review of Berkeley—with his welcoming of opinion set 
by “the fagot and the rack” (1871/1992, p. 91)—his presentation in this essay is more 
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refined and emphasizes instead the objective nature of reality. He similarly has a more 
refined and clearer presentation of the relationship between truth and man’s common 
sense experience in the world, and the process by which immediate perception is 
purified—in other words, how accidental attributes are shed and truth is approached, or 
the limits of human understanding. As Peirce explains his position more, questions about 
the coherence of his position also arise. Also of note: Peirce is here far less democratic 
with regard to the attainment of truth than he was in the review of Berkeley; and as with 
previous essays, history has a prominent role in Peirce’s presentation. 
a. Methods of Logic  
In this essay, Peirce reaffirms that logical validity depends on fact, not on what we 
are inclined to believe (1877/1992, p. 111–112). The aim of reasoning is to determine, 
“from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not 
know” (ibid., p. 111). While we “do generally reason correctly,” this is “an accident”: 
“the true conclusion would remain true if we had no impulse to accept it” (ibid., p. 112). 
The ability to reason well, while not an innate instinct, is a tool we can develop: “We 
come to the full possession of our power of drawing inferences the last of all our 
faculties, for it is not so much a natural gift as a long and difficult art” (ibid., p. 110). This 
formulation of truth thus points to the existence of an objective truth, independent of 
man, that with the right tools, man is able to uncover and comprehend. It is certainly not 
what the democratic masses agree upon or are inclined to believe. 
Peirce begins the essay by telling the story of the development of the tools of logic. 
He explains how for the Romans and “mediaeval schoolmen,” knowledge ultimately 
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rested on “a premise derived from authority” (ibid.). To Roger Bacon in the middle of the 
thirteenth century, it became clear that only through experience could anything be 
learned; Francis Bacon in turn insisted on learning through experiment (ibid.). Neither 
thinker’s conception would be accepted in its entirety by modern readers: Roger Bacon 
thought that the experience of “interior illumination” taught more than the external senses 
could—for example, about the transubstantiation of bread—and Francis Bacon’s “view 
of scientific procedure” was entirely inadequate (ibid.). Nonetheless, both men evidenced 
the nascent stages of the scientific method and the understanding that it is important to 
check theory with experience (ibid.). 
The methods of early scientists like Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo were closer 
still to those of modern scientists (ibid.). Kepler impressed on men’s minds the 
importance of testing their theories with evidence from experience. 
His greatest service to science was in impressing on men’s minds that this was the 
thing to be done if they wished to improve astronomy; that they were not to content 
themselves with inquiring whether one system of epicycles was better than another, 
but that they were to sit down to the figures and find out what the curve, in truth, 
was. (ibid.) 
Yet, without clear guidance on how best to conduct his research, Kepler set upon many 
futile paths before stumbling upon the right answer. This took much virtue—
“incomparable energy and courage” (ibid.)—but was also very inefficient. Kepler 
[blundered] along in the most inconceivable way (to us), from one irrational 
hypothesis to another, until, after trying twenty-two of these, he fell, by the mere 
exhaustion of his invention, upon the orbit which a mind well furnished with the 
 
 
126 
 
 
weapons of modern logic would have tried almost at the outset.45 (ibid., p. 110–
111) 
Peirce suggests, in other words, that the tools of logic can guide scientific experiment to 
make it more efficient. This is a key clue, then, as to another aspect of the role Peirce 
thinks philosophy—in this case, logic—ought to have in its relation with science: it can 
help science zero in on a correct understanding of reality. Like with the example of 
Kepler, every great work of science provides an example of “the defective state of the art 
of reasoning of the time when it was written” (ibid., p. 111). As such, “each chief step in 
science has been a lesson in logic” (ibid.). 
b. Logic, Psychology, and Mental Habits  
The second section of this essay ventures into examining the psychological 
processes with which man makes inferences. In other words, in almost the same breath in 
which Peirce explains that logic and psychology are different matters entirely, he once 
again veers into an examination of man’s psychology within a discussion of logic. Peirce 
posits an evolutionary explanation for man’s relation to logical thinking. It seems to be in 
our nature to think logically about practical matters: “Logicality in regard to practical 
matters is the most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result from 
the action of natural selection” (ibid., p. 112). In other respects we are entirely illogical:  
                                                
45 In his collection of Peirce’s writings, Philip P. Wiener notes that Peirce apparently amended 
this view of Kepler’s work in later years, commenting in 1893 that “Kepler’s work on Mars ‘is 
the most marvelous piece of inductive reasoning I have been able to find’” (Wiener 1958, p. 94 
fn3). Peirce’s comments about Kepler in “The Fixation of Belief” are nonetheless useful because 
they illustrate Peirce’s larger point regarding how the tools of logic can aid scientific 
examination. 
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Most of us, for example, are naturally more sanguine and hopeful than logic would 
justify. We seem to be so constituted that in the absence of any facts to go upon we 
are happy and self-satisfied; so that the effect of experience is continually to 
contract our hopes and aspirations. Yet a lifetime of the application of this 
corrective does not usually eradicate our sanguine disposition. Where hope is 
unchecked by any experience, it is likely that our optimism is extravagant. (ibid.) 
It is probably best for man’s survival that we are illogical in these ways—“of more 
advantage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, 
independently of their truth”—and thus illogicality in matters not of immediate practical 
importance is likely also the result of natural selection (ibid.). 
 Taking up, once more, the understanding of the role of habit discussed earlier, 
Peirce claims it is “some habit of mind” that determines the inferences we draw (ibid.). 
This habit can be either a part of our nature or acquired (ibid.). The goodness of our 
mental habits is judged by the rules of logic—an acknowledgment of the distinction 
between mental habits and logic:  
The habit is good or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from true 
premises or not; and an inference is regarded as valid or not, without reference to 
the truth or falsity of its conclusion specially, but according as the habit which 
determines it is such as to produce true conclusions in general or not. (ibid.) 
An example of an acquired habit of mind: observing that “a rotating disk of copper 
quickly comes to rest when placed between the poles of a magnet” and inferring “that this 
will happen with every disk of copper” (ibid.).  
In practical matters in which we are engaged on a regular basis, experience aids the 
mind in determining the best way to act, and the mind ultimately acts in a routine manner 
(ibid., p. 113). Thus a better understanding of mental habits “would probably be . . . of no 
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service to a person whose thought is directed wholly to practical subjects, and whose 
activity moves along thoroughly-beaten paths” (ibid., p. 112–113). But when a man is in 
an “unfamiliar field,” or is not “continually checked by experience,” guidance regarding 
mental habits is helpful. Let us remember what Peirce said about Kepler’s efforts: 
All history shows that the most masculine intellect will ofttimes lose his orientation 
and waste his efforts in directions which bring him no nearer his goal, or even carry 
him entirely astray. He is like a ship in the open sea, with no one on board who 
understands the rules of navigation. (ibid., p. 113)  
In such cases, “some general study of the guiding principles of reasoning” is useful 
(ibid.).  
Peirce’s position thus seems to be that through much familiarity and experience, the 
mind, perhaps unconsciously, develops efficient mental habits, which it employs by 
routine—which is of course what “habit” suggests. In areas in which one does not have 
much experience, by contrast, a serious study of logic can be of much aid. A serious 
study of logic can, in other words, be a substitute for long experience.  
 Peirce explains that a proper examination needs to delineate at the outset between 
those facts that can be examined, and those that are taken for granted in an examination. 
Many things are assumed when a logical question is asked: for example, that there are 
“states of mind as doubt and belief,” and that it is possible to pass from one to the other, 
“the object of thought remaining the same, and that this transition is subject to some rules 
which all minds are alike bound by” (ibid.). One consequence is that “conceptions which 
are really products of logical reflection . . . mingle with our ordinary thoughts” without us 
 
 
129 
 
 
being aware, and are thus “frequently the causes of great confusion” (ibid.). The concept 
of “quality” is an example:  
A quality as such is never an object of observation. We can see that a thing is blue 
or green, but the quality of being blue and the quality of being green are not things 
which we see; they are products of logical reflection. (ibid.) 
What this means is that our common sense conceptions “are deeply imbued with that bad 
logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied” (ibid.). This 
confusion can only be cleared up with a “severe course of logic” (ibid.).  
This recognition of the errors in our common sense experience is an apparent 
amendment to the common-sense realism that Peirce espoused in his review of Berkeley. 
In later years, as we shall see in the next chapter, Peirce explains that his is a “Critical” 
common sense philosophy (1905b/1998, p. 346). Our common sense understanding—
itself the product of our experience in the world—needs to be subjected to logic. 
c. Belief, Doubt, and Inquiry 
The third and fourth sections of “The Fixation of Belief” examine the experience of 
doubting and believing. Peirce has only discussed doubt thus far in the context of 
explaining why fake doubt—Cartesian doubt—is a distraction from fruitful questioning 
and thus the pursuit of knowledge. Here we learn about the distinction between fake 
doubt and real doubt. Continuing in the theme of evolution and history, Peirce presents 
real doubt and belief as physical states that determine our behavior, much like other 
physical states of the body, such as an irritated nerve. 
Doubt and belief are physical states that we sense, with the one feeling different 
than the other:  
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We generally know when we wish to ask a question and when we wish to 
pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity between the sensation of 
doubting and that of believing. (1877/1992, p. 114) 
Beliefs “guide our desires and shape our actions”; they indicate a habit in our nature that 
will determine our actions (ibid.). Belief is thus an indication of a potentiality in us: that 
we are conditioned to act in a certain way when a certain condition arises (ibid.). Peirce 
explains a biological analogue of belief is “that habit of the nerves” wherein “the smell of 
a peach will make the mouth water” (ibid.). 
Doubt, on the other hand, does not determine action, but is rather an irritating and 
uncomfortable feeling that indicates the lack of belief. It is “an uneasy and dissatisfied 
state from which we struggle to free ourselves” (ibid.). In contrast, we “cling tenaciously” 
to both believing and “believing just what we do believe” (ibid.). Doubt, for its part, 
“stimulates us to action until it is destroyed” and we are able to reach a state of “calm and 
satisfactory” belief (ibid.). Its biological analogue is “the irritation of a nerve and the 
reflex action produced thereby” (ibid.). 
Peirce uses the term “inquiry” to refer to the “struggle to attain a state of belief” 
(ibid.). The “irritation of doubt” is the immediate cause of inquiry (ibid.). More generally, 
inquiry is undertaken because we want beliefs that will successfully “guide our actions so 
as to satisfy our desires” (ibid.). As having such beliefs is “certainly best for us,” we will 
“reject any belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to insure this result” 
(ibid.). This indicates that a real doubt, as opposed to a Cartesian or fake doubt, emerges 
when our beliefs pose a problem for us—when acting on our beliefs does not result in the 
consequences we expect. Experience either confirms a belief or raises questions about 
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it—it is that which tests a belief’s strength. When a belief is brought into doubt by 
experience, inquiry starts, with the sole aim of reaching a firmer belief that is not shaken 
by one’s experience in the world (ibid., p. 114–115).  
Peirce explains that while we think we want a true opinion, not merely any opinion, 
in fact we settle for an opinion that simply satisfies the circumstances that prompted our 
initial doubt. 
We may fancy that . . . we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put 
this fancy to the test, and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is 
reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false. (ibid., p. 115)  
This proposition that “the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry” is “very 
important” because it “sweeps away . . . various vague and erroneous conceptions of 
proof” (ibid.). It does away with pretend Cartesian doubt, as we have noted. Doubt that is 
not real will take up mental energy, but will not propel the mind along a path of inquiry 
whereby it will grow and learn. 
The mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the 
mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without 
this all discussion is idle. (ibid.) 
Similarly, philosophical inquiry can rest on foundations no firmer than that of a 
proposition that is not doubted. 
It is a very common idea that a demonstration must rest on some ultimate and 
absolutely indubitable propositions. These, according to one school, are first 
principles of a general nature; according to another, are first sensations. But, in 
point of fact, an inquiry, to have that completely satisfactory result called 
demonstration, has only to start with propositions perfectly free from all actual 
doubt. (ibid.)  
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The absence of doubt is, in fact, as firm as a point can be, and thus it makes no sense to 
continue to argue about something about which “all the world is fully convinced” (ibid.). 
Continuing to argue about such matters would be entirely futile: “When doubt ceases, 
mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it would be without a 
purpose” (ibid.). This sounds very much like the realist position Peirce laid out in his 
review of Berkeley.   
What is confusing about this argument is that Peirce only just explained how our 
common sense understanding of the world is rife with confusion. Now he argues that 
propositions that are commonly accepted ought to be regarded as sufficiently sound. How 
exactly do we know which propositions are sufficiently sound—warranting belief—and 
which contain confused notions that need to be cleared up with further examination—
warranting, in other words, doubt? We will get more clarity on these questions when we 
examine “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” in the following section.  
d. Four Methods for Settling Doubt: The Virtues of the Scientific Method 
Now that Peirce has explained in what inquiry consists—searching for a belief that 
settles doubt—he spends the final section of this essay examining different stages of 
methods for settling doubt. Each method examined has its advantages and downsides, and 
each later method attempts to address the deficiencies of the method it displaces. In 
Peirce’s presentation, it seems as though the trajectory he presents is an historical and 
necessary one, like his presentation of the scholastic and modern philosophic approaches 
to truth in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” A close reading of this section, 
though, suggests that while there is something historical about the trajectory, it certainly 
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is not a necessary trajectory and in fact many individuals do not move along the 
trajectory but rather remain governed by one of the early methods, incapable of 
improving their method of understanding. As we shall see, man’s social instinct plays a 
primary role in the development of knowledge; second to man’s social instinct as a driver 
in the development of knowledge and methods of logic is the force of external, objective 
reality. 
(1) Method of Tenacity 
The method of tenacity is presented as the earliest method of settling doubt. It is 
characterized as:  
Taking any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it 
to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn 
with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it. (ibid.) 
The method of tenacity is the ordinary religious position. It is “pursued by many men” 
(ibid.), is at times “deliberately adopted,” and more often what results because men have 
an “instinctive dislike of an undecided state of mind” (ibid., p. 116). In contrast to the 
“vague dread of doubt,” a “steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind” 
(ibid.). It may be inconvenient at times, of course—such as if one believes that fire will 
not burn him46—but the man who sticks to this method must experience more pleasure 
from its certainty than pain from its inconveniences (ibid.). That some people are able to 
stick to this method even when it goes against experience suggests that even experience 
                                                
46  This example echoes the example of a hot stove from “Question Concerning Certain 
Faculties Claimed for Man” to illustrate the elements of experience and social testimony in our 
knowledge (1868a/1992, p. 20). This example quietly points to the importance of that second 
force of understanding, experience.  
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does not rattle the beliefs of some—that some people’s beliefs are impervious to the 
feedback of the external world.  
 There are layers to Peirce’s presentation of the method of tenacity; delving into 
these layers sheds light on his understanding of the soundness of that which is the 
opposite of this method, namely philosophy. On the surface is Peirce’s claim that we 
should not judge a man attached to this method for being irrational because he does not 
claim to be rational. Such a man will in fact “talk with scorn of man’s weak and illusive 
reason” (ibid.)—in other words, deride those who seek to understand the world around 
them. Proclaiming that a man attached to the method of tenacity is irrational would thus 
be “an egotistical impertinence”; it would amount simply to “saying that his method of 
settling belief is not ours” (ibid.). Here we have an acknowledgment by Peirce that there 
will always be men for whom reason is not a standard, and no argument is capable of 
persuading them otherwise.  
Underneath the surface, though, Peirce quietly mocks the person attached to the 
method of tenacity. He portrays the ordinary religious position as cowardly, if also happy.  
If it be true that death is annihilation, then the man who believes that he will 
certainly go straight to heaven when he dies, provided he have fulfilled certain 
simple observances in this life, has a cheap pleasure which will not be followed by 
the least disappointment. (ibid.)  
Peirce then compares such a person to an ostrich who “buries its head in the sand as 
danger approaches”; this is “very likely . . . the happiest course. It hides the danger, and 
then calmly says there is no danger” (ibid.). In other words, such a position entails hiding 
from the truth for the sake of a “cheap pleasure.” This criticism of cowardice and 
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dishonesty is consistent with Peirce’s surface teaching that calling this method irrational 
is not a sufficient criticism, if that was not the adherents’ criterion to begin with.47 Peirce 
acknowledges that an adherent of reason—the philosopher or scientist—can not convince 
a religious person of the superiority of reason, for any argument would entail applying 
the tools of reason; but at the least, he can point out the lack of fortitude and honesty on 
the part of a believer who refuses to question received articles of faith.  
 In addition to its lack of philosophic virtue, the method of tenacity has the 
significant flaw that it does not work well in practice (ibid.). The social impulse—that 
force that we have seen play a crucial role in the development of our understanding of the 
world—works against it (ibid.). 
The man who adopts [the method of tenacity] will find that other men think 
differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that 
their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his 
belief. (ibid.) 
Man’s social impulse is a product of evolution and natural selection, and is vital for the 
survival of the species (ibid., p. 116–117). While some individuals might be able to get 
by according to the method of tenacity, at the level of all men, burying one’s head in the 
sand is a poor survival strategy.  
                                                
47 Peirce’s acknowledgment that such a criticism would be begging the question by simply 
assuming the superiority of reason is an indication that Peirce is aware of a concern raised earlier: 
that he seems to be also assuming the superiority or even desirability of reason––that reason is its 
own end without his having given a justification for this assumption.  
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(2) Method of Authority 
Man’s social impulse requires that a method for settling doubt settle doubt for the 
community, not only for the individual. The method of authority is able to do this—it is 
like the method of tenacity for the whole community.  
Let the will of the state act, then, instead of that of the individual. Let an institution 
be created which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the 
attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the 
young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being 
taught, advocated, or expressed. (ibid., p. 117)  
Such a method requires, in addition, threatening those who do not tow the line: 
Let all men who reject the established belief be terrified into silence. Let the people 
turn out and tar-and-feather such men, or let inquisitions be made into the manner 
of thinking of suspected persons, and, when they are found guilty of forbidden 
beliefs, let them be subjected to some signal punishment. . . . A general massacre of 
all who have not thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of 
settling opinion in a country. (ibid.) 
Peirce explains that political and religious doctrines have been upheld by such means 
since the “earliest times” (ibid.). He points to the history of Rome and the Catholic 
Church— “from the days of Numa Pompilius to those of Pius Nonus”48—as a prime 
example of the application of such tactics, but explains that “wherever there is a 
priesthood . . . this method has been more or less made use of” (ibid.). The method is also 
employed in some form by any class of men—an aristocracy or a guild, for example—
                                                
48 The editors of The Essential Peirce note that Pius Nonus, otherwise known as Pope Pius IX, 
pope from 1846–1878, was the “prime mover in the acceptance, on 18 July 1870, of the doctrine 
of papal infallibility, an event that deeply impressed Peirce.” (Houser and Kloesel/1992, p. 377, 
note 19) 
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whose positions rest on the widespread acceptance of “certain propositions” (ibid.). 
Inevitably, the method entails cruelty, and when “consistently carried out,” will be seen 
as “atrocities of the most horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man” (ibid.). It is 
indeed “natural” that “sympathy and fellowship should . . . produce a most ruthless 
power” (ibid.). 
 The method of authority has many advantages—“immeasurable mental and moral 
superiority” (ibid., p. 117–118)—as compared with the method of tenacity. It is more 
successful at fixing belief, and has “over and over again worked the most majestic 
results” (ibid., p. 118). 
The mere structures of stone which it has caused to be put together—in Siam, for 
example, in Egypt, and in Europe—have many of them a sublimity hardly more 
than rivaled by the greatest works of Nature. (ibid.) 
While religious creeds do not really stay fixed over long periods of time, they change so 
slowly as to be imperceptible during a man’s life, “so that individual belief remains 
sensibly fixed” (ibid.). This is perhaps the best method of fixing belief “for the mass of 
mankind”; “if it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they ought to 
remain” (ibid.). Like in his treatment of the method of tenacity, it seems that there is 
thinly veiled contempt here, while at the same time an appreciation of the method’s 
advantages, given the nature of “the mass of mankind.” 
 A deficiency of this method—by which it seems Peirce means a feature that 
prevents it from fixing all belief for everyone for all time, so in other words, a practical 
deficiency—is that it is impossible for one person or institution to set an opinion on every 
topic. 
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No institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject. Only the most 
important ones can be attended to, and on the rest men’s minds must be left to the 
action of natural causes. (ibid.) 
This will not pose a problem for the method in the case of most men, on whom culture 
will act to prevent the doubting of authority. But some men will be driven by a wider 
social impulse and will be moved to question the legitimacy of authoritative opinion 
when other men in different times and places have thought differently.  
In the most priestridden states some individuals will be found who are raised above 
that condition. These men possess a wider sort of social feeling; they see that men 
in other countries and in other ages have held to very different doctrines from those 
which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and they cannot help 
seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have. . . . 
Their candor cannot resist the reflection that there is no reason to rate their own 
views at a higher value than those of other nations and other centuries; and this 
gives rise to doubts in their minds. (ibid.) 
This recognition will cause them to doubt not only this opinion or that, but every opinion 
that seems arbitrary (ibid.). It will be recognized that beliefs cannot be willfully adhered 
to, nor imposed on others, and a new method of settling doubt will be sought (ibid.).  
(3) A Priori Method 
A superior method will both “produce an impulse to believe,” as well as provide 
guidance on which propositions should be believed (ibid.). Because it is “natural causes” 
that interfere—at least for some men—with the method of authority, this next method 
will have to be in line with natural causes. As man’s social impulse seems to be chief 
among these natural causes, this method will consist of working with his social impulse 
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rather than against it. It will consist of men speaking with one another and discussing 
ideas to determine beliefs. No ideas and possibilities will be considered off limits in such 
a discussion. Man’s social impulse—through discourse—is at the center of this new 
method, which Peirce terms the a priori method.  
Let the action of natural preferences be unimpeded, then, and under their influence 
let men, conversing together and regarding matters in different lights, gradually 
develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes. (ibid.)   
The a priori method resembles the method of artists; it does not rely upon “observed 
facts, at least not in any great degree,” but rather upon propositions that are “‘agreeable to 
reason’”—in other words, “that which we find ourselves inclined to believe” (ibid., p. 
118–119). Plato’s teaching that “the distances of the celestial spheres from one another 
should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious 
chords,”49 and “Kepler’s theory, that the celestial spheres are proportional to the inscribed 
and circumscribed spheres of the different regular solids,” are both examples of applying 
the a priori method (ibid., p. 119). While some will find Plato’s position more agreeable 
and others will prefer Kepler’s, ultimately men will be led by “the shock of opinions . . . 
to rest on preferences of a far more universal nature” (ibid.).  
 The a priori method of settling doubt is “far more intellectual and respectable 
from the point of view of reason” than are the other two methods we have examined—
those of tenacity and authority—but “its failure” has also been the “most manifest” 
(ibid.). Inquiry turns into a matter of taste, which “unfortunately, is always more or less a 
                                                
49 A citation to the Timaeus 35-39 and Epinomis 990-992 (Houser and Kloesel/1992, p. 377 
n20). 
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matter of fashion” (ibid.). Metaphysics thus swings from one philosophy to another 
without reaching “any fixed agreement” (ibid.). “The pendulum has swung backward and 
forward between a more material and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times 
to the latest” (ibid.). Thus, while this method “promised to deliver our opinions from their 
accidental and capricious element,” it ultimately failed to do so (ibid.). The a priori 
method does thus “not differ in a very essential way from that of authority” (ibid.). 
(4) The Method of Science  
Those who do not want opinions that are the result of accidents will seek a method 
of settling doubt that is superior to that of a priori. This next method will speak to that 
other important force that has been almost absent thus far in this essay: experience, or the 
feedback of reality. It will be superior because it will not be checked by human opinion, 
but by something external to the individual man: “caused by nothing human, but by some 
external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (ibid., p. 
120). Such a thing must “be something which affects, or might affect, every man” (ibid.). 
The method must be one that yields the same conclusion, though individuals will be 
affected by the external thing in various ways (ibid.). This is the method of science. Thus 
we see that other important force of knowledge—reality—enters back into the discussion.  
The method of science rests on the fundamental hypothesis that there is a reality 
(ibid.); we indeed deduced that this was Peirce’s implicit assumption in his 1869 
“Grounds of Validity” essay. Spelled out, the assumption upon which science operates is 
that 
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There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions 
about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though 
our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking 
advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things 
really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experience and reason enough about 
it, will be led to the one true conclusion. (ibid.) 
Of the methods Peirce explores in this essay, only the method of science takes reality into 
account (ibid.). 
Peirce acknowledges that he could be accused of circularity if he were to attempt to 
prove the existence of reality by pointing to scientific conclusions, which of course rest 
on this assumption (ibid.). He addresses this accusation with four arguments. The 
multitude of arguments he gives speaks to both the difficulty of proving reality—of 
proving that there exists an objective external world, available to all men, and thereby 
justifying science—and the thought Peirce has given to the matter. That Peirce provides 
many arguments here moreover suggests that he has not been entirely satisfied with how 
he has addressed the issue up until this point. His method of argument once again 
illustrates his proposal in “Some Consequences” of the need to attack problems with 
multi-form arguments.  
Here is his four-fold response: (1) while investigation might not able to prove there 
are real things, it also will not prove there are not real things; “the method and the 
conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony” (ibid.). Thus, unlike with the 
other methods examined, “no doubts of the method . . . necessarily arise from its 
practice” (ibid.). In other words, it is in line with—and thus will not be shaken by—our 
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experience. This is of course similar to the justification he gave in “Grounds of Validity,” 
only there with regard to the assumption that the sufficiently long run will materialize.  
(2) Implicit in the irritating feeling of doubt that spurs us to inquiry is the 
assumption that there is a correct answer to the doubt.  
The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at 
two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is 
some one thing to which a proposition should conform. (ibid.)  
Doubt thus entails the assumption of reality. No one then really doubts reality—or, if he 
did, the doubt would not be a source of irritation, and thus would not prompt him to 
inquiry. Similarly, the social impulse—that other force that produces knowledge—will 
not cause us to doubt this assumption (ibid.).  
(3) Peirce’s third argument in favor of the assumption of reality and the scientific 
method is a naturalistic one of sorts: men in fact already apply the method of science to 
“a great many things” (ibid.). They do not use it only in those matters in which they do 
not know how to apply it. Finally, (4) Peirce explains that the use of the method further 
does not lead to doubt because of its great success in producing conclusions that can be 
widely accepted.  
Experience of the method has not led me to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific 
investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion. 
(ibid.) 
These are the reasons, Peirce explains, that he does not doubt the scientific method or the 
assumption of reality upon which it rests (ibid.). Without real doubt, then, “it would be 
the merest babble for me to say more about it” (ibid., p. 120–121). If someone indeed has 
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a “living doubt upon the subject,” then he should pursue the question further (ibid., p. 
121).  
 Another virtue of the scientific method is that, of the four methods examined, 
only it presents a clear standard for judging the soundness of a proposition—in other 
words, “any distinction of a right and a wrong way” (ibid.). The standard of the method 
of tenacity is whatever I may think; the only test for the method of authority is what the 
state may think. Peirce holds up Hegel as an illustrative example of the standard of the a 
priori method, portraying his method as not significantly different, in fact, from those of 
tenacity and authority:  
The very essence of the [a priori method] is to think as one is inclined to think. . . . 
The Hegelian system recognizes every natural tendency of thought as logical, 
although it be certain to be abolished by counter-tendencies. Hegel thinks there is a 
regular system in the succession of these tendencies, in consequence of which, after 
drifting one way and the other for a long time, opinion will at last go right. (ibid.) 
In other words, for Hegel, every tendency of thought is legitimate, as is every counter-
tendency; what is right can not be known at any of the intermediate stages, but rather 
only at the end of time when the whole is understood. The a priori method, moreover—
Peirce claims—ultimately simply follows the lead of science.  
It is true that metaphysicians get the right ideas at last; Hegel’s system of Nature 
represents tolerably the science of that day; and one may be sure that whatever 
scientific investigation has put out of doubt will presently receive a priori 
demonstration on the part of the metaphysicians. (ibid.)  
The a priori method is thus not contributing to advancing knowledge, which is its aim. 
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By contrast, the scientific method provides concrete guidance as to what it does and 
does not support.  
The test of whether I am truly following the method is not an immediate appeal to 
my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the application of the 
method. (ibid.) 
What is this guidance? Despite his praise for the scientific method in “The Fixation of 
Belief,” Peirce does not give a clear statement in the essay of what exactly the scientific 
method is. To better understand how the method provides “concrete guidance” in inquiry, 
we will briefly turn to a later discussion of the scientific method from Peirce’s 1901 
“Laws of Nature” essay.  
Peirce explains that science consists of generalizing and explaining phenomena 
(1901b/1998, p. 73). When confronted with a phenomenon in need of explanation, the 
scientific man will conjecture as to its cause; his conjectures “will be suggested by the 
phenomena,” and indeed, “unless there be something like inspiration in them, he never 
could make a successful step” (ibid.). His conjectured explanations then need to be tested, 
a process that “ought to be governed solely by considerations of economy”; for example, 
it makes sense to first test a hypothesis that is unlikely to be true, and which can thus be 
disposed of by a single experiment (ibid.). Once a hypothesis has been “provisionally 
adopted, on probation,” Peirce explains:  
the effort ought to be to search out the most unlikely consequences of it that can be 
thought of, and that is among those that are readily capable of being brought to the 
test of experiment. (ibid., p. 73–74)  
A failed prediction may mean that the theory is wrong, or that it simply needs to be 
altered (ibid., p. 74). On the other hand, if the unlikely prediction is “verified,” and if it 
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continues to be verified by subsequent experiments, “although each time the most 
unlikely of the (convenient) predictions has been tried,” then the theory proves its 
strength: “one begins to doff one’s cap to the rising star that nature herself seems to 
favor” (ibid.). Even these “rising star[s]” are accepted only provisionally: “indeed, the 
presumption is that the time will come when it will have to be reformed, or perhaps even 
superseded” (ibid.). We see from this description that the scientific method consists of 
continuously fine-tuned feedback between man’s mind and the external world; the mind 
offers suggestions of connections between observed phenomena by way of explanation—
hypotheses—which experience in the external world—experiment—either confirms or 
rejects.  
Returning to “Fixation,” Peirce explains further that the fact that both good and bad 
reasoning is possible is “the foundation of the practical side of logic” (1877/1992, 121). 
In other words, because a priori reasoning can go both well and erroneously, and on its 
own has no way of straightening itself out, ideas must be tested in experience. Only 
“rough facts” can awaken us from the pleasant dream that the a priori method leaves us 
in (ibid.). 
(5) Peirce’s Philosophical Project 
In concluding “Fixation,” Peirce provides us hints of his intended philosophical 
project: what is behind it, and what it is after. He discusses the advantages of the first 
three methods of settling doubt over the scientific method, explaining that in certain 
respects they are easier to adhere to. “The a priori method is distinguished for its 
comfortable conclusions”—it allows one to think as one is inclined (ibid.). The method of 
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tenacity is admirable “for its strength, simplicity, and directness” (ibid., p. 122). Men 
who use it act decisively.  
They do not waste time in trying to make up their minds what they want, but, 
fastening like lightning upon whatever alternative comes first, they hold to it to the 
end, whatever happens, without an instant’s irresolution. (ibid.) 
Such a method of reasoning will “generally accompany brilliant, unlasting success” 
(ibid.). 
The method of authority is the method that will always govern the masses. 
Governments will always think there are some thoughts too dangerous to not be 
suppressed (ibid., p. 121). Public opinion will then step in to govern what government 
does not: 
If liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the grosser forms of constraint, then 
uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral terrorism to which the 
respectability of society will give its thorough approval. . . . Let it be known that 
you seriously hold a tabooed belief, and you may be perfectly sure of being treated 
with a cruelty less brutal but more refined than hunting you like a wolf. (ibid., p. 
121–122) 
Given this, the greatest minds do not openly express all of their thoughts:  
The great intellectual benefactors of mankind have never dared, and dare not now, 
to utter the whole of their thought; and thus a shade of prima facie doubt is cast 
upon every proposition which is considered essential to the security of society. 
(ibid., p. 122) 
The torment comes not only from without, but also from within: “a man torments himself 
and is oftentimes most distressed at finding himself believing propositions which he has 
been brought up to regard with aversion” (ibid). We are reminded of Peirce’s claim in 
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“Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” about the effect the opinions 
of others have on our understanding: “testimony is even a stronger mark of fact than the 
facts themselves” (1868a/1992, p. 19). Adhering to the method of authority is thus “the 
path to peace”: “the peaceful and sympathetic man will . . . find it hard to resist the 
temptation to submit his opinions to authority” (1877/1992, p. 122).50  
 In closing his essay, Peirce exhorts his reader that if he wants his opinion to 
“coincide with the fact” then his method will be that of science (ibid.). It is only this 
method that promises to uncover reality—that which is external to individual men. 
“There is no reason why the results of [the other] three methods should do so” (ibid.).  
Up until this point, Peirce’s account has been naturalistic: he has taken the tone of a 
dispassionate observer, describing phenomena as they occur. Methods of inquiry fail 
because they do not work—they do not settle doubt. Those who are not satisfied by a 
given method do not need its deficiencies explained to them; they run into the 
deficiencies, and thus experience doubt, through their own activity in the world. Yet here 
Peirce makes a concerted effort to promote the scientific method. He veers away, in other 
words, from the dispassionate tone of the scientist who observes nature, and instead aims 
to ignite a great desire in his audience to pursue knowledge. If one wishes to pursue 
knowledge, Peirce explains, one ought to adopt the scientific method as one’s method of 
inquiry. It is no longer a matter of simply what method of inquiry works for an 
individual; adopting the scientific method becomes a moral imperative.  
                                                
50 Peirce’s skepticism about the possibility of universal enlightenment runs counter to the way 
in which democratic theorists attempt to use his epistemology to support a theory of democratic 
politics, as discussed in the introduction to this dissertation. See, e.g., Talisse (2005), Misak 
(2000). 
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It is possible to overcome an attachment to the method of inquiry to which one is 
habituated, Peirce explains, by reflecting upon the virtues and vices of the different 
methods and one’s own habits (ibid.). Once real doubt sets in, a man should discard those 
beliefs that he “cannot help feeling rest on nothing”—just as a reformed Muslim ought to 
change his views on the proper relations of the sexes, or a reformed Catholic ought to 
change his views on the permissibility of reading the Bible (ibid., p. 122–123). The 
“integrity of belief” is “more wholesome than any particular belief”; it is thus both 
immoral and disadvantageous to “avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear 
that it may turn out rotten” (ibid., p. 123). Anyone who “confesses” that there is a reality 
or a truth51 ought to seek it, and seek it fully, he explains (ibid.). A “clear logical 
conscience” is a virtue (ibid.). Like all virtues—and “all that we cherish”—it will “[cost] 
us dear (sic)” (ibid.). No matter—“we should not desire it to be otherwise” (ibid.). A 
man’s logical method should be “loved and reverenced” like his “bride, whom he has 
chosen from all the world” (ibid.). Having chosen her, “he will work and fight for her,” 
no matter how difficult; he “will strive to be the worthy knight and champion of her from 
the blaze of whose splendors he draws his inspiration and his courage” (ibid.).  
What is the reason for Peirce’s efforts to instill doubt among his readers regarding 
the soundness of the other methods of inquiry? The most obvious explanation is in order 
                                                
51 It is worth noting that the definition of truth Peirce presents here—that truth is 
“distinguished from falsehood” in that it “will carry us to the point we aim at and not astray” if 
we act on it (ibid., p. 123)—differs significantly from the definition he presented in his review of 
Berkeley, wherein he defined reality as that on which the community will ultimately agree. The 
definition of truth presented in “Fixation” in fact bespeaks a heavier reliance on what is external 
to man than does the earlier definition. It is also consistent with the far less democratic nature of 
“Fixation” in general. At the same time, reality has an explicitly hypothetical nature in 
“Fixation”; the existence of reality is presented as an hypothesis, illustrating what Peirce said 
earlier about philosophy taking its lead from the method of science. 
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to convince them to adopt the method of science rather than those of a priori or authority. 
However, would not such an effort be at odds with Peirce’s earlier point that doubt can 
not be forced (ibid., p. 115)? Recognizing this, we are pointed to the suggestion that 
Peirce has a more profound motive: to protect the search for truth—pure science—
simply. If doubt can not be forced, it would then seem that Peirce senses that among a 
group of inquirers—namely, those whose opinions are not settled by the method of 
authority—there already was much doubt as to the soundness of the a priori method. 
That method has, after all, failed to “deliver our opinions from their accidental and 
capricious element,” as witnessed by the fact that “metaphysicians have never come to 
any fixed agreement” (ibid., p. 119). What Peirce in fact needs to do is not to convince 
his readers that the a priori method is insufficient at uncovering truth, but rather convince 
them that settling opinion about reality is indeed possible. He highlights the virtues of the 
scientific method and the inadequacies of the other methods, then, in order to argue that 
the scientific method will not fail to uncover reality—to lead to a consensus of opinion—
in the ways the other methods have failed. In other words, Peirce is aiming to convince 
his readers that knowledge is possible. This understanding complements well our earlier 
hypothesis that behind Peirce’s philosophical project is the goal of motivating men to 
investigation, as the belief in God had motivated them in the time of the Scholastics. 
IV. “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” 
In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”—published in January 1878 as the second essay 
in the series on science—Peirce introduces the logical maxim that James later refers to as 
the defining statement of pragmatism: 
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Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object. (1878/1992, p. 132) 
We will closely examine this essay to better understand what lies behind this maxim. A 
close examination will also illuminate the relationship between philosophy and science 
that Peirce envisions—how philosophy can and should aid natural science—and why 
philosophy ought to be pursued. In addressing these issues, Peirce ties together features 
of his thought that, up until this point, might have seemed unconnected—such as the role 
of induction in the formation of habit and the connection between habit and the mental 
states of doubt and belief. This essay continues in the somewhat naturalistic vein that we 
have seen throughout his writings thus far; the crux of the essay is concerned with 
deriving the core logic, and thus purpose, of a mental feature by observing how it 
functions. This is reminiscent of the presentation of thoughts as signs in “Questions 
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” and seems akin to treating features of 
thought as an evolutionary biologist treats the physical features of a species. Similarly, 
Peirce appears to be trying to derive laws of logic that are comparable to the physical 
science’s laws of nature. Let us explore how these components come together in the 
essay. 
a. Logic and Clear Ideas 
Peirce explains that logic ought to help us better understand the meaning of our 
ideas. We see here one important complementary role philosophy ought to play in 
relation to natural science: 
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We have a right to demand that logic shall teach us . . . how to make our ideas 
clear. . . . To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will make a 
solid foundation for great and weighty thought. (1878/1992, p. 126) 
For the individual man, “a few clear ideas are worth more than many confused ones” 
(ibid., p. 127). A clear understanding can help direct one away from futile inquiry, and 
toward a fruitful direction: It is only by clearing up his thought that a man can avoid 
wasting his “intellectual vigor” on a “single unclear idea” that might consume him for 
years, but ultimately prove fruitless—like the “circle-squarers” (ibid.). 
The modern study of logic—dating to Descartes’s “reconstruction of philosophy” 
(ibid., p. 125)—had itself sought ideas that are “clear and distinct,” but it did not provide 
adequate guidance for distinguishing clear ideas from those that merely seemed to be 
(ibid., p. 124–125). We see here a combination of Peirce’s presentation of the scholastics 
and the Cartesians in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” coming together with 
his presentation of the methods of authority and a priori in “The Fixation of Belief.” 
Peirce once again explains that in Descartes’s efforts “to discard the practice of the 
schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth,” he replaced their 
standard with “a more natural fountain of true principles,” which he thought he found “in 
the human mind” (ibid., p. 125). The way his method of “apriority” was to work was that 
“self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what 
was agreeable to reason” (ibid.). True ideas were to be denoted by their clearness and 
distinctness, though Descartes “did not explain himself with precision” as to what these 
two terms meant (ibid.). Peirce adds here that “the most essential point of the Cartesian 
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philosophy” is that accepting “propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing 
which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing” (ibid., p. 126).  
Because of its shortcomings, Descartes’s method is no longer fit to “modern uses” 
(ibid.) and a new “method of attaining to a more perfect clearness of thought” is needed 
(ibid., p. 125).  
That much-admired “ornament of logic”—the doctrine of clearness and 
distinctness—may be pretty enough, but it is high time to relegate to our cabinet of 
curiosities the antique bijou, and to wear about us something better adapted to 
modern uses. (ibid., p. 126) 
Descartes’s method is, in short, now outdated. (We see here for at least the second time 
that what is contemporary is presented as de facto good, and what is outdated as bad.) 
The “principles set forth” in “The Fixation of Belief” provide far better guidance 
for attaining clear and distinct ideas than do Descartes’s principles. Quietly replacing 
what he had termed “inquiry” with “thought” simply, Peirce reminds the reader that in 
the previous essay we have found that “the action of thought is excited by the irritation of 
doubt,” ceasing “when belief is attained” (ibid., p. 127). From this phenomenon—which 
Peirce presents here as more or less established fact—he explains that we learn the 
essence of thought: “the production of belief” is the “sole function” of thought (ibid.). 
This point is made more forcefully later in the essay: Thought’s “sole motive, idea, and 
function, is to produce belief” (ibid., p. 129). Other possible results of thought—such as 
amusement—are only incidental to it (ibid.).  
The soul and meaning of thought, abstracted from the other elements which 
accompany it, though it may be voluntarily thwarted, can never be made to direct 
itself toward anything but the production of belief. (ibid.)  
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Peirce—with his framework that appears to have a biological character—then presents 
the behavior of thought as if it acts according to a law of nature, in a conclusion 
reminiscent—though an inverse—of Newton’s first law of motion52: “Thought in action 
has for its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest” (ibid.). The suggestion 
that Peirce is treating thought as a naturalistic phenomenon is further supported by his 
remark that “it is as if I had described the phenomena as they appear under a mental 
microscope” (ibid., p. 127). It seems, in short, that Peirce is trying to determine rules of 
logic that imitate modern science’s “laws[s] of Nature” (ibid., p. 135).  
b. Doubt and Belief and Deriving the Purpose of Thought 
Peirce here elaborates on the nature of doubt and belief. Doubt is what arises when 
one hesitates about how to act—when there is no habit, denoting belief, on how to act in 
a given circumstance. “Most frequently doubts arise from some indecision, however 
momentary, in our action” (ibid., p. 128). As we discussed above, doubt sets thought in 
motion: “it stimulates the mind to an activity which may be slight or energetic, calm or 
turbulent” (ibid.). We have “attained belief” when “we find ourselves decided as to how 
we should act under such circumstances as those which occasioned our hesitation” (ibid.).  
Belief is something “we are aware of,” something that “appeases the irritation of 
doubt,” and something that “involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action . . 
. a habit” (ibid., p. 129). Thus we see Peirce’s earlier thought on habits and induction 
                                                
52 Newton’s first law of motion: a body in constant motion will remain in motion unless acted 
upon by an external force; or, as Peirce states it later in the essay: “If bodies were left to 
themselves, without the intervention of forces, every motion would continue unchanged both in 
velocity and in direction.” (1868/1992, p. 133) 
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brought together with what he has said more recently about the mental states of doubt and 
belief. As the irritation of doubt is appeased, “thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a 
moment when belief is reached” (ibid.). Belief is in reality only a temporary resting 
place, though: because its essence is to be a “rule of action,” further action will raise 
“further doubt and further thought” (ibid.). Thus while belief is a “stopping-place,” it is at 
the same time “also a new starting-place for thought” (ibid.). 
Peirce provides a mundane example to illustrate what he has in mind by doubt and 
belief.  
If there is the least hesitation as to whether I shall pay the five coppers or the nickel 
(as there will be sure to be, unless I act from some previously contracted habit in 
the matter), though irritation is too strong a word, yet I am excited to such small 
mental activity as may be necessary to deciding how I shall act. (ibid., p. 128) 
That is real doubt. Peirce explains he provides this example because he wants to make 
clear that he does not refer to the mental states of belief and doubt only in the context of 
“religious or other grave discussions” (ibid.). 
Peirce here also explains that fake doubt—“feigned hesitancy”—about how one 
should act also plays “a great part in the production of scientific inquiry” (ibid.). This 
latter point is puzzling: It seems to be in opposition to what he said earlier in “The 
Fixation of Belief” about the difference between real and fake doubt. Perhaps what is said 
here can be seen as complementing, or clarifying, rather than contradicting what was said 
earlier if we understand that the key Peirce is getting at here is acting: doubt—whether 
real or feigned—is productive only if it involves the question of how one is to act. An 
example he provides of feigned doubt that arises out of boredom supports this suggestion:  
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I have . . . to wait in a railway-station, and to pass the time I read the 
advertisements on the walls, I compare the advantages of different trains and 
different routes which I never expect to take, merely fancying myself to be in a 
state of hesitancy, because I am bored with having nothing to trouble me. (ibid.) 
Descartes’s “[theoretical] . . . skepticism” (ibid., p. 125) as to whether or not he existed 
would not fit this bill because his asking the question reveals his true beliefs on the 
matter—that he had enough belief in his existence to perform the action of asking—thus 
indicating that he was merely taking part in a mental exercise rather than pursuing a 
solution to a real doubt. In other words, Descartes’s doubt was not real because if it were, 
he would not have been able to so much as ask a question. 
Because the essence of belief is habit—a rule of action—a belief ought to be 
understood as the action it entails (ibid., p. 129). This means the same habit denotes 
equivalent beliefs:  
Different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they 
give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by 
producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of 
consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a 
tune in different keys is playing different tunes. (ibid., p. 129–130) 
This point was hinted at in “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” as we observed in 
the previous chapter, and stated more explicitly in the review of Berkeley. Understanding 
this point about meaning can clear up metaphysical confusion and help us get a better 
grasp of our muddled ideas by allowing us to recognize when two ideas that might seem 
different are in fact the same:  
Imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their 
mode of expression. . . . Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion 
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of beliefs really different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly 
to beware, especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. (ibid., p. 130)  
By a similar token, Peirce warns against mistaking “a mere difference in the grammatical 
construction of two words for a distinction between the ideas they express” (ibid.). 
To protect against such confusion of thought—or, as Peirce puts it, “these 
sophisms”—we need only to the remember that the  
function of thought is to produce habits of action; and that whatever there is 
connected with a thought, but irrelevant to its purpose, is an accretion to it, but no 
part of it. (ibid., p. 131) 
Any “unity among our sensations” that has no bearing on how we should “act on a given 
occasion” is not, then, to be considered thought (ibid.). It follows from this understanding 
of the essence of thought that the meaning of something is best understood as the habit of 
action it entails: “To develop its meaning, we have . . . simply to determine what habit it 
produces, for what a thing means is simply what habit it involves” (ibid.). It is thus “what 
is tangible and practical” that is the “root of every real distinction of thought” (ibid.).  
c. Peirce’s Logical Maxim 
From his determination that the function of thought is to create habits of action—in 
other words, having derived the essence of thought based on his analysis of the mental 
states of belief and doubt—Peirce derives his logical maxim:  
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object. (ibid., p. 132) 
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This is the maxim that William James publicized as the pragmatic maxim; it is through 
the application of this maxim that logic can help us better understand what we think. (It is 
important to note that Peirce himself remarks in this essay that an idea may be clear 
without it being true (ibid., p. 141).)  
 To illustrate how this rule of reasoning can help clear up confusion, Peirce turns 
to the example of transubstantiation—specifically, the disagreement between Protestants 
and Catholics on the matter. The disagreement concerns whether the wine and wafers 
used in the communion sacrament are literally blood and flesh or only metaphorically so.  
The Protestant churches generally hold that the elements of the sacrament are flesh 
and blood only in a tropical sense; they nourish our souls as meat and the juice of it 
would our bodies. But the Catholics maintain that they are literally just that; 
although they possess all the sensible qualities of wafer-cakes and diluted wine. 
(ibid., p. 131)  
Peirce explains we can cut through the disagreement by applying his maxim of meaning. 
Let us examine our conception of wine: according to Peirce’s maxim, our conception of 
wine is comprised of our beliefs about its properties and is indicated to us by how we are 
habituated to act when we come across it.  
Such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon occasion, act in 
regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities which we 
believe wine to possess. . . . Thus our action has exclusive reference to what affects 
the senses, our habit has the same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our 
habit, our conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean 
nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses. 
(ibid.) 
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Thus to “talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in 
reality blood, is senseless jargon” (ibid.). By applying Peirce’s maxim, we determine that 
Catholics and Protestants do not in fact disagree “about the elements of the sacrament” 
(ibid., p. 132). 
Having examined transubstantiation according to his rules of logic, Peirce then 
claims to back off from religious proclamations: “it is not my object to pursue the 
theological question” (ibid., p. 131). It is hard to take this claim seriously, of course, 
given that he chose this example of transubstantiation as the first example with which to 
demonstrate the application of his maxim. The implication of this example is that despite 
what a pious Catholic might think, his real belief is that the liquid served during 
communion is simply wine, and not Christ’s blood. The implication more broadly is that 
Peirce’s maxim ought to be applied to theological disputes—if, that is, a person wants to 
have a clear understanding of what he thinks. It would of course be possible for an 
individual to—either willfully or ignorantly—remain in a state of confused ideas. Most 
men, after all, are fated to remain guided by the method of authority.  
 Peirce next applies his maxim to several modern metaphysical concepts—“hard,” 
“weight,” and “force”—before ultimately returning to the concept of “reality.” What we 
mean by “hard” is simply that a hard thing “will not be scratched by many other 
substances” (ibid., p. 132). With regard to “weight,” heaviness indicates “simply that, in 
the absence of opposing force,” a heavy body “will fall” (ibid., p. 133). Peirce stresses 
that “the idea of Force” is especially important to comprehend because of the “principal 
part” it has played in “directing the course of modern thought, and in furthering modern 
social development” (ibid.). 
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This is the great conception which, developed in the early part of the seventeenth 
century from the rude idea of a cause, and constantly improved upon since, has 
shown us how to explain all the changes of motion which bodies experience, and 
how to think about all physical phenomena; which has given birth to modern 
science, and changed the face of the globe. (ibid.) 
It is, in addition, a concept “muddled” in “men’s minds”: it is often spoken of as a 
“‘mysterious entity’” in works of philosophy, indicating that many despair “of ever 
getting a clear notion of what the word means!” (ibid., p. 136). Peirce’s rule of meaning 
prescribes that we “begin by asking what is the immediate use of thinking about force”: it 
is by force that we “account for changes of motion,” and thus it should be understood 
(ibid., p. 133). The conception of force embodies the “grand fact” that 
If the actual changes of motion which the different particles of bodies experience 
are each resolved in its appropriate way, each component acceleration is precisely 
such as is prescribed by a certain law of Nature, according to which bodies in the 
relative positions which the bodies in question actually have at the moment, always 
receive certain accelerations, which, being compounded by geometrical addition, 
give the acceleration which the body actually experiences. (ibid., p. 135)  
This is all the idea of force represents. It is a “self-contradiction” to say that “we know 
what the effects of force are” but we do not understand “what force itself is” (ibid., p. 
136). To “say that a force is an acceleration, or that it causes an acceleration, is a mere 
question of propriety of language”; there is no more difference in meaning between the 
two phrases as there is “between the French idiom ‘Il fait froid’ and its English 
equivalent ‘it is cold’” (ibid.).  
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d. Reality 
Peirce returns to the concept of reality, which we have seen he has had difficulty 
both defining and justifying. Up until now Peirce has defined reality as that which is 
external to men, and that which men will agree upon at the end of inquiry—variously 
emphasizing one or the other of these definitions in the different essays. In “The Fixation 
of Belief,” the notion of reality was a late development of sorts: it distinguished the 
method of science from the other methods of settling doubt, but by the same token, was 
portrayed as less influential in the development of knowledge as compared with man’s 
social impulse. Confirming our observations regarding the trickiness Peirce sees in this 
concept, Peirce remarks here how the concept of reality is both used with ease by 
children while it would at the same time “puzzle most men . . . to give an abstract 
definition of the real” (ibid.). Peirce then repeats the definition of reality on which he 
seems to be relying more heavily of late: “that whose characters are independent of how 
you or I think is an external reality” (ibid.). He explains that this definition is reached 
when you try to distinguish what is real from a figment of imagination—from what one 
has dreamt, for example (ibid., p. 136–137). Peirce nonetheless admits that “however 
satisfactory” this definition of reality “may be found” to be, it is still less than “perfectly 
clear” (ibid., p. 137).  
To apply Peirce’s maxim of understanding in order to clear up our understanding of 
this concept, we must consider “the peculiar sensible effects which things partaking of it 
produce” (ibid.). Reality’s effect is to act as a backdrop for all our beliefs about that 
which exists around us: “The only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all 
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the sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs” (ibid.). 
The concept of reality thus acts as a necessary hypothesis as we engage with the world.  
e. Methods for Settling Doubt 
At this point in the essay, Peirce returns to discussing the various methods of 
settling doubt. His focus here is not man’s overwhelming social impulse—that which was 
presented in “Fixation” as the primary logic that drives man’s transition from one method 
of settling doubt to another. Rather, the explanation given here of that which drives man 
forward along the trajectory of methods of understanding is man’s natural propensity for 
reasoning: “Reason is too natural to men” for “the method of tenacity” to have ever 
“prevailed exclusively” (ibid.). 
Peirce explains that different methods for settling doubt can reign at the same time, 
often even in individual men. He cites a scholastic thinker who is guided by the method 
of tenacity at the same time that he is guided by the method of authority, and provides a 
humorous example of his having made up an explanation out of thin air: 
When Scotus Erigena is commenting upon a poetical passage in which hellebore is 
spoken of as having caused the death of Socrates, he does not hesitate to inform the 
inquiring reader that Helleborus and Socrates were two eminent Greek 
philosophers, and that the latter having been overcome in argument by the former 
took the matter to heart and died of it. (ibid.) 
Peirce adds that “the real spirit of Socrates . . . would have been delighted to have been 
‘overcome in argument,’ because he would have learned something by it” (ibid.). 
During the time of the scholastics, when the “method of authority prevailed,” truth 
was understood simply as “the Catholic faith” (ibid., p. 138).  
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All the efforts of the scholastic doctors are directed toward harmonizing their faith 
in Aristotle and their faith in the Church, and one may search their ponderous folios 
through without finding an argument which goes any further. (ibid.) 
In such times, “the idea of loyalty [replaces] that of truth-seeking” (ibid.). In the a priori 
age harmony of one’s system is more important than is what one can learn from the facts 
(ibid.). Men of this system do not expect consensus of opinions to be reached, in other 
words, for belief to ever “be settled” (ibid.).  
It is of course different with the method of science. Those who follow it seek to 
confirm theories with facts, and thus to persuade all others who follow it.  
The followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if 
only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which 
they can be applied. (ibid.) 
Key to the method of science is that you can approach a question from various different 
angles, and still reach the same fated conclusion: 
One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and 
the aberration of the stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of 
Jupiter’s satellites; a third by the method of Fizeau; . . . a ninth, may follow the 
different methods of comparing the measures of statical and dynamical electricity. 
They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his method and his 
processes, the results will move steadily together toward a destined centre. (ibid.) 
In other words, the method of science can point its practitioners to those opinions fated to 
be final—those opinions that experience will not bring into doubt, and to which all men 
who investigate (albeit according to the method of science) can assent.  
Let us note, of course, the assumption that there is one fated opinion at which men 
who observe nature will arrive. This assumption is another way of stating the assumption 
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of reality—the existence of something real outside of individual men that is real for all 
men. We have seen, of course, this assumption quietly justified in “Grounds of Validity 
of the Laws of Logic,” and more explicitly in “The Fixation of Belief” because of its 
indispensability for rationality and the fact that it is not brought into doubt by the activity 
of reason.  
 In this essay, rather than bringing attention to the assumption being employed 
here and its justification, Peirce talks up the method of science’s power at pointing 
inquirers toward the fated opinion, in almost a mystical way. He explains that even if 
“different minds” start out “with the most antagonistic views,” “the progress of 
investigation” will carry “them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same 
conclusion” (ibid.).  
This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a 
foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of 
view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can 
enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. (ibid.)    
That science should point to one “predestinate opinion” is a “great law” that is “embodied 
in the conception of truth and reality” (ibid., p. 138–139).  
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is 
what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. 
That is the way I would explain reality. (ibid., p. 139) 
As we said, if there is something independent of one man that is true of all men, the 
scientific method—which bases itself on those external facts—is the way to uncover it. 
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f. The Nature of Reality and Truth 
At this point Peirce enters into a discussion in which he admits the seeming tension 
between the two definitions of reality he has given—(1) that truth is what is external to 
all men, and (2) that truth is what men ultimately think—and explains how the two 
positions are in fact entirely reconcilable, or in fact, the same. For one thing, truth 
understood as what men ultimately think is different from truth being dependent on what 
a particular group of men think:  
But the answer to this is that, on the one hand, reality is independent, not 
necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of 
men may think about it; and that, on the other hand, though the object of the final 
opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not depend 
on what you or I or any man thinks. (ibid., p. 139) 
Circumstances may postpone the arrival of the true opinion for a long time, and maybe 
indefinitely: 
Our perversity and that of others may indefinitely postpone the settlement of 
opinion; it might even conceivably cause an arbitrary proposition to be universally 
accepted as long as the human race should last. (ibid.) 
The nature of the true opinion would, nonetheless, not change: “Yet even that would not 
change the nature of the belief, which alone could be the result of investigation carried 
sufficiently far” (ibid.). To repeat: Truth does not depend at all on the opinions of any 
group of men at any given time, or where investigation does end up. It is what 
investigation ought to uncover, given sufficient time.  
Peirce moreover remains sanguine that if the human race were to be extinguished, 
other rational creatures would be capable of further investigation and thus of uncovering 
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the true opinion—in a claim that reminds the reader of Kant’s extension of moral 
capabilities to all reasonable beings, not just human beings. 
If, after the extinction of our race, another should arise with faculties and 
disposition for investigation, that true opinion must be the one which they would 
ultimately come to. “Truth crushed to earth shall rise again,” and the opinion which 
would finally result from investigation does not depend on how anybody may 
actually think. (ibid.) 
Thus arbitrary circumstances or an asteroid extinguishing man from the earth will not 
affect what the true opinion is. The reality of the true opinion—“of that which is real”—
depends simply on “the real fact that investigation is destined to lead, at last, if continued 
long enough, to a belief in it” (ibid.). All the true opinion depends on is that there be 
sufficient time for reality to be investigated.  
In other words, as we have said, truth understood as dependent on what men think 
at the end of inquiry is not subjective—the process of inquiry will shed what is accidental 
or arbitrary about an opinion, and it will be agreed to by all who investigate. This is at the 
same time, importantly, a very human truth—the limit of what is available to the human 
mind to comprehend about the world. This is how Peirce’s two formulations of reality are 
reconciled.  
g. Reason 
At the end of this essay, Peirce provides some clues about that question we have 
been asking throughout: Why is reason desirable, such that it justifies the assumption of 
reality and warrants our pursuit? Peirce explains that true ideas—which he seems to 
equate with ideas that are “vital and procreative”—advance civilization and make up “the 
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dignity of man” (ibid., p. 141). This image begins to account for Peirce’s pursuit of 
philosophy, and his rhetorical attempts to attract students similarly to its pursuit. We will 
continue to explore this issue in the following chapters. 
V. In Sum 
Although Peirce sounds like a relativist at times—most especially when he suggests 
in the 1871 review of Berkeley that what men really want is settled opinion, however it is 
settled, including by the “fagot and the rack”—in fact his theory of truth points to what is 
independent of man and thus true for all men. Truth is a human concept, but is 
constrained by what is real and external to man—it can not be chosen or created. Truth is 
the limit of what is available to the human mind, and what is independent of any 
particular human mind.53 It is thus available to any human mind, though it is not 
dependent on what any person or group of people happens to think.  
Because, among the methods of settling doubt, only the scientific method tests 
propositions against experience, only the scientific method promises to home in on this 
truth and shed what is merely arbitrary or accidental. Most people will remain governed 
by the method of authority, so practically speaking we do not expect all men to reach the 
true opinion. Rather, we approach inquiry with the hope that it is the fate of some 
inquirers to uncover those propositions that will not be unsettled by further experience, 
and to which others who have sufficiently investigated the matter will assent.  
                                                
53 Buchler (1940) has similarly understands “truth” for Peirce as being independent of what 
any particular community of inquirers thinks (p. xiv). 
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We have seen that science relies on the assumption of reality—not necessarily of 
the assumption of a permanent nature, but simply that there is something real outside of 
the individual human mind, to which the human mind has access and will thus uncover 
given sufficient time for inquiry. This assumption is behind any investigation for truth or 
dissatisfaction with a belief. It is also justified because, in addition to it not being 
unsettled—but is, rather, affirmed—by investigation, it is also necessary for the sake of 
reason. This raises the question of why reason ought to be pursued. Why ought we pursue 
knowledge? 
As we have seen thus far, Peirce explains that true ideas make up the “dignity of 
man” (1878/1992, p. 140). Truth is desired simply, and not for the purposes of being used 
for man’s practical advantage. Like Kant’s good will, the pursuit of reason is a good that 
might interfere with our well-being—it might “[cost] us dear” (1877/1992, p. 123),54 but 
such is the case with all that we “cherish” (ibid.). The noble nature of truth justifies these 
costs.  
Philosophy provides a foundation for natural science by articulating the nature of 
truth. By explaining the nature of the knowledge available to mankind, Peirce appears to 
be aiming to motivate men to inquiry. This is necessary because we modern men “believe 
in nothing” like the scholastics believed in God—a belief that motivated them to great 
feats (1871/1992, p. 86). In explaining that it is the pursuit of truth that makes up the 
dignity of man, Peirce aims to ignite a passion for the pursuit of truth in his reader, a 
passion that might replace the powerfully motivating belief in God. In an age of 
                                                
54 See the Introduction chapter for a comparison of reason for Peirce and Kant’s good will. 
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skepticism,55 this passion needs to be ignited, but also educated. Peirce thus 
simultaneously tries to arouse his audience to the pursuit of truth by making clear that 
truth is attainable, while also explaining the nature of this truth so as to modify 
expectations. If you think you want to know the “thing-in-itself” behind the phenomenon, 
you are mistaken; human knowledge is of phenomena, and this knowledge grows richer 
through experience—both one’s own experience, and the experience of others. 
Given the nature of knowledge, we must begin inquiry where we actually are. We 
begin, in other words, at our common sense understanding. We maintain our common 
sense understanding until it runs into problems in our experience—when a “real and 
living doubt” as to how to act arises (1877/1992, p. 115). Once a doubt arises, we 
investigate. Investigating according to the scientific method consists of positing 
hypotheses about the world and then checking them in experience. With its investigation 
into the nature of belief, doubt, truth and inquiry, philosophy thus aids natural science by 
steering scientists away from meaningless questions or futile tasks, and toward questions 
about which there really is some doubt. 
The study of logic similarly has a complementary role to play in relation to natural 
science. It aids investigation by clarifying the meaning of our ideas—by helping us to be 
“masters of our own meaning” (1878/1992, p. 126). Peirce’s logical maxim—that an idea 
means what sensible effects we expect of it—aims to clear up our understanding by 
explaining what abstract concepts like “force” mean; alerting us when two concepts or 
                                                
55 Peirce explained in an 1863 talk that the skepticism raised by Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason—“perhaps, the greatest work of the human intellect”—profoundly affected all subsequent 
thought (1863/1958 p. 7–8). 
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words that appear to mean different things are in fact synonymous; and cutting out what 
is extraneous to a concept’s core meaning. This logical maxim results from Peirce’s 
analysis of the mental states of doubt and belief, and focuses on the “tangible and 
practical” of an idea (ibid., p. 131). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 In a paper delivered in 1898 to the University of California (Berkeley) 
Philosophical Union, William James introduces the doctrine of “pragmatism” and 
attributes it to Peirce (James 1898/2011, p. 66). James credits Peirce—“one of the most 
original” of his contemporaries—as having set him upon the direction of the pragmatic 
“trail of truth,” and explains that he first heard Peirce speak of the doctrine of pragmatism 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the early 1870s (ibid.). Following James’s public 
introduction of pragmatism, many begin writing about the doctrine, claiming to be among 
its adherents. This, coupled with criticism Peirce receives regarding his 1878 formulation, 
prompts Peirce to revisit pragmatism in the last decades of his life. Beginning with a 
series of lectures at Harvard in 1903 and continuing until his death in 1914, Peirce seeks 
to clarify what precisely pragmatism means, upon what foundations it rests, and what 
follows from it. To better understand Peirce’s doctrine, we will explore this later 
treatment; our examination will entail an examination into Peirce’s clarification as to 
what pragmatism means, its nature as a doctrine, and the relationship between 
pragmatism and metaphysics. In this examination we will explore pragmatism as a 
common-sense philosophy as well as its connection to scholastic realism. 
I. Pragmatism and Pragmatists 
Echoing James’s account, Peirce explains that “pragmatism” was a term he 
“used . . . continually in philosophical conversation since, perhaps, the mid-seventies” 
(1905c/1998, p. 335). Though its name was not used, its idea was introduced in writing in 
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the 1878 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1903b/1998, p. 134). Peirce explains that 
objections raised to pragmatism following the 1878 essay caused him to reexamine his 
maxim: 
I am free to confess that objections to this way of thinking have forced themselves 
upon me and have been found more formidable the further my plummet has been 
dropped into the abyss of philosophy, and the closer my questioning at each new 
attempt to fathom its depths. (ibid., p. 133)  
Following James’s 1898 talk, many started writing about pragmatism, alleging to be 
carrying its torch (1903b/1998, p. 134). The objections raised to pragmatism coupled 
with Peirce’s desire to distinguish his doctrine from what he saw suddenly coming into 
vogue—the pragmatism of the “brood of young” philosophers (ibid., p. 134)—prompts 
him to revisit the doctrine. 
 On the one hand, Peirce sees some affinity with, or at least a beneficial effect 
pragmatism has had on, these others who claim to be pragmatists: “It seems to me clear 
that their approximate acceptance of the Pragmaticist56 principle . . . has helped them to a 
mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that other philosophers have seen 
but through a mist” (1908a/1998, p. 450). Peirce explains that such truths include  
their denial of necessitarianism; their rejection of any “consciousness” different 
from a visceral or other external sensation; their acknowledgement that there are, in 
a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits . . . ; and their insistence upon interpreting all 
                                                
56 In “What Pragmatism Is” (1905) Peirce renames his doctrine “pragmaticism”: a name 
“ugly enough” to keep it “safe from kidnappers” (the fate of “pragmatism”) (1905c/1998, p. 335). 
Because Peirce reverts to using “pragmatism” to refer to his doctrine in later writings, I will 
continue to do so here as well to avoid confusion. “Pragmatism” and “pragmaticism,” in reference 
to Peirce, ought to be understood as synonymous throughout this dissertation. 
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hypostatic abstractions in terms of what they would or might (not actually will) 
come to in the concrete. (ibid.)  
On the other hand, Peirce sees in those who claim to be pragmatists a lack of interest in 
logic; a concern only with action and consequences and not with the intellectual purport 
revealed by pragmatism; and a misunderstanding of Peirce’s formulation of the nature of 
truth for the erroneous conclusion that truth is whatever one believes it to be.57 In a letter 
to the Italian pragmatist Mario Calderoni, circa 1905, Peirce explains that pragmatists 
like “[F. C. S.] Schiller, [William] James, and [John] Dewey” propound “the ultra 
pragmatism notion that action is the sole end and purpose of thought” (1905d, CP 8.205, 
CP 8.212; emphasis in original). He explains elsewhere that the pragmatism of “Mr. 
Schiller and the pragmatists of today” seems to be “characterized by an angry hatred of 
strict logic” (1908a/1998, p. 450). They furthermore confuse what they are satisfied with 
for what is true: 
If Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual satisfaction, but must be the 
satisfaction which would ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its 
ultimate and indefeasible issue. (ibid.) 
This misguided conception of truth stops inquiry rather than facilitating it; it is used as an 
excuse to ignore abstract philosophical questions and concepts.  
It seems to me a pity they should allow a philosophy so instinct with life to become 
infected with seeds of death in such notions as that of the unreality of all ideas of 
infinity and that of the mutability of truth, and in such confusions of thought as that 
of active willing (willing to control thought, to doubt, and to weigh reasons) with 
willing not to exert the will (will to believe). (ibid.)  
                                                
57 In contrast to those mentioned in this paragraph, Peirce saw a kindred spirit in Josiah 
Royce; he thought he was the only one around him who understood what he was getting at.  
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The concluding remark here reminds the reader of William James’s The Will to Believe.58   
II. Pragmatism’s Grounding: A Reconsideration 
Objections to pragmatism raised since its original formulation lead Peirce to rethink 
his doctrine’s grounding.  
I am free to confess that objections to this way of thinking have forced themselves 
upon me and have been found more formidable the further my plummet has been 
dropped into the abyss of philosophy, and the closer my questioning at each new 
attempt to fathom its depths. (1903b/1998, p. 133) 
The fact that the pragmatic maxim is useful does not prove that it is true (ibid.). Its 
logical soundness similarly does not prove its correctness. Peirce points out that 
Ockham’s razor is “no doubt . . . logically sound”; yet,  
One may very properly entertain a suspicion of any method which so resolves the 
most difficult questions into easy problems. . . . We may very well doubt whether a 
very simple hypothesis can contain every factor that is necessary. Certain it is that 
most hypotheses which at first seemed to unite great simplicity with entire 
sufficiency have had to be greatly complicated in the further progress of science. 
(ibid.) 
Neither utility nor logical soundness is sufficient to prove pragmatism’s truth; it needs a 
proof.  
Peirce regrets having originally rooted his principle in psychological analysis, as he 
did by basing the argument for pragmatism in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” on the 
nature of belief. 
                                                
58 Another place where Peirce apparently takes a dig at James’s pragmatism is in his fourth 
Cambridge Conferences lecture, where he advocates for the “Will to Learn” (1898, lecture 4, p. 
170).  
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The argument upon which I rested the maxim in my original paper was that belief 
consists mainly in being deliberately prepared to adopt the formula believed in as 
the guide to action. (ibid.)  
There are reasons to doubt that belief simply concerns practical consequences—that it is 
a “mere nullity so far as it does not influence conduct” (ibid., p. 141). For example: 
“What possible effect upon conduct can it have . . . to believe that the diagonal of a 
square is incommensurable with the side?” (ibid.). Peirce admits that this original 
argument “was so flimsy . . . that I must confess the argument of that essay might with 
some justice be said to beg the question” (1908a/1998, p. 450). 
The problem is not simply that Peirce begged the question with regard to the nature 
of belief. The larger problem is that a “psychological principle” is ultimately not an 
adequate resting place for a philosophical argument: “I do not think it satisfactory to 
reduce such fundamental things to facts of psychology” (1903b, EP 2 p. 140). Rather than 
stopping at saying that this is how man’s mind works, we must ask why it is that this is 
how man’s mind works. “Why has evolution made man’s mind to be so constructed?”— 
in other words, what is it about nature that man’s mind is fitted in this way (ibid.)? If 
pragmatism were simply based on psychology, then the meaning it yielded would only 
bespeak that psychology. For it to yield objective truth—truth about that which is 
independent of the human mind—pragmatism needs to be based on something objective, 
in other words, also independent of the human mind.59  
                                                
59 For a more elaborate discussion on this, see Hookway 1985, p. 285 ff.  
 
 
175 
 
 
III. Pragmatism’s Grounding 
Because Peirce was dissatisfied with his early psychological grounding of 
pragmatism—a grounding based on the mental states of belief and doubt and an assertion 
about what desire lies behind these states—he set about in his later years to provide 
pragmatism with a firmer grounding. In a series of 1903 lectures at Harvard, Peirce 
attempts to ground pragmatism upon categories of phenomena, which make up the 
fundamental components of man’s experience in the world. As opposed to the normative 
sciences—esthetics, ethics, and logic—phenomenology “contemplates phenomena as 
they are,” “describes what it sees,” and states “what it finds in all phenomena alike” 
(1903b/1998, p. 143). It is “the science which Hegel made as his starting point” (ibid.). 
Peirce attempted to ground the normative science on his phenomenology, and in turn to 
ground his phenomenology on that science which is not positive: namely, mathematics 
(ibid., p. 144). It seems Peirce thought that to be proved right, pragmatism must not rest 
on man’s psychology, but rather on something objective. Mathematics, as the ultimate 
foundation, would provide that universal and ideal foundation. 
We will not dwell here on his attempted proof of 1903 because Peirce continues to 
search for firm foundations. What is important to note is Peirce’s admission of having 
considered challenges to pragmatism since its first written formulation, his dissatisfaction 
with the arguments he has thus far given for it, and his new desire to provide it with 
firmer foundations. Again, these foundations can not be simply arbitrary or accidental, or 
to rest on mere utility. To be philosophically compelling, pragmatism has to rest on 
something objective. 
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In 1907 Peirce once again looks to ground pragmatism. This time, he grounds it not 
on the phenomenological categories but rather on his theory of signs. Peirce’s theory of 
signs is a philosophy of mind, an explanation of conscious thought; it gives an account of 
the relationship between the human mind and the objects that are external to and 
constraining on the mind.60 Semeiotics provides a more objective starting point because it 
rests on what is independent of the human mind rather than on psychological desires.  
Every word, thought, or idea is a sign. A sign is in a three-way relationship 
between an object, its sign, and the effect of the sign on its interpreter, which Peirce 
terms the “interpretant.” 
A sign has . . . three references: first, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; 
second, it is a sign for some object to which in that thought it is equivalent; third, it 
is a sign, in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object. 
(1868b/1992, p. 38)  
A sign has three kinds of interpretants: feelings, effort, and intellectual (1907/1998, p. 
430). The intellectual meaning of a sign is a consequence of a sign upon the mind (ibid., 
p. 431); of a general nature (ibid., p. 418); and concerns what is real, what is independent 
of what any particular mind might think—it is upon the intellectual interpretant that 
“arguments concerning objective fact may hinge” (ibid., p. 421). The intellectual 
meaning of a sign can be given by a verbal definition (ibid., p. 430). But the words that 
make up a definition are themselves signs that need interpretation (ibid.). “This 
                                                
60 See, e.g., Short (2004); Skagestad (2004). Short (2004) explains that the “term 
‘semeiotic’ is a transliteration of the Greek word Locke introduced, at the end of his 1690 Essay, 
to name a new ‘doctrine of signs.’” Nonetheless, Short continues, “it should be emphasized . . . 
that Peirce’s concept of thought was Kantian, not Lockean: thought, for Peirce, is always 
conceptual, hence, general in content” (p. 216).  
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consideration compels us to seek elsewhere than among signs . . . since they are all signs, 
for ultimate intellectual interpretants” (ibid.).61  
Experimental investigation will show that to believe the concept in question is 
applicable to anything is to be prepared under certain circumstances, and when actuated 
by given motives, to act in a certain way (ibid., p. 432). “Under given conditions, the 
interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way, whenever he may desire a 
given kind of result” (ibid., p. 418). Habits rest not on other signs—intellectual 
interpretants themselves in need of definition—but rather on what is external to and 
constraining on the mind. Habits are thus the ultimate logical interpretants—they are the 
“real and living logical” meaning of a concept (ibid., p. 418).62 It is through our habits 
that our inner world acts upon the outer world (ibid., p. 419). 
Peirce illustrates what he means with a problem of mathematics—“experimentation 
in the inner world” (ibid., p. 418). Thinking about a “collection of seventeen single 
members involves . . . the act of counting in the imagination” (ibid., p. 432). This 
involves generalization: “the action must be generalized into a habit connected with the 
predication of seventeen” (ibid.). Generalizing one’s effort “is habit” (ibid.). Habit, as 
opposed to mere energetic action, has the generality that an ultimate intellectual 
                                                
61 Notice the difference between this late theory of semiotics and the early theory as it was 
introduced in the 1868 “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”—examined in this 
dissertation’s first chapter—where it was signs all the way down. Short (2004) explains that 
“Many writers have adopted a version of Peirce’s early theory as if it were his only theory of 
signs, from which they have derived ideas of ‘unlimited semiosis’ (Eco 1976: 68–72) and 
‘indefiniteness of reference’ (Derrida 1974: 49)” (Short 2004, p. 237). 
62 Here we see here for the first time Peirce bringing together his pragmatism and 
semeiotics, thereby making each stronger than they were by themselves. Short (2004) calls this a 
“fundamental revolution in doctrine,” and explains that this joining of pragmatism and semeiotics 
is for both doctrines “a step away from a too extreme intellectualism” (p. 228–229).  
 
 
178 
 
 
interpretant requires (ibid., p. 418). A description of the habit—action in response to 
certain stimuli with the intention of a certain result—is the “the most perfect account of a 
concept that words can convey” (ibid.).  
This semeiotic examination of meaning has thus led us to the pragmatic maxim.  
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conceptions of the object. (1878/1992 p. 132) 
One’s habituated response to a concept reveals that concept’s intellectual meaning. Peirce 
explains to Calderoni that pragmatism was never about conduct but rather always about 
habit:  
I deny that pragmaticism as originally defined by me made the intellectual purport 
of symbols to consist in our conduct. On the contrary, I was most careful to say that 
it consists in our concept of what our conduct would be upon conceivable occasions. 
(1905d, CP 8.208)  
The pragmatic maxim aims to home in on a matter’s experiential truth, purifying it of 
what is accidental or subjective. It is the logical application of the scientific method—it 
checks our understanding with that which is real, in other words, which is external to how 
any particular mind thinks (1907/1998, p. 400–401).  
IV. Revisiting the Meaning of Pragmatism 
The popularization of pragmatism prompts Peirce to clarify its meaning—among 
other reasons, because he is afraid James’s formulation had repelled “many thinkers 
whom I should reckon among pragmatists” (1907/1998, p. 421). He clarifies that the 
pragmatic maxim is a maxim of logic, not metaphysics; moreover, it does not scoff at 
 
 
179 
 
 
metaphysics the way that positivism does. Pragmatism is a common-sense philosophy, 
but of a critical nature. Peirce also understands pragmatism to support scholastic realism, 
in contrast to the nominalism of modern philosophy.  
a. Logic, Not Metaphysics 
In a 1903 lecture at Harvard, Peirce clarifies that, in contrast to that of the “brood 
of young” philosophers who have begun to write about pragmatism, his pragmatism is 
not a “sublime principle of speculative philosophy” (1903b/1998, p. 134). He similarly 
writes to Calderoni that “Pragmatism is not a system of philosophy. It is only a method of 
thinking” (1905d, CP 8.206). In a 1907 essay he explains that “Pragmatism is, in itself, 
no doctrine of metaphysics” (1907/1998, p. 400). Rather, it is a doctrine of logic, which 
aims at uncovering the intellectual content of an idea—that upon which “objective fact 
may hinge” (ibid., p. 421). The pragmatic maxim, by pointing to the effects we conceive 
of an object having—in other words, the habits that are at the root of our understanding—
aims at identifying this intellectual core.  
The pragmatic maxim is essentially applying the “experimental method”63 to ideas 
(ibid., p. 400). It cuts out what is extraneous, or beside the point, in a belief while 
highlighting what is essential to it. This future-oriented maxim “eliminates” an idea’s 
“sential element” and translates its meaning based on how it is “applicable to human 
conduct” (1905c/1998, p. 341). The maxim highlights the “very essence or reality of what” 
a word “signifies” (1905c/1998, 342). 
                                                
63 That same method “by which all the successful sciences . . . have reached the degrees of 
certainty that are severally proper to them today” (1907/1998, p. 400–401). 
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This maxim of logic is a modern day “Ockham’s razor,” ready to “clean shave off” 
any talk of “entities of whose existence you can know nothing” (1905c/1998, p. 336). 
What the pragmatist has his pragmatism for is to be able to say, Here is a definition 
and it does not differ at all from your confusedly apprehended conception because 
there is no practical difference. (1903b/1998, p. 141)  
Pragmatism enables an inquirer to “acquire full mastery” of the meaning of a concept by 
teaching one to “recognize the concept under every disguise” (1908a/1998, p. 447). It is a 
“wonderfully efficient instrument” (1903b/1998, p. 133). “There is no doubt . . . that 
pragmatism opens a very easy road to the solution of an immense variety of questions” 
(ibid., p. 139).  
b. Dismiss Make-Believes: Doubt, Belief, and Inquiry 
In his 1905 essay “What Pragmatism Is,” Peirce explains that all of the 
“preliminary propositions” of pragmatism “might . . . be included under the vague maxim, 
‘Dismiss make-believes’” (1905c/1998, p. 335). Among such “make-believes” that 
pragmatism opposes are Cartesianism and British empiricism, each of which “take[s] its 
start from one or another state of mind in which no man . . . actually is” (ibid., p. 335–
336). 
One proposes that you shall begin by doubting everything, and says that there is 
only one thing that you cannot doubt, as if doubting were “as easy as lying.”64 
Another proposes that we should begin by observing “the first impressions of 
sense,” forgetting that our very percepts are the results of cognitive elaboration. 
(ibid., p. 336)  
                                                
64 “As easy as lying” is quoted from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, in a line delivered by the title 
character toward the end of act 3, scene 2. 
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Pragmatism recognizes that inquiry can only legitimately start from the place that men 
actually are, with all of the understanding that one has thus far developed in one’s life:  
In truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can “set out,” namely, the 
very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do “set 
out,”—a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already 
formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would. (ibid.) 
Moreover, Peirce adds, if you even could “divest yourself” of the cognitions you 
necessarily bring to the outset of inquiry, knowledge would thereby be made impossible 
(ibid.). 
Belief and doubt denote the knowledge one has gathered through experience of the 
world. A belief is a “habit of mind” that “[endures] for some time,” mostly unconsciously 
(1905c/1998, p. 336). Beliefs are evident whenever a man acts with intention (ibid., p. 
341). This habit lasts until “it meets with some surprise that begins its dissolution”; until 
that time, it is “perfectly self-satisfied” (ibid., p. 337).  
Doubt, on the other hand, being a “privation of habit,” promotes “erratic activity” 
until the state of belief—the formation of a habit—takes its place (ibid.). A belief is 
genuinely brought into question—into doubt—when it is shaken by experience: “Genuine 
doubt always has an external origin, usually from surprise” (1905b/1998, p. 348). 
Pragmatism helps men thus clarify that when they are after the “‘Truth,’” what they are 
really after is a “state of belief unassailable by doubt” (1905c/1998, p. 336). While a 
belief is largely held unconsciously, once its self-satisfaction is dissolved and it is 
brought into doubt, it is capable of self-controlled modification (ibid., p. 337). 
Experiment aids in fixing beliefs that are unshaken by future experience (ibid.).  
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 To promote productive inquiry, pragmatism cautions against paper doubts: “Do 
not make believe; if pedantry has not eaten all the reality out of you, recognize, as you 
must, that there is much that you do not doubt, in the least” (ibid.). What you do not 
truthfully doubt, you believe; this, to you, is the “infallible, absolute truth” (ibid.). Inquiry 
must begin from genuine doubt, in other words; it ought to take for granted the common-
sense experience of the world.65 
c. Belief and Truth 
The habit that results from “self-control[led]” thought is “the state of fixed belief, 
or perfect knowledge” (1905c/1998, p. 340). A belief that is not further shaken by 
experience, that one “cannot in the least help believing,” is, “justly speaking,” not a 
wrong belief (ibid.). In other words, it is not wrong for the individual to hold such a belief. 
There is nonetheless an important distinction between an individual’s belief and absolute 
truth.  
Knowledge exists at the level of men at large, not at the level of the individual 
person. Thought occurs in language—in signs that are public or communal by nature. 
Thus ultimate knowledge—absolute truth—can not be for an individual alone, but rather 
must assuage the doubts of the community.  
A person is not absolutely an individual. . . . Man’s circle of society . . . is a sort of 
loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an 
individual organism. (ibid., p. 338) 
                                                
65 We see here that belief and doubt still have a place in pragmatism; they no longer 
provide its foundations, however.  
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If a person develops a sure belief through critical examination, or if a person has an 
unexamined belief that experience never brings into doubt, those beliefs are sufficiently 
sound for that person—they are not wrong beliefs. However, beliefs must be examined 
by others, in other situations and times—to have exhausted examination—to be 
considered absolute truth. The confidence available to the individual during his lifetime is 
that a belief has withstood examination; this confidence is boosted if the belief has been 
subjected to the scientific method, as the scientific method checks a theory against reality, 
thus promising to home in on that eventual truth. Approaching this truth—the “destined 
generals”—is the pragmatist’s “summum bonum” (ibid.). In other words, the highest good 
for the pragmatist concerns understanding, not action or practical benefit (ibid.). 
Pragmatism—through the pragmatic maxim and its lessons about the scientific 
method and experimentation—promises to home in on that ultimate opinion that all who 
investigate will agree upon (ibid., p. 342). This is because, as a “rational experimental 
logic” to guide thought, it aims to shed that which is subjective or accidental in opinion 
(ibid.). An opinion that has shed its accidental elements is essentially what the word “real” 
was created to mean.  
Peirce explains the terms “realis” and “realitas” were “terms of philosophy” that 
were “invented” in the thirteenth century (ibid.). According to its original meaning, 
“reality” or the “real” was simply that which existed independently of what anyone 
thought.  
The meaning they were intended to express is perfectly clear. That is real which 
has such and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to have those characters or 
not. (ibid.)  
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Having shed its accidental elements, the “ultimate,” “destined” opinion that investigators 
reach is thus what is “real” (ibid., p. 342–343). We see here, then, that what is real is 
independent of how any man or group of men think, though not of thought in general: 
“the real is that which is such as it is regardless of how it is, at any time, thought to be” 
(1905b/1998, p. 356). In other words, there is something real about the phenomena as we 
experience them. The limit of the understanding that results from our experience 
constitutes this reality, and this is what we mean by the “reasonable” (ibid., p. 343).  
 In sum we see that beliefs that are not doubted are, in effect, considered to be true 
by the believer. At the same time, there is a distinction between what one holds to be true 
and the absolute truth. That which is absolutely true is the destined opinion that is 
assented to at the end of inquiry; it is this that the terms “reality” and “reasonable” point 
to. In the last stages of the process toward this truth, thought must be controlled 
(1905c/1998, p. 344); this is where logic, the science of controlled-thought, helps in 
reaching what will be the absolute truth. 
d. Critical Common-Sensism   
We have seen that one ought not to pretend to doubt what one does not genuinely 
doubt, and also that the pragmatic maxim helps clarify confused thought by identifying 
an idea’s intellectual core. How do these two components of pragmatism—acceptance of 
much of common-sense, along with a critical logical maxim that acts as a razor, shaving 
off confused thought—fit together? Do common-sense propositions that experience does 
not throw into doubt have the same degree of validity as those that have been logically 
clarified and scientifically verified? A philosophy of common-sense could easily interfere 
 
 
185 
 
 
with inquiry—block or discourage questioning—by encouraging potential investigators 
to remain satisfied with whatever beliefs they do not care to critically examine. Such a 
position verges on James’s more relativistic variant of pragmatism, discussed in the 
Introduction, which is concerned only with acquiring beliefs that “work”—such as the 
proposition that “Moses wrote the Pentateuch” (James 1909/1971, p. 274).  
 As we saw in the opening to this chapter, Peirce understands pragmatism as 
facilitating inquiry, not putting an end to it. We also saw that he balks at the suggestion 
that one can understand as true whatever belief one is satisfied with. Indeed, in an 1898 
lecture that we will explore in the next two chapters, he explains that “an important 
corollary” of the first “rule of reason” is that “the way of inquiry” shall not be blocked 
(1898, lecture 4, p. 178). Does Peirce’s common-sense philosophy facilitate inquiry, or 
ultimately contradict this principle and stand in its way?  
 Peirce recognizes the concern that rather than promoting inquiry pragmatism, as a 
common-sense philosophy, might in effect put an end to questioning and make students 
over-confident with their initial or common-sense understanding, and attempts to clarify 
his position in later writings. He explains his is a common-sense teaching of a critical 
nature: It is a doctrine of “Critical Common-Sensism” (1905b/1998, p. 346). This 
doctrine is an important consequence of pragmatism (ibid.), without which “pragmatism 
amounts to very little” (1907/1998, p. 433). Pragmatism “implies faith in common-sense 
and in instinct, though only as they issue from the cupel-furnace of measured criticism” 
(1908a/1998, p. 446). 
 Critical Common-Sensism holds that investigation must begin with a real doubt, 
for one can only “make but a futile pretense to criticize” a proposition that one does not 
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genuinely doubt (1907/1998, p. 433). Peirce’s common-sense philosophy warns against 
“taking a paper-doubt for the genuine metal,” as we are apt to do in the “artificial life” of 
the university, “especially in that of a student” (1905b/1998, p. 349). Investigation must 
start where one actually is—with the assumptions one has about the world as one goes 
about one’s life (1905c/1998, p. 336).  
Conduct bespeaks our habits and thus our implicit knowledge regarding an idea 
(1907/1998, p. 418); it is thus the test to determine belief and doubt (ibid., p. 433). 
Understood as such, certain beliefs are beyond the reach of doubt (ibid.). In this sense 
they are “original” as “one cannot ‘go behind’ them” (1905b/1998, p. 347). Peirce 
explains that these indubitable core beliefs are necessarily of a vague nature (ibid., p. 
350): “For example, everybody’s actions show that it is impossible to doubt that there is 
an element of order in the world; but the moment we attempt to define that orderliness we 
find room for doubt” (1905d, CP 8.208).  
The indubitable beliefs moreover generally “relate to the ordinary conduct of life” 
(1907/1998, p. 433). They can be understood as instinctive because they “resemble the 
instincts of the lower animals” (ibid.). Such beliefs are most soundly applied in situations 
that resemble man’s primitive origins—the context, in other words, in which the instincts 
developed (1905b/1998, p. 349). Genuine instincts can not be overcome in practice, 
regardless of reason’s assessment—a matter which experience and experiment will verify 
(ibid.).  
 There are other beliefs, however, which many take for granted but which are not 
in fact “indubitable” (1907/1998, p. 433). Thus, while there are propositions beyond the 
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reach of doubt, no particular proposition should be considered indubitable without critical 
examination first.  
If we are to admit that some propositions are beyond our powers of doubt, we must 
not admit any specified proposition to be of this nature without severe criticism; 
nor must any man assume with no better reason than because he cannot doubt it, 
that another man cannot do so. (ibid.) 
It is not that every belief can or ought to be investigated; only those beliefs that 
experience brings into doubt can be adequately examined. Common-sense thus remains 
the correct starting point in investigation: it is “good methodeutic to presume” one’s 
common-sense understanding is correct “until some evidence to the contrary is 
forthcoming” (1905b/1998, p. 349). What Critical Common-Sensism maintains is that 
those beliefs that have withstood examination are firmer than those that have not, though 
even such “indubitable” beliefs “maybe be proved false” later on (ibid., p. 353).  
Thus, while the “Critical Common-Sensist” does not spend time contemplating idle 
matters about which there is no “real and living doubt” (1877/1992, p. 115)—matters on 
which nothing is at stake—he welcomes genuine doubt (ibid.). So much so that the 
Critical Common-Sensist “is not content to ask himself whether he does doubt,” but 
rather actively attempts to raise new doubts: he “invents a plan for attaining to doubt, 
elaborates it in detail, and then puts it into practice” (ibid.). Peirce explains that Critical 
Common-Sensism is distinguished from the Scottish common-sense philosophy in this 
welcoming of doubt, as well as in its recognition that common-sense can be flawed, 
especially the further one is from the context in which an instinct developed (ibid.).  
 
 
188 
 
 
Peirce further reminds his readers that Critical Common Sensism is a doctrine of 
philosophy—a guide for scientific inquiry. It is not a guide for everyday life. “I do not 
recommend carrying the analysis so far, in other than exceptional cases” (1907/1998, p. 
432). The “ordinary commonsense concepts” of such notions as “force” and “acceleration” 
are “far more trustworthy” guides for the purposes of everyday life than are the “exacter 
concepts of science” (ibid., p. 433). 
e. Scholastic Realism 
Peirce understands pragmatism to support and be supported by scholastic realism. 
Pragmatism’s “strenuous insistence upon the truth of scholastic realism,” he explains, is 
an important way in which pragmatism is distinguished from positivism (1905c/1998, p. 
339). Scholastic realism holds that there are real things that are independent of the human 
mind, which constrain our understanding. In Peirce’s theory of the triadic relationship 
between an object, its sign, and its interpretant, the object is the real thing that constrains 
the interpretant. Yes, the interpretant is the mind’s ultimate understanding of the sign—is 
an interpretation of the object’s sign by the mind—but it is not something that the mind 
creates or has control over.  
Peirce’s realism understands there to be a real element of intelligence in the 
external world. Peirce explains that the nominalist holds that all that exists is “brute fact,” 
and order or law is imposed by the human mind (1907/1998, p. 425). The realist, in 
contrast, understands that law—the order that is observed—is a “real intellectual 
ingredient of the universe” (ibid.). 
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Further entailed in Peirce’s realism is an account of the existence of generals and 
potentiality as a mode of being. When we observe a chair, we do not observe its many 
components and then arbitrarily assign it a name (1868b/1992, p. 49–50). Rather, we 
observe it as a whole thing, as a member of the general class of chair (ibid.). Habits are, 
as explained above in the discussion of pragmatism’s semiotic grounding, generalizations. 
They bespeak our generalized understanding of a concept. While “individuals alone exist,” 
the meaning of a word or sign—the meaning yielded by the pragmatic maxim—is of a 
general nature (1905c/1998, p. 341–342).  
Habits—the intellectual interpretant—moreover concern both the actual and 
potential behavior of the sign: 
Intellectual concepts . . . essentially carry some implication concerning the general 
behavior either of some conscious being or of some inanimate object, and so 
convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more, too, than any existential fact, 
namely, the “would-acts” of habitual behavior. (1907/1998, p. 401–402) 
The ultimate meaning of a sign reflects not only how an object does act, but how it would 
act in any circumstance. 
The total meaning of the predication of an intellectual concept consists in affirming 
that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the 
predication would (or would not) behave in a certain way,—that is, that it either 
would, or would not, be true that under given experiential circumstances (or under 
a given proportion of them, taken as they would occur in experience) certain facts 
would exist. (ibid., p. 402) 
The recognition of the reality of potentiality, Peirce explains, is the “kernel of 
pragmatism” (ibid.).  
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V. Pragmatism and Metaphysics: A Neglected Argument for the Existence of God 
We saw above that pragmatism is not a metaphysical doctrine. Peirce at times, 
though, makes claims that point to the opposite understanding, creating confusion. In a 
1905 essay, he claims that pragmatism transforms metaphysical problems, leaving only 
that which can be tested and settled by empirical investigation. However in another essay 
that same year, Peirce writes that pragmatism merely reveals a concept’s logical meaning, 
not its psychological or metaphysical content. In 1907, as we saw above, Peirce clarifies 
that pragmatism is not a metaphysical doctrine. He expresses moreover that there is 
indeed a place for non-scientific speculation in our thought. This paves the way for his 
1908 speculative essay, “The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” in which he 
offers a hypothesis to account for the key assumption of science that reality is knowable. 
Let us explore Peirce’s position. 
In an essay published in April 1905, “What Pragmatism Is,” Peirce explains that 
pragmatism is a “species of prope-positivism” that can help clarify confusion in 
metaphysical thought (1905c/1998, p. 339). Its “raison d’etre” is to  
show that almost every proposition of ontological metaphysics is either 
meaningless gibberish,––one word being defined by other words, and they by still 
others, without any real conception ever being reached,––or else is downright 
absurd. (1905c/1998, p. 338) 
What will remain in philosophy will be simply “a series of problems capable of 
investigation by the observational methods of the true sciences” (ibid.). Unlike the other 
doctrines of positivism, pragmatism does not “merely [jeer] at metaphysics” but rather 
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“extracts from it a precious essence, which will serve to give life and light to cosmology 
and physics” (ibid.).  
It appears however that Peirce backs away from the claim that pragmatism 
ultimately resolves all metaphysical problems, and does so rather quickly. In an essay 
published in October 1905, Peirce explains that the pragmaticist meaning of “Time” will 
not “attack those most difficult problems connected with the psychology, the 
epistemology, or the metaphysics of Time” (1905b/1998, p. 357). Rather, pragmatism 
will only shed light on the “humbler question of what we mean by Time. . . . What is the 
intellectual purport of the Past, Present, and Future?” (ibid.).66 Writing in 1907, Peirce 
once again explains that “When we pass to consider the nature of Time, it seems that 
pragmatism is of aid, but does not of itself yield a solution” (1907/1998, p. 420).  
Peirce maintains that there are many questions “commonly reckoned as 
metaphysical” that pragmatism does clarify (ibid.). Such questions include:   
What is reality? Are necessity and contingency real modes of being? Are the laws 
of nature real? Can they be assumed to be immutable or are they presumably results 
of evolution? Is there any real chance, or departure from real law? (ibid.) 
Once “pragmatism is . . . sincerely accepted,” these questions “cannot logically resist 
settlement” (ibid.).  
                                                
66 The pragmatic definition of “Time” concerns the effect the concept has upon our conduct. 
The Past “bear[s] upon our conduct” in that  
whenever we set out to do anything, we “go upon,” we base our conduct on facts already 
known, and for these we can only draw upon our memory. . . . In short, the Past is the sole 
storehouse of all our knowledge. (1905b/1998, p. 358)  
The Future, for its part, concerns “controllable conduct” (ibid., p. 359). The Present involves “the 
consciousness . . . of a struggle over what shall be” (ibid.). 
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For those matters that can not be so reduced, however—such as with the concept 
“Time”—there is an important place for non-scientific meditation. 
For those metaphysical questions that have such interest,—the question of a future 
life and especially that of One Incomprehensible but Personal God, not immanent 
in but creating the universe,—I, for one, heartily admit that a Humanism that does 
not pretend to be a science but only an instinct, like a bird’s power of flight, but 
purified by meditation, is the most precious contribution that has been made to 
philosophy for ages. (ibid., p. 420–421) 
He explains similarly in 1908 that “problems of metaphysics will inevitably present 
themselves that logical analysis will not suffice to solve” (1908a/1998, p. 438). Thus, 
despite Peirce’s April 1905 claim that pragmatism reduces all metaphysical questions to 
logical questions that can be resolved through empirical investigation, it seems he quickly 
backs away from that position and more consistently maintains that pragmatism is simply 
a logical doctrine and that there are valid questions that neither logic nor empirical 
science can resolve. 
a. Reality of God 
An example of such meditation is Peirce’s musings that bring him to the hypothesis 
of “the Reality of God” (1908a/1998, p. 446). He explains that contemplating the 
remarkable connection between pure ideas, brute fact, and signs—the  “homogeneities of 
connectedness” of each universe of experience—will bring one to the “hypothesis of 
God’s Reality” (ibid., p. 438–439). “It is simply the natural precipitate of meditation 
upon the origin of the Three Universes” (ibid., p. 446).  
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Another way of speaking about the connectedness of Peirce’s three universes is to 
note the remarkable link between the human mind and the world of experience. Science 
begins by positing hypotheses about the world. These hypotheses are the product not of 
deduction or induction but of instinct—the “spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason” 
(ibid., p. 443). Modern science is founded upon Galileo’s “il lume natural” (ibid. p. 444). 
Reasoning about phenomena is, moreover, as natural to man as is flying to a bird. 
“Embody[ing] general ideas in art-creations, in utilities, and above all in theoretical 
cognition” is his “proper function” (ibid., p. 443). This is man’s “divinatory power” (ibid., 
p. 445). 
It is “historical truth,” moreover, that with this instinct as guide, humans have been 
successful at uncovering order in the world: that “the well-prepared mind has 
wonderfully soon guessed each secret of nature” (ibid.). The “bedrock of logical truth” is 
that “man’s mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what 
he has discovered” (ibid.). “Unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, 
he has no chance of understanding nature, at all” (ibid.). 
What accounts for the human mind being “attuned to the truth of things”?67 Peirce 
explains that the hypothesis of God’s reality undergirds scientific activity. In a 1908 letter 
                                                
67 Hookway (1985) explains that Peirce’s metaphysics aims to account for the regulative hopes 
that set the foundation of his theory of science and knowledge, to “assure us of a hoped-for 
attunement between our cognitive nature and reality” (p. 287). Peirce  
holds that it will not suffice for the regulative loans to be repaid through a scientific 
investigation. There must be a metaphysics, prior to all of the special sciences . . . which 
will ground all the regulative hopes. (p. 282) 
In addition to his speculations about the nature of God, Peirce’s metaphysics also includes a 
theory of “tychism,” an evolutionary theory of reality that 
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to his friend Victoria Lady Welby, Peirce explains that the scientist’s faith in reason is in 
effect a faith in God. 
Every true man of science, i.e., every man belonging to a social group all the 
members of which sacrifice all the ordinary motives of life to their desire to make 
their beliefs concerning one subject conform to verified judgments of perception 
together with sound reasoning . . . really believes the universe to be governed by 
reason. (1908b/1958, p. 400) 
The belief that the universe is governed by reason amounts to an implicit “Faith in God” 
(ibid.).  
The God that undergirds science is a natural, or philosophical, God. The God that 
Peirce describes as resulting from musing over the remarkable connection between pure 
ideas, the external world, and the human mind, has the character of necessity: “Ens 
necessarium” (1908a/1998, p. 434). It is not an embodied God, and thus also “probably 
has no consciousness” (ibid., p. 447).68 And It is the “creator of all three Universes of 
Experience” (ibid., p. 434): of pure ideas like mathematics; of brute experience; and of 
that which can perceive order and law—“everything whose Being consists in active 
power to establish connections between different objects” (ibid., p. 435).  
                                                                                                                                            
holds that the reality that is the object of our investigations is approximately governed by 
law; it also exemplifies “chance sportings” which deviate from these laws. . . . Through 
time, this chance sporting decreases and law increases its hold upon the course of events. 
The world comes increasingly to exhibit a rational or intelligible order. (p. 271) 
68 Smith (1978) must not have come across this passage because he maintains that “Peirce’s 
idea of God is . . . frankly anthropomorphic” (p. 178). Smith bases this conclusion on an arguable 
misreading of a passage in which the “Pragmaticist” in a dialogue simply explains that “man is so 
completely hemmed in by the bounds of his possible practical experience . . . that he cannot, in 
the least, mean anything that transcends those limits” (CP 5.536). This is not in contradiction with 
my argument that Peirce’s God is a philosophical akin to nature. In contrast, Hookway (1985) 
recognizes that there is a “Pantheistic tendency in Peirce’s thought,” which is in line with my 
reading (p. 280).  
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As “Creator,” God is responsible for the possibility of knowledge. This “Creator” 
God is moreover “independent” of two of the three universes of experience (ibid., p. 
448)—the two being, presumably, those of pure ideas and signs. Peirce suggests that this 
God is also omniscient and omnipotent, but in ways that do not interfere with “His 
essential character of Ens necessarium” (ibid., p. 447). Responsible for knowledge and 
experience, without a body, and with a being characterized by necessity, this God is a 
philosophical, not providential, God. Peirce’s claim that faith in God’s reality undergirds 
science is another way of saying that the activity of science and philosophy entails an 
assumption of nature. Peirce indeed speaks of “Nature” in religious terms in an 1898 
lecture: “Nature is something great, and beautiful, and sacred, and eternal, and real,––the 
object of [science’s] worship and its aspiration” (1898/1992, lecture 4 p. 177). 
The hypothesis of God’s existence is an “explanatory hypothesis” (1908a/1998, p. 
447). It is unlike ordinary scientific hypotheses. It is both more plausible than ordinary 
scientific hypotheses, but can also only be “apprehended so very obscurely” (ibid.). 
Finally, it has a “commanding influence over the whole conduct of life of its believers” 
(ibid.). The hypothesis fits well with human instincts (ibid., p. 445). It is ultimately borne 
out by the success of humankind’s efforts at pursuing knowledge: Its “ultimate test must 
lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of man’s conduct of life” (ibid., p. 446).  
The neglected argument for God’s existence is intended to be “full of nutrition for 
man’s highest growth” (ibid., p. 435). “Every heart will be ravished by the beauty and 
adorability of the Idea” of the reality of God (ibid., p. 446).  
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The more he ponders it, the more it will find response in every part of his mind, for 
its beauty, for its supplying an ideal of life, and for its thoroughly satisfactory 
explanation of his whole threefold environment. (ibid., p. 439) 
By accounting for the possibility of knowledge, the idea of the reality of God supplies 
“an ideal of life” (ibid., p. 439).  
Motivating the pursuit of knowledge is philosophy’s role.  
In every age, it can only be the philosophy of that age . . . which can animate the 
special sciences to any work that shall really carry forward the human mind to 
some new and valuable truth. (1898/1992, lecture 4 p. 171)  
We have seen such an effort previously. In the previous chapter of this dissertation I 
argued that Peirce’s ultimate aim was to provide a philosophical foundation that would 
motivate scientists to pursue knowledge—as the belief in god had motivated scholars in 
the Middle Ages. The belief in god’s existence impelled the accomplishment of great 
feats. 
If any one wishes to know what a scholastic commentary is like, and what the tone 
of thought in it is, he has only to contemplate a Gothic cathedral. The first quality 
of either is a religious devotion, truly heroic. One feels that the men who did these 
works did really believe in religion as we believe in nothing. (1871/1992, p. 86) 
Peirce’s assertion—that truth will converge in “one catholic consent” (ibid., p. 89–90)—
can be understood as an attempt to provide a sufficiently motivating goal to us men today 
who “believe in nothing” (ibid.). I argued that Peirce’s main concern was that his was an 
age of skepticism, in which knowledge would not be sufficiently pursued, and that his 
philosophical project was to motivate its pursuit. The hypothesis for God’s existence—
that there is a nature to which the human mind has access—is part of this same effort to 
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motivate inquirers to pursue knowledge. We will see in the next chapter that the pursuit 
of knowledge is the highest human occupation.  
VI. Conclusion 
Pragmatism is a logical doctrine. It aims to help us clarify the meaning of difficult 
concepts. It does so by acting as a logical manifestation of the scientific method, 
identifying the habit of action behind our understanding of a concept. Its concern with 
habits of action aims at understanding, not at action simply.  
Pragmatism is a variant of common-sense philosophy, as it maintains that only 
legitimate doubt can lead to fruitful inquiry. While one can not pretend to doubt what one 
does not doubt in one’s heart, the truth seeker ought not be simply satisfied with one’s 
common-sense understanding, but should rather create exercises to throw into doubt that 
common-sense understanding. Pragmatism is not about complacency. It is a critical 
common-sense doctrine.  
The habit that the pragmatic maxim identifies is of a general nature; pragmatism 
thus complements and is complemented by a view of scholastic realism—recognizing the 
existence of generals and potentiality as a mode of being. Peirce’s pragmatism, moreover, 
recognizes that it exhausts neither the psychological nor metaphysical meaning of a 
concept, and that there is room for metaphysical speculation to supplement a logical 
examination. Peirce’s own metaphysical speculation yields a hypothesis that can account 
for the possibility of knowledge, a key assumption of science. It is philosophy’s role to 
motivate the sciences; providing the intellectual groundwork to motivate inquirers in the 
pursuit of knowledge has been a primary goal of Peirce’s throughout his work.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 In this chapter I explore Peirce’s understanding of the relationship between the 
theoretical and the practical. We learn that they ought to be separated. A concern for 
utility interferes with the pursuit of truth. Pure philosophy requires Erotic devotion. 
Peirce tries to instill this desire for knowledge in his audience.  
Peirce also explains that the practical realm ought to be governed by instinct, by 
traditional morality. Philosophy can and should influence instincts slowly; should 
influence morality only with caution. “Instincts” are comprised of biological instinct, 
culturally inculcated norms, and the practical wisdom one has gained in one’s life. We 
learn a bit about what Peirce’s critical common-sensism consists of: Biological instincts 
can not be overcome. Once a belief is understood as culturally inculcated, it can be 
overcome. It is then the role of reason to assess its soundness and whether it ought to be 
overcome.  
Philosophy does not produce simple formulas for acting. It does, however, 
influence the instincts according to what is universal, as it concerns “ideal and eternal 
verities.” Though these truths do not yield clear guides for action, Peirce does provide 
hints about the direction in which philosophy transforms the instincts. Peirce expects 
contemplation of the whole will imprint on man’s inner being the interconnectedness of 
human beings. 
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I. Theory and Practice 
In speaking about the connection between pragmatism and practical matters, Peirce 
says confusing and at times seemingly contradictory things. This leads students of his and 
those who associate with pragmatism to either write him off,69 ignore Peirce’s actual 
views,70 or spend much effort trying to make sense of Peirce’s views in order to justify 
applying his thought to political or ethical theory.71 This chapter is, in a way, of the latter 
sort; though in its effort to make sense of Peirce’s views on practical matters, it seeks to 
take more seriously Peirce’s conservatism than is ordinarily done.72  
In Peirce’s early writings, he explicitly connects philosophy, and logic specifically, 
with matters of psychology, political theory, theology, and morality. In “Grounds of 
Validity of the Laws of Logic,” he explains that logic teaches that putting one’s own 
interests above those of the community’s is illogical (1869/1992, p. 81). This is because 
each individual man is so highly dependent on the community of men for any knowledge 
at all; when coupled with the observation that men frequently subordinate their self-
interest to that of the community, this moreover belies the doctrine that men simply 
pursue their own self-interest (ibid.). In his review of The Works of George Berkeley, 
                                                
69 This is one reason Richard Rorty dismisses Peirce as a traditional philosopher (Hookway 
1985, p. 3). Hilary Putnam similarly dismisses Peirce’s views about practical matters, explaining 
that Peirce was simply a conservative (Putnam 2013).  
70 E.g., Talisse (2012) says that if Peirce doesn’t make the argument he finds in “The Fixation 
of Belief,” then that is his problem (p. 118).  
71 E.g., Misak (2004a) and Ayim (1981). 
72 Short (2001) similarly tries to do this, though his article is merely an invitation to do so, and 
leaves much work on the matter to be done. Jacobsohn (1979) looks favorably upon Peirce’s 
separation of theory and practice and the resulting conservatism, arguing that Peirce offers a 
“healthy antidote to the legal scientism practice by Justice Holmes, which culminated in the case 
of Buck v. Bell in 1926” (Skagestad 1981, p. 227). 
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Peirce explains that the logical dispute between realism and nominalism touches 
questions directly related to our lives: 
The question whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals, is 
the question whether there is anything of any more dignity, worth, and importance 
than individual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. Whether men 
really have anything in common, so that the community is to be considered as an 
end in itself, and if so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most 
fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution 
of which we have it in our power to influence. (1871/1992, p. 105) 
In “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce encourages men to “overcome” the “old beliefs” that 
they come to understand to “have no sound basis”—which they can do by reflecting upon 
the inadequacy of the method by which these beliefs were originally acquired 
(1877/1992, p. 122). This applies to a “reformed Mussulman” and his “old notions in 
regard to the relations of the sexes,” as well as to “a reformed Catholic” who still 
“shrink[s] from reading the Bible” (ibid., p. 122–123). In “How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear,” Peirce explains that, according to his pragmatic maxim, there is no real 
disagreement between Protestants and Catholics with regard to the doctrine of 
transubstantiation because, despite what they say, Catholics can not mean that matter 
with the properties of wine and wafers are really blood and flesh: “We can . . . mean 
nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses” 
(1878/1992, p. 131). To say that something with the sensible qualities of wine is in reality 
blood is simply “senseless jargon” (ibid.).  
In an 1898 talk to William James’s students, however, Peirce appears to say quite 
the opposite with regard to the relationship between philosophy and practical matters. In 
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the first in a series of lectures in Cambridge, Massachusetts—a series that came to be 
known as the “Cambridge Conferences” lectures—Peirce condemns “with the whole 
strength of conviction the Hellenic tendency to mingle Philosophy and Practice” (1898, 
lecture 1, p. 107). He explains that “the two masters, theory and practice, you cannot 
serve” (ibid., p. 113; emphasis in original). This warning is for the sake of each: the focus 
on practice interferes with theoretical inquiry, and the practical application of scientific 
propositions—which are necessarily tentative—is imprudent. Whereas theory ought to be 
governed by reason, practical matters ought to be governed by instinct, sentiment, and 
art.  
Below we will analyze the arguments Peirce lays out in the first Cambridge 
Conferences lecture by both examining the lecture as it was delivered, as well as an 
earlier draft of the lecture.73 This examination will reveal what seems to be the 
overarching purpose of Peirce’s philosophical practice, of which we have seen hints in 
the previous three chapters: namely, to formulate a theory of knowledge and reality that 
can save and continue to motivate theoretical inquiry. It will also explore Peirce’s 
practical conservatism and understanding of the appropriate role of reason and theory in 
the practical realm. We will see that Peirce’s concerns about the intermingling of theory 
and practice are important and ought to be taken seriously. By supplementing our 
examination of this 1898 lecture with other of Peirce’s writings, we will also see that in 
Peirce’s thought there is in fact a role for reason in the practical realm, as there is a role 
                                                
73 The lecture as delivered is published in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, edited by 
Kenneth Laine Ketner (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), and is denoted in in-
text citations as (1898, lecture 1, p. xx). The earlier draft of the lecture can be found in the 
Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce vol. 1, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss 
(Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1998), and is denoted in in-text citations as (1898, CP §xx).  
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for instinct in theoretical inquiry. It will ultimately be argued that there is a way to 
understand Peirce’s early statements about the connection between philosophy and more 
practical matters as largely, if not entirely, consistent with his later warnings about their 
intermingling. This discussion will shed light on important differences between 
philosophy and practical concerns, as well as reveal yet more reasons why Richard Rorty 
considered Peirce to be a “traditional philosopher” (Hookway 1985, p. 3)—but in a way 
that appreciates Peirce’s prudence. 
II. The Proper Role of Reason 
Peirce explains that reason is aptly fit for discovering general laws and “uncovering 
one great Cosmos of Forms, a world of potential being” (1898, lecture 1, p. 121). The 
conclusions reason reaches through its processes of deduction, induction, and 
retroduction are only provisional in nature, and are thus not intended for application in 
practical matters:  
Pure science has nothing at all to do with action. The propositions it accepts, it 
merely writes in the list of premises it proposes to use. Nothing is vital for science; 
nothing can be. Its accepted propositions, therefore, are but opinions, at most; and 
the whole list is provisional. The scientific man is not in the least wedded to his 
conclusions. He risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to abandon one or all as 
soon as experience opposes them. (ibid., p. 112) 
We see Peirce’s fallibilism expressed here: propositions in science are accepted only 
provisionally, and will be abandoned if experience throws them into doubt. Peirce thus 
refers to reason as the “department of the soul which is most superficial and fallible” 
(ibid., p. 121).  
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Illustrating how “superficial the faculty [of reason] is” is the fact that man 
“ridiculously overrates his own reasoning” (ibid., p. 110). Moreover, men generally 
attribute reason after the fact to justify what their instincts direct them to do:  
Men many times fancy that they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons 
they attribute to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct 
invents to satisfy the teasing ‘whys’ of the ego. (ibid., p. 111)  
This “self delusion” is enough “to render philosophical rationalism a farce” (ibid.). 
Rather than being a tool for governing practical matters, the proper role for 
reason—of philosophy and science—is to make “the acquaintance of pure ideas” (ibid., 
p. 119). In this position, Peirce explains that he allies himself with Plato (ibid.) and 
Aristotle (ibid., p. 107). 
Theoretical science was for [Aristotle] one thing, animated by one spirit and having 
knowledge of theory as its ultimate end and aim. Aesthetic studies were of a 
radically different kind; while Morals, and all that relates to the conduct of life, 
formed a third department of intellectual activity, radically foreign in its nature and 
idea, from both the other two. (ibid., p. 107) 
Peirce “confesses[es]” that he is “an Aristotelian and a scientific man” when he separates 
theoretical science from moral and aesthetic matters (ibid.). 
The true man of science approaches inquiry with a concern for truth, and not with 
an eye toward usefulness; “the true scientific investigator completely loses sight of the 
utility of what he is about” (ibid.). It would be a crime if a scientist were to dissect a dog 
for any reason other than pure knowledge (ibid.). And while the chemist or physiologist 
who was concerned with utility might greatly benefit mankind—“though he will not do 
much for science” (ibid.)—the consequences of a preoccupation with utility for 
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philosophy are more dire. A man who purports to be a philosopher but who does not 
approach his material with the right intentions and “stand aloof from all intent to make 
practical applications,” will both “obstruct the advance of the pure science” as well as 
“endanger his own moral integrity and that of his readers” (ibid.). Progress in philosophy 
requires that those pursuing it be “animated by the true scientific Eros” (ibid.). This is all 
the more serious because the subject matter of philosophy touches “upon matters which 
are, and ought to be, sacred to us” (ibid).74 
If philosophy or science are pursued for some other end—such as improving men’s 
lives—this other intention corrupts the scientist and interferes with the pursuit of truth. It 
is 
indispensable . . . for the successful march of discovery in philosophy and in 
science generally, that practical utilities, whether low or high, should be put out of 
sight by the investigator. (ibid., p. 113; emphasis in the original) 
One reason why this ulterior motive interferes with pure science is because the concern 
for utility is always very narrow (ibid.). To illustrate, Peirce points to the field of 
chemistry: 
How much less we should know, if the rare elements and the compounds which 
only exist at low temperatures had received only the share of attention to which 
their utility entitled them. (ibid.; emphasis in the original) 
Moreover, to do something well, a man must put his “whole heart and soul” in it (ibid.); 
science done successfully requires a man’s full attention:  
                                                
74 Skagestad (1981) points out the similarity to Locke’s point in the Essay concerning Human 
Understanding: “He that would seriously set upon the search of truth ought, in the first place, to 
prepare his mind with a love of it. For he that loves it not, will not take much pains to get it; nor 
be much concerned when he misses it” (Locke 1690, Book 4, Chapter 19; quoted in Skagestad 
1981, p. 201). 
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That perfect balance of attention which is requisite for observing the system of 
things is utterly lost if human desires intervene, and all the more so the higher and 
holier those desires be. (ibid., p. 113–114) 
What’s more, our prejudices will cloud our judgment if “we allow ourselves to dwell 
upon them at all” (ibid., p. 114). A concern for practical consequences will prevent a 
scientist from honestly pursuing methods of inquiry that aim at uncovering truth if he 
thinks the path he is on will lead to an ugly truth that will adversely affect behavior:  
It is far better to let philosophy follow perfectly untrammeled a scientific method, 
predetermined in advance of knowing to what it will lead. If that course be honestly 
and scrupulously carried out, the results reached, even if they be not altogether true, 
even if they be grossly mistaken, cannot but be highly serviceable for the ultimate 
discovery of truth. Meanwhile, sentiment can say “Oh well, philosophical science 
has not by any means said its last word yet; and meantime I will continue to believe 
so and so.” (ibid., p. 114) 
A man can thus not aim at both uncovering truth and producing what is useful.  
III. The Imprudence of Applying Philosophy to Practical Matters 
We thus see that a concern for practical utility threatens science and philosophy. By 
the same token, philosophy is a threat to practical concerns. In this lecture, Peirce 
emphasizes that philosophy is a bad guide for practical action. He points to the poor state 
of the study of philosophy at his time, in addition to the provisional nature of the 
conclusions of reason. He cautions it would be “unwise” (ibid., p. 111) and “exceedingly 
dangerous” (ibid., p. 108) for man to base his conduct in life on the conclusions of his 
reason. The infantile state of philosophy at the time—as indicated by the lack of 
consensus among its students—accounts for the danger of such an action: “It is all far too 
dubious to warrant risking any human life upon it” (ibid.). Philosophy even in a more 
 
 
207 
 
 
advanced state—as with all of science—would still only have conclusions that were 
provisional in nature (ibid., p. 112). Given the provisional nature of reason’s conclusions, 
it would thus be foolish to base one’s conduct on its determinations. 
A much sounder guide to action, especially action of vital importance, is instinct: 
“A Logica Utens, like the analytical mechanics resident in the billiard player’s nerves, 
best fulfills familiar uses” (ibid., p. 109). Sentiment and instinct75 embody wisdom 
gleaned through all of man’s experiences: “instinctive or Sentimental induction 
[summarize] the experience of all our race” (ibid., p. 111). Our instincts result from 
evolution, and are thus present in “all human beings” (ibid., p. 110): they are 
“inheritances that have come to us from the biped who did not yet speak” (ibid.). The 
“mental qualities we most admire in all human beings”76 result from these instincts: “the 
maiden’s delicacy, the mother’s devotion, manly courage” (ibid., p. 110). Man’s aversion 
to incest similarly results from his instinct and sentiment (ibid., p. 111). These instincts 
are the “common sense” that “the healthy, natural, normal democracy thinks” (1898, CP 
1.654).  
Peirce moreover recognizes that some men are going to have better instincts than 
will others. The statesman’s instincts are honed through “long experiential training,” for 
example (more on this below) (1898, lecture 1, p. 109). It is due to the fitness of man’s 
                                                
75 Peirce uses “sentiment” and “instinct” interchangeably in this lecture; for example: “matters 
of vital importance must be left to sentiment, that is, to instinct” (1898, lecture 1 p. 112). 
However, as we will see below, elsewhere he provides a more nuanced understanding of each, 
with instinct indicating what we inherit in our biology via evolution, and sentiment that which 
culture inculcates in us. 
76 To which, Peirce adds (as we have seen), “except our several selves,” thus quietly indicating 
that Peirce holds intellectual pursuit and virtue above moral virtue (1898, lecture 1, p. 110). 
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instincts in practical matters that “the wise man follows his heart and does not trust his 
head” in “the greatest affairs of life” (1898, CP 1.653). Indeed, this method should be 
followed by “every man, no matter how powerful his intellect” (ibid.). 
Recognizing that reason should yield to sentiment in the realm of action implies an 
attitude of “Conservatism”—the essence of which is a refusal “to push any practical 
principle to its extreme limits” (1898, lecture 1 p. 111). It would be “unwise,” for 
example, for an individual to “hastily” allow his reason to trump his sentiment in matters 
of action (ibid.).  
We do not say that sentiment is never to be influenced by reason, nor that under no 
circumstances would we advocate radical reforms. We only say that the man who 
would allow his religious life to be wounded by any sudden acceptance of a 
philosophy of religion or who would precipitately change his code of morals, at the 
dictate of a philosophy of ethics,—who would, let us say, hastily practice incest,—
is a man whom we should consider unwise. The regnant system of sexual rules is 
an instinctive or Sentimental induction summarizing the experience of all our race. 
(ibid.) 
The provisional nature of the conclusions of reason and science makes it inherently an 
unsound guide: “Sentiment can say ‘Oh well, philosophical science has not by any means 
said its last word yet; and meantime I will continue to believe so and so’” (ibid., p. 114). 
Thus, while Peirce’s conservatism does not pretend that instincts are absolutely infallible, 
it holds that they ought to be considered infallible for the individual (ibid., p. 111).  
In the draft of his talk, Peirce speaks more candidly about his conservatism and 
what it means to be moral. He explains, for example, that he finds it “foolish and 
despicable” to “allow mere reasoning and reason’s self-conceit” to overturn “the normal 
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and manly sentimentalism which ought to lie at the cornerstone of all our conduct,” 
despite how “commendable . . . it undoubtedly is to reason out matters of detail” (1898, 
CP 1.662). He explains moreover that the philosophy of religion and ethics are both 
useless: “genuine religion” comes from the “heart” not from the “head” (ibid., CP 1.665); 
and there is no “use” to “prying into the philosophical basis of morality,” as morality is 
simply “behaving as you were brought up to behave” (ibid., CP 1.666). This of course 
entails conservatism—respect for what one inherits—and means “not trusting to one’s 
reasoning powers” (ibid.). “To be a moral man is to obey the traditional maxims of your 
community without hesitation or discussion” (ibid.). The problem with the study of ethics 
is that it tries to reason out a basis for morality; it is thus “composed of the very substance 
of immorality” (ibid.). Thieves “reason about the basis of morals” (ibid.). 
Peirce moreover acknowledges that his conservatism demands that even 
conservatism not be taken to the extreme, and that sometimes the upending of sentiment 
by reason might be necessary. “We do not say that sentiment is never to be influenced by 
reason, nor that under no circumstances would we advocate radical reforms” (ibid.). In 
this lecture, however, Peirce does not provide guidance as to what would merit radical 
reform, or what characteristics good instincts would have. He only explains at the end of 
his lecture that right understanding will yield right instinct, though reason does not seem 
to be able to direct instinct directly (ibid., p. 121–122). We will return to this topic below.  
IV. Philosophy and the Threat Posed to It by a Concern with Utility 
Thus we see that a concern for utility interferes with science, as philosophy can 
harm practical action and decision making. Peirce understood that the kind of men who 
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will be interested in improving people’s lives are very different from those who will be 
able to contribute to “purely theoretical” science (1903b/1998, p. 197): “It will be in 
general quite different men, and two knots of men not apt to consort the one with the 
other, who will conduct the two kinds of inquiry” (ibid., p. 198).77 The genuinely 
scientific man is animated by an awareness of his own ignorance, coupled with a taste of 
the truth and the inkling that he has the ability to further knowledge. His is not “a wish 
either to ‘support social stability’ or . . . to increase the sum of men’s pleasures” 
(1901a/1998, p. 58). Rather, he has “received a deep impression of the majesty of truth, 
as that to which, sooner or later, every knee must bow” (ibid.). Moreover, he has found 
that “his own mind is sufficiently akin to that truth to enable him, on condition of 
submissive observation, to interpret it in some measure” (ibid.). The more one encounters 
and understands the relationship between human reason and truth, the more the scientist 
finds himself drawn into its pursuit:  
As he gradually becomes better and better acquainted with the character of 
cosmical truth, and learns that human reason is its issue and can be brought step by 
step in accord with it, he conceives a passion for its fuller revelation. (ibid.) 
Above all, he is aware of “his own ignorance,” and recognizes that he can only play a 
small role in the discovery of truth (ibid.). His actions are thus generous to those who 
come after:  
Small as [his steps in discovery] are, he deems them precious; and he hopes that by 
conscientiously pursuing the methods of science he may erect a foundation upon 
which his successors may climb higher. (ibid.)  
                                                
77 Ayim (1981) suggests this points to the main upshot of Peirce’s advocating for the 
separation of theory and practice: that different investigators are fit for investigating theoretical 
and practical matters.  
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 For the scientist has a part to play in “progressive creation”: 
The very being of law, general truth, reason . . . consists in its expressing itself in 
a cosmos and in intellects which reflect it, and in doing this progressively; and 
that which makes progressive creation worth doing . . . is precisely the reason, the 
law, the general truth for the sake of which it takes place. (ibid., p. 58–59) 
“Such, I believe . . . is the motive which effectually works in the man of science” (ibid., 
p. 59). 
Peirce saw widespread negative impact resulting from the predominance of the 
kind of men who are concerned with utility in the field of science and philosophy. As 
Peirce saw it, men “devoid of genuine scientific curiosity” now “barricade the road of 
science with empty books and embarrassing assumptions” (1898, lecture 1, p. 114). This 
has resulted in an undisciplined field of study, which has produced the “mistaken notion” 
that all of metaphysics is “necessarily idle subjective and illogical stuff” (ibid., p. 117). 
This moreover accounts for the “present infantile condition of philosophy” (ibid., p. 107). 
Peirce points to “men like Hegel,” who were “educated in Theological Seminaries,” as 
responsible for such developments. These men have “not been nurtured in dissecting-
rooms and other laboratories,” but have rather “been inflamed with a desire to amend the 
lives of themselves and others” (ibid., p. 107). It is because of such men that the sciences 
were progressing without the aid of philosophy, whereas philosophy ought to be leading 
the sciences (ibid., p. 116–117).78 
Peirce understands a mindset only focused on practical concerns to yield negative 
consequences. He explains that the pursuit of “‘topics of vital importance’ as the first and 
best” (1898, CP 1.673) can only produce one of two results:  
                                                
78 Peirce’s efforts to articulate reality and truth, examined in the previous three chapters, aim 
precisely at this end, I argue.  
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Either on the one hand what is called, I hope not justly, Americanism, the worship 
of business, the life in which the fertilizing stream of genial sentiment dries up or 
shrinks to a rill of comic tit-bits, or else on the other hand, to monasticism, 
sleepwalking in this world with no eye nor heart except for the other. (ibid.) 
These consequences—a “worship” of low, practical matters, or a mental cloistering of 
oneself off from the world—are the two possible results of a primary concern with 
practical matters and using reason solely as the guide to utility.79 “Take for the lantern of 
your footsteps the cold light of reason and regard your business, your duty, as the highest 
thing, and you can only rest in one of those goals or the other” (ibid.). 
Implicit in Peirce’s warning is the suggestion that applying reason to pure 
theoretical inquiry opens another possibility: That man can use his capacity for reasoning 
and contemplation to be at home in this world, by not only accepting but being happy in 
the lot of man. In this too, then, he is in agreement with the traditional understanding of 
philosophy. Indeed, in several key respects, Peirce presents philosophy in its traditional 
form. Philosophy, Peirce explains, seeks to uncover “ideal and eternal verities” (1898, 
lecture 1, p. 122), a “great Cosmos of Forms” (ibid., p. 121). Philosophy is both noble—it 
is man’s “highest occupation” (1898, CP 1.673)—as well as good, offering much 
blessedness:  
Let our hearts murmur “blessed are we” if the immolation of our being can weld 
together the smallest part of the great cosmos of ideas to which the sciences belong. 
(ibid., CP 1.670)  
                                                
79 This is one reason I think Peirce’s warning against a preoccupation with practical concerns 
is stronger than scholars like Ayim (1981) and Misak (2004a) acknowledge. 
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The true scientist, prompted by an awareness of his own ignorance, pursues truth because 
he understands man’s ability to uncover the cosmos to be that which gives meaning to 
life and worth to humanity: “This, for him, is what makes life worth living and what 
makes the human race worth perpetuation” (1901a/1998, p. 58).80  
Peirce explains that through acquaintance with them, the “ideal and eternal verities” 
will “by slow percolation gradually reach the very core of one’s being” (1898, lecture 1, 
p. 122). It is this way that philosophy can and ought to affect our instincts—“the soul’s 
deeper parts”—and thereby “come to influence our lives” (ibid., p. 121–122). In other 
words, though philosophy ought not to be directly applied to practical decision making, 
in the long run, slowly and indirectly, it will influence the investigator’s practical 
judgment.81  
                                                
80 Peirce’s presentation of philosophy echoes the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. In the 
“Symposium,” Socrates recounts that Diotima tells him that philosophy is beautiful because it is 
eternal—“always being and neither coming to be nor perishing, nor increasing nor passing away” 
(211a 1-3, 1986 p. 41)—as well as “perfect, and most blessed” (204c4-5, 1986 p. 34). She 
moreover explains that “It is at this place in life, in beholding the beautiful itself . . . that it is 
worth living, if—for a human being—it is [worth living] at any place” (211d1-3, 1986 p. 42). 
Aristotle similarly explains in the Ethics that contemplative activity is the “activity of the god” 
and “superior in blessedness” (Book 10, ch. 8, 1178b20-25, 2011 p. 227). The human life that 
resembles divine contemplative activity is that which is blessed (Book 10, ch. 8, 1178b25-27, 
2011 p. 228). The “blessed person” who is able to partake of the “activity of the intellect” has 
“something divine present in him” (Book 10, ch. 7, 1177b24, 1177b20, 1177b27-28, 2011 p. 
225). 
81 In the “Symposium” Diotima similarly explains that true virtue results only from 
understanding the beautiful that is “always being and neither coming to be nor perishing” (211a1-
2, 1986 p. 41):  
Only here, in seeing in the way the beautiful is seeable, will he get to engender not 
phantom images of virtue—because he does not lay hold of a phantom—but true, because 
he lays hold of the true; and that once he has given birth to and cherished true virtue, it lies 
within him. (212a 3-7, 1986 p. 42)  
A true understanding of the eternal entails “[laying] hold of the true” within oneself, which in 
turn produces true virtue within one’s soul (ibid.). 
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V. Peirce’s Political Project  
Now that we have established Peirce’s traditional understanding of the nobility and 
blessedness available in the philosophic life, it is important to note that in his delivered 
remarks (as compared with the drafts of his talk), Peirce tones down his message 
somewhat and shows an appreciation for the non-philosophic way of life as well. In the 
1898 talk as it was delivered, Peirce explains that he agrees with Plato that “making the 
acquaintance of pure ideas” is “the ultimate end of philosophy and of science in general,” 
but says that Plato was in error in saying that this is “the whole end and aim of human 
life” (1898, lecture 1 p. 119). To Peirce, Plato does not appropriately appreciate the 
simple human life: “I do not mean that [Plato’s teaching does] justice at all to those who 
live simple lives without at all thinking of philosophy” (ibid.). Finally, whereas Peirce 
refers to philosophy as man’s “highest occupation” in a draft of the lecture, he does not 
do so in his delivered remarks.  
Why did he tone down his message in the delivered version of the lecture? For one 
thing, Peirce does not think most men are capable of philosophy. In the 1898 lecture 
Peirce distinguishes the intellectual abilities of himself and his audience from those of 
most men (ibid., p. 110). In the earlier draft of the talk, he explains that the ability to 
reason well is a rare attribute: 
Powers of reasoning in any but the most rudimentary way are a somewhat 
uncommon gift, about as uncommon as a talent for music. Indeed, a much smaller 
number of persons actually attain to any proficiency in reasoning. (1898, CP 1.657) 
In “The Fixation of Belief,” moreover, Peirce explains that “the method of authority will 
always govern the mass of mankind,” whether that authority be maintained by the 
 
 
215 
 
 
“organized force in the state” or “secured by a moral terrorism to which the respectability 
of society will give its thorough approval” (1877/1992, p. 121–122). In other words, 
Peirce expects that the “the mass of mankind” will never be capable of applying their 
own individual reasoning powers—whether by the method of science or a priori 
reasoning—to make sense of the world.  
Peirce’s undemocratic position would likely not resonate with an American 
audience. In “The Fixation of Belief,” Peirce moreover acknowledges the need for 
thinkers to self-censor. He explains that because society has the capacity to hunt the 
holder of a “tabooed belief” like it would “a wolf,” “the greatest intellectual benefactors 
of mankind have never dared, and dare not now, to utter the whole of their thought” 
(1877/1992, p. 122). Thus the likely explanation for Peirce’s ultimate presentation of 
philosophy not being the proper aim of most men’s lives is out of a combination of his 
undemocratic understanding of men’s capacities combined with his sensitivity to and 
respect for his audience’s democratic prejudices. This explanation in turn raises the 
question: For what purpose does Peirce want to win over his audience? We will first 
explore at what Peirce’s rhetoric aims, as this touches on what I argue is Peirce’s overall 
philosophic project: to attract serious students to the pursuit of truth and purely 
theoretical study. In the next section we will also see that Peirce indeed has an 
appreciation for traditional morality that is connected to his philosophic understanding. 
The rhetorical explanation for Peirce’s self-censorship fits in well with other 
apparent efforts in this talk to attract potential philosophers and scientists by igniting an 
erotic longing for truth among his audience, on the chance that it contains an individual 
or two capable of real philosophic investigation. We have already seen that progress in 
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philosophy requires that those pursuing it be “animated by the true scientific Eros” (1898, 
lecture 1, p. 107), and moreover that philosophy is a blessed activity. In the previous 
three chapters, we saw that Peirce’s philosophic efforts aim at articulating how truth and 
reality can still be understood after the skepticism of modernity. Here Peirce points to 
developments in the field of mathematics to add weight to his claim that philosophy is 
indeed possible.  
Peirce remarks on how wondrous it is that mathematicians in different subfields 
and without any contact with one another are converging on the same hypotheses: 
The host of men, who achieve the bulk of each year’s new discoveries, are mostly 
confined to narrow ranges. For that reason you would expect the arbitrary 
hypotheses of the different mathematicians to shoot out in every direction into the 
boundless void of arbitrariness. But you do not find any such thing. On the 
contrary, what you find is that men working in fields as remote from one another as 
the African Fields are from the Klondike, reproduce the same forms of novel 
hypotheses. (ibid., p. 120)  
Peirce provides the following example to illustrate his point: 
Riemann had apparently never heard of his contemporary Listing. The latter was a 
naturalistic Geometer, occupied with the shapes of leaves and birds’ nests, while 
the former was working upon analytical functions. And yet that which seems the 
most arbitrary in the ideas created by the two men, are one and the same form. 
(ibid., p. 121) 
This example is not “isolated” but rather “characterizes the mathematics” of Peirce’s time 
(ibid.). That unconnected investigators, starting from completely different starting places, 
appear to be uncovering a single mathematical system is remarkable. Thus the “pure 
mathematician . . . feels” that he is uncovering the “Eternal”:  
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All this crowd of creators of forms for which the real world affords no parallel, 
each man arbitrarily following his own sweet will, are, as we now begin to discern, 
gradually uncovering one great Cosmos of Forms, a world of potential being. 
(ibid.)  
The example of mathematics in turn adds weight to the possibility of philosophy, of 
uncovering an eternal and objective truth. Peirce promises, moreover, that once one 
understands the blessedness available by gazing on the eternal forms that are uncovered 
by philosophical and scientific study—“once you become inflated with that idea”—then 
matters of practical use and judgment will pale in comparison: matters of “vital 
importance” will seem “to be a very low kind of importance, indeed” (ibid., p. 121; 
emphasis in original). In other words, whereas matters of vital importance concern simply 
the particular situation and needs of an individual, the proper subject matter for reason to 
concern itself with is something much higher: the cosmos as a whole. 
What similarly seems to be part of Peirce’s rhetorical strategy, aimed at attracting 
potential scientists—true philosophers—away from matters of ethics and practical 
concerns and to the study of philosophy, is his flattering his audience by grouping them 
with himself in contrast to other thinkers and positions. For example, he groups his 
audience members along with himself in predicting that they, too, are interested in the 
purely theoretical study rather than in the practical application of science: 
No doubt a large proportion of those who now busy themselves with philosophy 
will lose interest in it as soon as it is forbidden to look upon it as susceptible of 
practical applications. We who continue to pursue the theory must bid adieu to 
them. (ibid., p. 114; emphasis added)  
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In the same vein, Peirce includes his audience among those with superior intellectual 
qualities, in contrast to the common man:  
The mental qualities we admire most in all human beings except our several selves 
are the maiden’s delicacy, the mother’s devotion, manly courage, and other 
inheritances that have come to us from the biped who did not yet speak. (ibid., p. 
110; emphasis added) 
With such flattery, Peirce appears to be trying to sweep his audience along with him as he 
lays out his argument that the proper end of philosophy is knowledge and understanding, 
and that its pursuit ought to be entirely distinct from the goal of improving men’s lives.   
VI. Instincts, Sentiment, and the Practical Realm  
Let us return to Peirce’s argument as to why reason is ill-suited as a guide to 
conduct and practical matters. Below we will explore what Peirce understands to be the 
nature of instinct and sentiment, and why he thinks these subconscious drives should 
guide us in practical matters. We will also explore some of Peirce’s more nuanced 
presentations of the connection between instincts and reason; this examination will reveal 
that though Peirce maintains the superiority of instinct in practical matters, he also 
acknowledges a role for the conscious modification of instinct. Understanding this 
element of his thought gives us a better idea of how, in Peirce’s view, a moderate 
conservatism works; as well as the process by which some individuals—for example, the 
statesman—are able to modify their instincts such that they develop superior practical 
judgment.  
By “instinct” or “sentiment,” Peirce means an inclination that penetrates to the 
“very core of one’s being” (ibid., p. 122). It is “that department of the soul . . . that is 
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deep and sure” (ibid., p. 121). In contrast, reason is merely the surface of our soul, that 
part of which we are conscious. Despite these differences, reason and instinct share the 
similarity that they both develop through our experiences in the world. 
Instinct is capable of development and growth,—though by a movement which is 
slow in the proportion in which it is vital; and this development takes place upon 
lines which are altogether parallel to those of reasoning. And just as reasoning 
springs from experience, so the development of sentiment arises from the soul’s 
Inward and Outward Experiences. (ibid., p. 121) 
Meditation and adversity are types of inward and outward experiences by which 
sentiment develops (ibid.). This development is both “of the same nature as the 
development of cognition,” and in fact “chiefly takes place through the instrumentality of 
cognition” (ibid.), as we will see. We should also note that, as we see in the quote above, 
instinct develops slowly, especially as it concerns important matters; it can not simply be 
changed “hastily” (ibid., p. 111), or imposed upon by the dictates of reason.  
Behind man’s instincts, Peirce sees an evolutionary logic: they aim at the survival 
of the human race. Instincts thus benefit individuals only to the extent that they can 
contribute to its numbers.  
The instincts of those animals whose instincts are remarkable present the character 
of being chiefly, if not altogether, directed to the preservation of the stock and of 
benefitting the individual, very little, if at all, except so far as he may happen as a 
possible procreator to be a potential public functionary. Such, therefore is the 
description of instinct that we ought to expect to find in man, in regard to vital 
matters; and so we do.82 (ibid., p. 113)  
                                                
82 It is worth noting that Peirce’s discussion here illustrates well his understanding of scientific 
knowledge and method: he combines data observed among other groups of animals along with 
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Man’s capacity for self-sacrifice is thus to be expected, and thus not quite praiseworthy:  
Instinct does, as a matter of course, prompt us, in all vital crises, to look upon our 
individual lives as small matters. It is no extraordinary pitch of virtue to do so; it is 
the character of every man or woman that is not despicable. (ibid.) 
There is nonetheless something universal and eternal that is available for man when he 
follows his moral instincts, for doing so entails disregarding the “discontinuities” of his 
own particular “will” (1898, CP 1.673). That it is “no extraordinary pitch of virtue” to 
follow one’s instincts of course raises the question of moral responsibility. We will see 
below that while Peirce makes no claim about man being responsible for his nature or 
reasoning capacities, he does think that the individual has some role to play in his 
ultimate adoption of moral ideals. Implicit in here is also the suggestion that philosophy 
is man’s highest occupation precisely because it does not entail simply abiding by a 
biological urge, as is the case with more practical matters. 
 Before we address the individual’s role in assessing his moral ideals and in the 
development of his own sentiment, it should be pointed out that evolutionary instinct is 
not the only thing that influences man’s moral and practical sense. Culture also plays an 
important role. In the draft of the 1898 lecture, Peirce distinguishes between “hereditary 
instincts”—that which have been bred into the biology of man—and “traditional 
sentiments”—that which we are inclined to think as a result of our education (1898, CP 
1.661). He acknowledges, for example, that an aversion to incest might not be built into 
                                                                                                                                            
evolutionary theory to put forth a hypothesis about human behavior and psychology, and then 
looks to empirical data to see whether or not support for that hypothesis can be found. We see 
that Peirce understands scientific knowledge to begin with the positing of hypotheses; that 
scientific theories are of a provisional nature (“present the character of being”); and that the more 
concrete sciences (biology) can help inform the more abstract ones (human psychology). 
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our DNA but rather must be inculcated somehow into our sentiments. He suggests that it 
is “tradition and the feelings that tradition and custom have developed” in a man that is at 
the root of an aversion to incest—at the root of what stops a man from “marry[ing] his 
own sister” (ibid.). Peirce similarly mentions here the “Brahmin . . . traditional sentiment 
in favor of suttee,” in an acknowledgment of the wide spectrum of things that humans are 
capable of finding acceptable, depending on their education (ibid.).  
That moral sentiments depend on education and culture is similarly expressed in his 
1885 review of Josiah Royce’s Religious Aspect of Philosophy. He explains in this 
review, against Royce’s attempt to intellectualize religion, that “a conscience . . . is not a 
theorem or a piece of information which may be acquired by reading a book; it must be 
bred in a man from infancy” (1885b/1992, p. 237). In an acknowledgment of the specific 
education of a Christian upbringing, Peirce continues:  
Every man born and reared in a christian community, however little he may believe 
the dogmas of the Church, does find himself believing with the strongest conviction 
in the moral code of christendom. He has a horror of murder and incest, a 
disapproval of lying, etc., which he cannot escape from. (ibid.) 
A Christian rearing provides an individual with “a horror of certain crimes and a 
disapproval of certain lesser sins” and “the spirit of Christian love . . . shall and will 
govern him in all questions of disputed morals” (ibid., p. 238).  
 This is not to say that Peirce thinks the teachings or traditions of every culture are 
equally correct. In his remarks on suttee, it is clear that he finds the practice wrong—and 
not simply from his Christian-raised point-of-view (1898, CP 1.661). He uses the 
example of suttee in fact to illustrate how “sentiment lays no claims to infallibility” 
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(ibid.). This comment suggests that there is a standard outside of particular cultures by 
which to judge cultural norms and traditions—for otherwise, sentiment could be nothing 
but infallible. Peirce furthermore recognizes that the example of suttee raises doubts 
regarding the soundness of the conservatism he has expounded: The “reflection” that he 
“might have been born a Brahmin with a traditional sentiment in favor” of the practice 
“tempts” the conservative “to become a radical” (ibid.). This might then be the type of 
thing about which the conservative would “advocate radical reforms,” as Peirce explains 
in the final draft of his lecture (1898, lecture 1 p. 111). “On the whole,” he explains, the 
conservative “thinks his wisest plan is to reverence his deepest sentiments as his highest 
and ultimate authority” (1898, CP 1.666).  
Thus we have Peirce advocating for a conservative appreciation of man’s biological 
instincts and inherited cultural norms, while nonetheless quietly acknowledging that there 
are reasons to doubt the soundness of one’s inherited norms, and thus that there is a limit 
to the thoughtful man’s conservatism. Yet, in his desire to forcefully advocate separating 
theory and practice, Peirce leaves us no further guidance as to how such things should be 
assessed. That Peirce recognized that his treatment of the matter was not adequate is 
suggested by the fact that he took up the topic again, and in a more nuanced and 
thoughtful manner. We will look at a 1905 essay in which Peirce returns to the issue of 
judging the soundness of inherited norms; as well as a draft of a lecture from the 1903 
Lowell Lecture series, in which Peirce addresses the role cognition plays in our 
acceptance—as well as alteration—of our moral maxims.  
In his 1905 essay “Issues of Pragmaticism,” Peirce provides further guidance as to 
the relationship between instinct, inherited cultural norms, and conscious reflection. He 
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explains that instinct is surest the closer the situation at hand is to “a primitive mode of 
life” (1905b/1998, p. 349). By the same token, it is doubtful that our instincts can guide 
us correctly in matters with which we have very little experience—such as understanding 
the motion of electrons (ibid.). Peirce nonetheless advises that it is “good methodeutic to 
presume” that a matter—even such as the motion of electrons—acts in accord with rather 
than against our instincts, until “some evidence to the contrary” arises (ibid.). Turning to 
the matter of judging cultural norms, Peirce similarly cautions against mistaking “paper-
doubt for the genuine metal” (ibid.). He illustrates what he means by exploring two 
examples: “the criminality of incest” and “the belief that suicide is to be classed as 
murder” (ibid., p. 350).  
Peirce first sets out to decide whether each norm is instinctual, thus common to the 
race, or simply an arbitrary cultural norm; Peirce seems to consider the former to be 
powerful forces on us, against which reason is powerless, whereas the latter are 
susceptible to modification through reflection. Incest “excites” a “thrill of horror” in us 
(ibid., p. 349). This horror is supported by biological concerns but is not fully explained 
by such concerns (ibid.). There is thus reason to think our aversion to the practice is 
instinctual (ibid., p. 350). The upshot of this determination, as Peirce sees it, is that, 
whatever rationalizing a pair of siblings might do to justify the act to themselves, they 
would still not be able to “shake off” the “conviction of horrible guilt” (ibid., p. 350). 
Peirce’s understanding, in other words, is that certain primitive instincts are stronger than 
is our reason, and thus cannot be overcome through the use of reason.  
The same can not be said for the “the belief that suicide is to be classed as murder,” 
however (ibid.). To start off with, Peirce points to “two pretty sure signs” that the belief 
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is not instinctually ingrained in us: it is culturally dependent—“substantially confined to 
the Christian world”—and the mind is easily able to discard the belief upon reflection 
(ibid.). Moreover, to argue in favor of the belief, its supporters largely rely on appeals to 
authority (ibid.). Taken together, these reflections suggest that “the belief . . . should be 
set down as dubitable” (ibid.). Once deemed dubitable, a belief is susceptible to the reach 
of reason. In this particular case, Peirce judges that reason “stamp[s]” the belief “as false” 
(ibid.).83  
This treatment of the relationship between reason and sentiment turns out to be 
consistent with—and thus helps us make sense of—Peirce’s earlier account in “The 
Fixation of Belief” that was cited in the beginning of this chapter as an example of a 
potential tension in Peirce’s thought. In that essay, Peirce encourages men to “overcome” 
the “old beliefs” that they come to understand to “have no sound basis” (1877, EP 1 p. 
122). He explains this they can do by reflecting upon the inadequacy of the method by 
which these beliefs were originally acquired (ibid.). What is striking in this account, and 
what seems to conflict with his later warning about mixing theory and practice, is 
Peirce’s encouraging members of specific cultures to reflect upon the beliefs they were 
brought up with in order to discard them. As examples he cites the “reformed 
                                                
83 On display here is the “critical” component of Peirce’s Critical Common-Sensism (which is 
a consequence of Pragmaticism; 1905b/1998, p. 346). Peirce explains that it is this critical 
component that distinguishes his doctrine from that of the Scots: “The Scotch school appears to 
have no such distinction concerning the limitations of indubitability and the consequent 
limitations of the jurisdiction of original belief” (ibid., p. 350).  
It is this critical element in Peirce’s conservative caution wherein lies his answer to 
Skagestad’s (1981) criticism that Peirce does not adequately account for instances in which 
discarding tradition on the basis of recent scientific findings is in fact the sound thing to do (p. 
226).  
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Musselman” who hangs on to “his old notions in regard to the relations of the sexes,” as 
well as the “reformed Catholic” who still “shrink[s] from reading the Bible” (ibid., p. 
122–123). It thus appears Peirce is encouraging reason to impose itself where sentiment 
has not lost its grip, simply for the philosophical virtue of “integrity of belief” (ibid., p. 
123). Upon further reflection, though, we see that Peirce’s position here is the same as his 
position in the 1905 essay, albeit with a different emphasis. He explains in “Fixation” that 
it is not that reason ought to impose itself on sentiment, but rather that sentiment will 
easily yield in each case so long as reasonable reflection is allowed to take place:  
The force of habit will sometimes cause a man to hold on to old beliefs, after he is 
in a condition to see that they have no sound basis. But reflection upon the state of 
the case will overcome these habits, and he ought to allow reflection its full weight. 
(ibid., p. 122)  
Thus we see that Peirce is in fact consistent with his treatment of the matter: once 
genuine doubt has arisen—as we can understand to be the case when speaking of a 
“reformed Musselman” and “reformed Catholic”—reasonable reflection can, and ought 
to, overcome sentimental habit if allowed to take place.  
Thus we see that, as opposed to biologically ingrained instincts, sentiments rooted 
in culture are open to reasonable reflection. A belief is not doomed if it is determined to 
be rooted in culture; this recognition merely opens up the belief to reasonable analysis. A 
draft of Peirce’s first lecture from his 1903 Lowell Lectures will shed light on the 
question of how reason ought to go about assessing a particular sentiment.84 In this draft, 
                                                
84 The Lowell Lectures were a series of lectures Peirce delivered at Harvard University in 
1903, organized by William James. 
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Peirce gives more space to the role of human agency and elaborates on the role of 
cognition in the development of instinct, sentiment, and our adoption of moral ideals.  
Peirce explains that every man “imbibe[s] in childhood” “certain ideals” of 
conduct, and that these ideals evolve gradually as a result of a dialectic with the man’s 
nature and the ideas of those around him: they are “gradually . . . shaped to his personal 
nature and to the ideas of his circle of society rather by a continuous process of growth 
than by any distinct acts of thought” (1903a, CP 1.591–1.592). Peirce identifies three 
reasons a man is usually drawn to his ideals: for their “esthetic quality,” “when a man 
contemplates them . . . he thinks that conduct fine”; for the expected esthetic effects of an 
action’s imagined consequences; and for the sake of consistency with his other ideals, 
“for inconsistency is odious to him” (ibid., CP 1.591). When a man adopts ideals that 
recommend themselves to him, he “intend[s] to make his own conduct conform at least 
to a part of them,” and then “formulates . . . certain rules of conduct” (ibid., CP 1.592). 
Reflecting upon these rules he has set for himself, and the general ideals on which they 
are based, “has a certain effect upon his disposition, so that what he naturally inclines to 
do becomes modified” (ibid.). He foresees future occasions that will require him to act in 
a certain way based on his rules of conduct, and he resolves to do so (ibid.).  
The man’s resolution ultimately becomes an “efficient agency,” by which “one can 
forecast the man’s conduct on the special occasion” to which his resolve applies (ibid.). 
This “efficient agency” is “hidden in the depths of our nature” (ibid., CP 1.593). Though 
“we do not know by what machinery the conversion of a resolution” into an efficient 
agency is accomplished, we are aware of it inside of us as a “feeling of need, of desire” 
(ibid.). When we act according to our ideal, as we resolved to do, it is pleasurable (ibid., 
 
 
227 
 
 
CP 1.594); or, more specifically, when we review our actions in our mind, we are “aware 
of a certain quality of feeling, the feeling of satisfaction—and directly afterward 
recognize that that feeling was pleasurable” (ibid., CP 1.596). When we judge that an 
action is in accord with our “general intentions,” this judgment will also be accompanied 
by a feeling of satisfaction that is pleasurable, and “deeper” even than the feeling of 
pleasure that accompanied our determination that an action was in line with a particular 
resolution (ibid., CP 1.597).  
As a man reviews his actions and determines whether or not he is satisfied with 
himself, he will—or has the opportunity at least—to absorb lessons and act better in the 
future.  
Whether the man is satisfied with himself or dissatisfied, his nature will absorb the 
lesson like a sponge; and the next time he will tend to do better than he did before. 
(ibid., CP 1.598)  
Similarly, a man will also continue to review his ideals—a process that is endlessly being 
contributed to by “the experience of life” (ibid., CP 1.599). This is done first through the 
depths of a man’s being, and only later reaches his consciousness: his experiences “are 
digested first, not in the man’s consciousness, but in the depths of his reasonable being. 
The results come to consciousness later” (ibid.). Conscious meditation on the matter, 
however, enables a “mass of tendencies” to more quickly “settle down” and “[conform] 
to what is fit for the man” (ibid.). A man is then “at full liberty . . . to make his life more 
reasonable” (ibid., CP 1.602; emphasis in the original). It thus appears that, as Peirce has 
presented it, ideals continue to develop as a result of an interplay between the ideals of a 
man’s youth and the society that surrounds him, his experiences in the world, and his 
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own instinctive and cognitive nature. Among other things, this process makes some sense 
of the fact, noted above, that some individuals have more refined instincts and practical 
judgment than do others.  
In the interplay Peirce identifies, pleasure has the role of transmitting information. 
Peirce explains, though, that his account takes issue with those who argue that man acts 
from no other motive than pleasure and that there can be “no room for any distinction of 
right and wrong” when pleasure is a motive to action (ibid., CP 1.603). In fact, our 
conscious determinations to action work alongside and against our desire for pleasure, 
and the interplay determines our actions (ibid., CP 1.605). Moreover, so long as man is 
able to be self-critical and “compare his conduct with a preconceived standard,” then the 
motive of pleasure does not do away with a standard of right and wrong: “for it would 
become disagreeable” to a man “to incur the sting of conscience” (ibid., CP 1.604). 
The above discussion sheds light on whether Peirce thinks sentiment can be 
evaluated by reason, and by what process such an evaluation might take place. What still 
remains unclear, though, is whether a universal standard exists by which sentiment can 
ultimately be evaluated. If there is no such standard, then it seems all that does exist, in 
Peirce’s understanding, are individuals’ assessments of right and wrong behavior. These 
amount to more than mere pleasure, but do not necessarily reflect a universal truth.  
I argue that Peirce understands the activity of philosophy—contemplating the 
whole—to yield a universal standard of judgment. As he explains:  
The soul’s deeper parts can only be reached through its surface. In this way the 
eternal forms, that mathematics and philosophy and the other sciences make us 
acquainted with will by slow percolation gradually reach the very core of one’s 
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being, and will come to influence our lives; and this they will do, not because they 
involve truths of merely vital importance, but because they [are] ideal and eternal 
verities. (1898, lecture 1, p. 121–122) 
Philosophy does not produce simple formulas for acting. It does, however, influence the 
instincts according to what is universal, as it concerns “ideal and eternal verities” (ibid., 
p. 122). Though these truths do not yield clear guides for action, Peirce does provide 
hints about the direction in which philosophy transforms the instincts, which we will 
explore below. First, though, we will revisit the question of whether there is any room for 
reason to take up practical subjects like ethics and politics. 
VII. Revisiting the Relationship between Reason and Practical Matters  
The examination above clarifies what Peirce sees as the appropriate way to study 
and think about practical matters, as distinguished from the type of intermingling of 
philosophy and vital matters that he warns against. Peirce explains that his reflections 
concerning how the individual modifies his sentiments constitute a “personal meditation 
on the fitness of one’s own ideals” and is an examination “of a practical nature” (1903a, 
CP 1.600). This is an entirely different activity from those who purport to study ethics 
theoretically and seek “to ascertain, as a matter of curiosity, what the fitness of an ideal of 
conduct consists in, and to deduce from such definition of fitness what conduct ought to 
be” (ibid.). The latter is entirely theoretical, and unrelated to how one’s conduct is 
actually shaped (ibid.), whereas the former is the process by which individuals assess and 
amend the principles by which they live. Here Peirce acknowledges that there is a place 
for the theoretical, removed study of ethics in this manner—so long as its character as a 
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theoretical study, “entirely distinct from the business of shaping one’s own conduct,” be 
“not lost sigh of” (ibid.).  
This is consistent with Peirce’s remarks in the draft of his 1898 lecture that he is 
not against such studies entirely, only in using such studies toward vital or useful ends. 
The “philosophy of religion . . . seems to me a most interesting study, at any rate,” though 
it be not “of vital importance” (1898, CP 1.665)—in other words, the study ought to be 
kept distinct from attempting to study religion not simply for the sake of understanding, 
but with the intention of trying to influence one’s own beliefs and conduct through this 
rational inquiry. Similarly, the study of ethics can be, “to a normal and healthy mind, a 
civilizing and valuable study,” so long as it is “recognized as not being a matter of vital 
importance or in any way touching the student’s conscience” (ibid., CP 1.669). Even still, 
though, this study is not of very great value—and is of value at all only to the extent that 
it is connected to the “great continuum of ideas” (ibid.).85  
Thus we see that what Peirce specifically objects to is studying ethics with the goal 
of deriving prescriptions for action. This makes sense given what we have seen about the 
prudence of leaving such decisions to instinct and sentiment. There is indeed room in 
Peirce’s view for the dispassionate study of such things, so long as the dispassionate 
nature of the study is not lost sight of. But though there is this room in Peirce’s view for 
this study, he nonetheless does not view the study as very interesting.86  
                                                
85 Peirce explains the study is “somewhat more [interesting] than the theory of whist, much 
more so than the question of the landing of Columbus” (1898, CP 1.669). 
86 See 1898, lecture 1, p. 116–117, for a longer discussion of the types of studies Peirce thinks 
are most worthwhile, and their relationship to one another.  
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VIII. The Philosopher’s Instincts 
Let us now take up Peirce’s remark that there is indeed one way in which 
philosophy can and will influence conduct: namely, by slowly shaping the instincts of the 
philosopher. While Peirce was not specific in his 1898 lecture about the manner in which 
he expected the philosopher’s instincts to be affected by his study, there are hints 
throughout his writings as to the effect Peirce expected contemplating the whole to have 
on a man’s inner being: namely, to make clear the interconnectedness of human beings. 
Let us now examine some of these suggestions and their connection to Peirce’s 
philosophical understanding. This examination will cite some of the examples mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter that appeared to conflict with Peirce’s warning that theory 
and practice must be separated; it turns out that, when understood in the proper context, 
no great conflict exists, and that it is in fact possible to understand Peirce’s thought on the 
matter as largely consistent.  
In his 1868 “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Peirce explains that his 
logical investigation reveals that men are highly dependent on one another for knowledge 
(1868b/1992, p. 52). Man as an individual is marked by his ignorance; it is only as a 
member of a community—in his connection with other men—that he can hope to be part 
of the uncovering of eternal truth (ibid., p. 54–55). Similarly, Peirce sees in his defense of 
scholastic realism and the existence of generals an argument for the existence of 
something higher than individual man, capable of elevating his particular existence:  
The question whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals, is 
the question whether there is anything of any more dignity, worth, and importance 
than individual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. Whether men 
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really have anything in common, so that the community is to be considered as an 
end in itself, and if so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most 
fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution 
of which we have it in our power to influence. (1871/1992, p. 105) 
These conclusions, derived from the study of logic, appear to be at the root of Peirce’s 
teaching in an earlier essay that it is illogical to put one’s own interests above those of the 
community’s (1869/1992, p. 81). In a similar vein, Peirce also understands logic to 
complement well the “correct” element of the “Buddhisto-christian religion”: that one 
should “recognize a higher business than your business,” and aim to overcome one’s 
individual identity and “weld” oneself “into the universal continuum” (1898, CP 1.673). 
It is arguably Peirce’s understanding of men’s mutual dependency that prompts him 
to minimize the difference between men and cultures and instead emphasize the common 
membership of individuals in the human race. An emphasis on the similarity among men 
and the downplaying of what is particular to or arguably superior about Western culture 
is evident throughout Peirce’s writings. In the first Cambridge Conferences lecture, 
Peirce speaks of how “we” individuals are “mere cells in a social organism” (1898, 
lecture 1, p. 121). Similarly, when speaking about those “qualities we most admire,” 
Peirce does not speak of anything particular to the Western or Christian tradition, but 
rather of “man,” “human beings,” and “all our race,” as well as our common ancestor, 
“the biped who did not yet speak” (ibid., p. 110–111).  
Peirce minimizes civilizational differences when he lumps together Buddhism and 
Christianity in the unused draft of his first Cambridge Conferences lecture, quoted above. 
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In an 1897 letter to William James, Peirce goes so far as to remark that Buddha is a better 
embodiment of Christianity than is Jesus: 
Christianity, or as we ought to call it Buddhism, for surely the Indian Prince was an 
incomparably more perfect embodiment of it than the miracle monger of the 
synoptic gospels. (letter, March 12, 1897; quoted in Ketner and Putnam 1992, p. 
10) 
An inclination to emphasize the wholeness of the human race, or at least raise questions 
about a presumed Western or Christian superiority, is arguably also on display in “The 
Fixation of Belief.” Peirce there mentions the Western prejudice in favor of monogamy, 
and then raises doubts about the soundness or this prejudice by remarking that Hindus 
find the Western treatment of women to be immoral (1877/1992, p. 119).  
The philosopher’s recognition of his dependency on other men is also connected to 
the generosity inherent in his investigations. Peirce explains that the true investigator, 
aware of “his own ignorance,” recognizes that he can only play a small role in the 
discovery of truth (1901a, EP 2 p. 58). His actions thus aim at benefitting future inquiry 
and inquirers, and thus the development of knowledge in the long run:  
Small as [his steps in discovery] are, he deems them precious; and he hopes that by 
conscientiously pursuing the methods of science he may erect a foundation upon 
which his successors may climb higher. (ibid.)  
The scientist realizes he only plays a part in mankind’s overall effort to uncover truth and 
reality.  
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IX. Conclusion 
 In summation, we have seen that: Peirce is serious in his concern that a focus on 
utility will interfere with philosophy and pure science by limiting investigators’ scope 
and turning away potential philosophers. We have also seen that Peirce is sincere in his 
warning that the findings of philosophy and science, which are inherently provisional in 
nature, will corrupt ethics and be imprudent to follow in practical matters. Instinct and 
sentiment, including that sentiment that reflects the individual’s experiences and 
conscious reflections, are far better guides in practical decision making and for acting 
than is pure reason. While science can take up the study of practical matters like ethics in 
a completely dispassionate way, it must maintain its dispassion; moreover, such a study 
will be of only a small amount of interest with regard to man’s efforts to uncover and 
contemplate the whole. Finally, the eternal verities that influence the philosopher’s 
instincts point to the interconnectedness and mutual dependence of human beings; that he 
recognizes that eternal verities have the potential to influence man’s instincts is what 
saves Peirce from moral relativism. In the next chapter, we will take up the question of 
the relationship between philosophy and statesmanship through an examination of 
Peirce’s recommendations of the education fit for cultivating leaders of a modern 
republic, and further examine Peirce’s understanding of the connection between reason 
and practical judgment.  
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CHAPTER 5 
In the last chapter we saw Peirce advocating largely separating theory and practice, 
explaining that “the two masters, theory and practice, you cannot serve” (1898, lecture 1, 
p. 113). We also saw that Peirce’s ultimate understanding of the matter was a bit more 
nuanced: not only is there room for theory to study practical things—albeit 
dispassionately—but it is also the case that reasonable reflection can modify instinct and 
sentiment. Peirce’s reflections on the Christian view of the criminality of suicide 
provided a glimpse of how this might be done. We also saw some suggestions of how a 
philosophical understanding might impact a man’s instincts—contemplation of the 
whole, for Peirce, yields the understanding of the interdependency of men. Despite these 
examples, the connection among philosophy, reasonable reflection, and instinct—the 
development of what it seems apt to call practical judgment—is still murky. In the fourth 
and fifth Cambridge Conferences lectures of 1898, Peirce once more examines the topic 
of the connection between theoretical study and practical action in a discussion of the 
education fit for statesmen—for those who will lead a modern republic. Interestingly, 
whereas in the first Cambridge Conferences lecture Peirce stresses the infallibility of 
instinct and sentiment for the individual, in the fourth and fifth lectures he argues that 
universities do no service to either their students or country by entrenching received 
wisdom. Universities should instead, he explains, be teaching their students the art of 
reasoning—sharpening their mental toolkit through a myriad of exercises and through 
confronting new and different ideas from various angles. This suggests, then, that a 
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philosophic and scientific education is crucial to the proper cultivation of men of action. 
In this chapter, we will examine Peirce’s discussion of the education fit for a modern 
republic in order to better understand what connection he sees between philosophy and 
practical decision making, and his views on political matters more generally.  
Peirce explains that “the good of the country” requires that American universities 
be reformed (1898, lecture 4, p. 172). The universities of his time were not contributing 
to the “advance of civilization” by carrying “forward the human mind to some new and 
valuable truth . . . one that goes toward enlarging the system of what is already known” 
(ibid., p. 171). Nor were they grooming men to whom the country could turn for “the 
solutions of the most urgent problems of each generation” (ibid., p. 172). In contrast, 
German universities were “the light of the whole world”; the old English universities “in 
the past gave birth to Locke and to Newton”; and the “medieval University of Bologna 
gave Europe its system of law” (ibid.).  
The reason that American universities were not contributing to the “advance of 
civilization” was that they were places of teaching, whereas the others were places of 
learning. The one contributes to entrenching knowledge, whereas the other to advancing 
knowledge: 
In order that a man’s whole heart may be in teaching he must be thoroughly imbued 
with the vital importance and absolute truth of what he has to teach; while in order 
that he may have any measure of success in learning he must be penetrated with a 
sense of the unsatisfactoriness of his present condition of knowledge. (1898, lecture 
4, p. 171) 
Only a “deep sense that one is miserably ignorant” can make a man feel his “need of 
learning,” and thus “spur one on in the toilsome path of learning” (ibid.). Only a man 
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who is aware of his ignorance can contract “that fever for learning that must consume the 
soul,” such that he will be able to “infect others with the same apparent malady” (ibid.). 
Institutions of learning, in other words, require that scholars have an “eagerness to learn,” 
as well as “freedom from dogmatism” (ibid.).  
 The awareness of one’s ignorance, which is necessary if one is to be open to 
learning, is simply an acknowledgment of the attitude of fallibilism that, as we have seen, 
is required for a true attitude of science. Scientific hypotheses are always merely 
provisional, only capable of being partially confirmed. A scientific theory does not stand  
upon the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground 
seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. (1898, 
lecture 4, p. 176–177) 
This is difficult to acknowledge because it goes against man’s instincts: “the natural 
cocksuredness and conceit of man struggles to escape such confession of total ignorance” 
(1898, lecture 4, p. 175). The “first . . . rule of reason,” then, is to quiet down this natural 
confidence and to recognize that “in order to learn you must desire to learn and in so 
desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think” (1898, lecture 4, p. 178). 
From this rule of reason there “follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed 
upon every wall of the city of philosophy”: “Do not block the way of inquiry” 
(emphasis that of author; ibid.). The “one unpardonable offense in reasoning” is to “set 
up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth” (ibid, p. 
179). Common ways in which such a barricade is constructed include: absolute assertions 
of truth; claims that a matter can never be known; claims that a matter of science is 
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foundational, with nothing beneath it to know; and claims that a “law or truth has found 
its last and perfect formulation” (ibid., p. 179–180).  
By entrenching received knowledge, or opinion, an educational institution is not 
going to create a class of educated elite that can adequately offer insight into the 
country’s “most urgent problems,” but rather only produce men set to “earn handsome 
incomes” and live in luxury (1898, lecture 4, p. 172). Such an outcome might aim to 
“benefit . . . individual students,” but it will not be “for the good of country” or “for the 
speedier elevation of man onto that rational animal of [which] he is the embryonic form” 
(ibid.). The good of the commonwealth requires that men be trained in the “art of 
thinking” (1898, lecture 5, p. 181). This used to be a goal of a liberal education. It is more 
important for the “welfare of the commonwealth” that men have the “power of 
recognizing the sort of thought and the sorts of methods in which it will be well for the 
government and public opinion to put their trust,” than that there be “assent of all the 
citizens to any definite propositions,—such, we will say, as the doctrine of the 
independence of the executive, legislative, and judiciary functions” (ibid.).  
In this discussion we see the main tenets that lie at the heart of Peirce’s views on 
education and a proper liberal arts university: anti-dogmatism and the noble pursuit of 
philosophy and science for the sake of reason simply. It is clear how such an image of a 
university acts to further the end of science, of uncovering the beautiful and sacred nature 
(1898, lecture 4, p. 176–177). Peirce also claims, however, that a proper liberal arts 
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education will benefit the commonwealth; how this is so is still unclear.87 We will 
examine Peirce’s writings on education as well as his specific curricular 
                                                
87 While several scholars have written about how Peirce’s philosophy is connected to the 
formation of democratic character, or Bildung, they focus on how Peirce’s recommendations will 
benefit individual students and not the state or polity as a whole; the common suggestion seems to 
be that individuals with developed capacities will benefit society simply. These commentators 
also do not adequately take into account the tension between what Peirce says about the practical 
benefits of a good education and his professed conservatism when it comes to the application of 
ideas in the practical realm. Strand (2005a) speaks of Peirce’s desire to teach critical thinking to 
students. Strand explains this is an extension of Peirce’s “critical commonsensism,” but it seems 
to me that she misuses Peirce’s concept, which is not about applying critical common-sense to 
everyday life, but about where and how scientific inquiry should start (e.g.: “The Scotch school 
appears to have no such distinction concerning the limitations of indubitability and the 
consequent limitations of the jurisdiction of original belief” (1905b, p. 350); “True, we are driven 
oftentimes in science to try the suggestions of instinct; but we only try them, we compare them 
with experience, we hold ourselves ready to throw them overboard at a moment’s notice from 
experience” (1898, lecture 1, p. 112)). Garrison (2005) uses “critical common-sensism” in a 
similar way as does Strand (2005a), in other words, as the training of individuals’ minds to 
question received wisdom:  
One of the most important aims of education in a pluralistic, communicative democracy is 
for the young to learn the value of challenging cultural dogma. Esteeming and possessing 
critical and creative acumen is an important part of the knowledge, attitudes, and values of 
most worth in a dynamic democracy. . . . Critical common-sensism can contribute to the 
restoration of genuinely democratic citizenship. (p. 181–182)  
Garrison explains further, “a democrat should endorse any pedagogy that educates more 
imaginative, creative, and autonomous students” (p. 186). Midtgarden (2005) understands 
Peirce’s reflections on the “dependencies and continuities between life world practices and 
scientific practices” to be a “locus for Bildung in the Humboldtean sense” (p. 332). Colapietro 
(2005) understands Peirce’s education recommendations as aiming to cultivate students’ 
capacities, especially their appreciation for the aesthetic and the imaginative. This is to prepare 
the student for a life of learning, as education is a life-long opportunity, and is not simply a 
preparation for life. Colapietro refers to Peirce’s “sentimental conservatism,” but does not 
acknowledge that this term for Peirce points to the distinction, and indeed tension, between 
practices fit for science and those fit for practical life. D. Anderson (2005) sees Peirce’s pedagogy 
as involving the “cultivation of a student’s overall character,” in a manner related to “what 
German culture understands as Bildung (p. 279). Anderson recognizes in addition that Peirce was 
interested in improving students by “putting her or him in a better position to act successfully in 
the world,” but by this Anderson seems to intend “success in the world” as simply benefit to the 
individual student: “Liberal education . . . provides general skills for general aims. . . . For Peirce, 
success and improvement in life depend on the ability to think proficiently” (p. 280–281). If 
Anderson intends for such success or cultivation of character to benefit the overall society, he 
does not explain how it might. The suspicion that Anderson is interested only in what will benefit 
individual students in their practical lives, rather than society, is bolstered by a point he makes 
that runs directly contrary to the entirety of Peirce’s first Cambridge Conferences lecture: “Peirce 
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recommendations to try to determine in what way he thinks a proper liberal arts education 
can yield practical benefit, or benefit the active life. We will begin by examining what 
Peirce says about what a university ought to be. 
I. The University 
In 1891 Peirce provided the definition of a “university” for the Century Dictionary: 
An association of men for the purpose of study, which confers degrees which are 
acknowledged as valid throughout Christendom, is endowed, and is privileged by 
the state, in order that the people may receive intellectual guidance and that the 
theoretical problems which present themselves in the development of civilization 
may be resolved.88 (1891/1952 p. 278) 
As we see from this definition, Peirce envisions a university as a place where men can 
congregate to study together. In Peirce’s terms, it is a place of learning rather than of 
teaching. The state has an interest in such institutions because they serve the dual 
purposes of providing “intellectual guidance” for “the people,” as well as aiming to 
resolve “the theoretical problems which present themselves in the development of 
civilization.”  
The Johns Hopkins University was created on a model that emphasized “original 
research and the training of specialists” (Fisch and Cope 1952, p. 307). Charles’s father, 
                                                                                                                                            
. . . recognized that logic, as a normative science, is closely linked to the practical art of reasoning 
and thus more generally to the conduct of life” (p. 283). The most he offers with regard to 
political concerns is: “Peirce . . . seemed to anticipate the Deweyan point that sustaining a 
democracy required of citizens an ability to think well” (p. 287). Ventimiglia (2005) is concerned 
with the continued growth of the individual student, though he does acknowledge the important 
Peircean lesson that “the ends of business and the ends of education are not ultimately 
commensurable” (p. 308). Liszka (2013) focuses on Peirce’s pedagogical view that individuals 
learn best by doing.  
88 Thyer-Bacon (2005) faults Peirce for this Western- and Christian-centric definition, 
claiming it merely reveals his own cultural biases. 
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Harvard math professor Benjamin Peirce, wrote up a “Working Plan for the Foundation 
of a University” in 1856 that portrayed a university as a community of scholarship and 
learning (Benjamin Peirce 1856); Fisch and Cope (1952) explain that Hopkins was in this 
model and “very like a fulfillment of the family dream” (ibid., p. 280). Christine Ladd-
Franklin—Peirce’s student at Johns Hopkins, who went on to teach at Columbia 
University—spoke of the remarkable intellectual atmosphere at Hopkins in its early days: 
For the first time the atmosphere of the great European centers of research had been 
created in America. . . . Probably there has never been in this country a center of 
learning where the conditions were more ideal for producing in its best form the joy 
of the intellectual life. (Ladd-Franklin 1916, p. 716)  
Peirce sings Hopkins’ praises on numerous occasions for precisely these reasons; it was 
the first American university based on the model of what a university should be.  
In an 1894 letter to Daniel Coit Gilman, the president of Hopkins who had been 
involved in both hiring and dismissing Peirce from that university, Peirce explains that 
Johns Hopkins served as a model for his Century Dictionary definition: 
I am strongly impelled . . . to express my sense of obligation to you. For of all the 
impressions of my life, none stands out in finer and nobler relief than that of your 
conception of a university. (You will find it influenced my definition of university 
in the Century Dictionary.) (1894/1952 p. 310) 
Peirce had previously expressed to Gilman, while under consideration for a Hopkins post: 
“You are the only real university in America” (1878/1958 p. 330). Speaking to an 
American audience in Paris on July 4, 1880, Peirce explains that Hopkins was the first 
American institution that was properly a university:  
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It has here [at the Johns Hopkins University of Baltimore] alone been recognized 
that the function of a university is the production of knowledge, and that teaching is 
only a necessary means to that end. In short, instructors and pupils here compose a 
company who are all occupied in studying together. (1880/1952 p. 277)  
The faculty and students, studying together, were prolific in their research, serving the 
goal of furthering knowledge: in “four short years,” with only “half a dozen professors 
and a hundred and fifty students,”  
the members of this little university have published some one hundred original 
researches, some of them of great value—fairly equal to the sum of what all the 
other colleges in the land have done . . . in the last twenty years. (ibid.)   
Clark University followed the Hopkins model once G. Stanley Hall, a colleague as well 
as admirer of Peirce’s at Hopkins, became its president in 1889 (Fisch and Cope 1952, p. 
307). Peirce lauded Clark under Hall’s leadership in an April 20, 1900, issue of Science 
marking the university’s decennial celebration: 
Clark University, in recognizing the pursuit of science as its first object, with 
teaching—of course, an indispensable means of securing continuity of work—as 
only a subordinate, or at most a secondary object, has perhaps the most elevated 
ideal of any university in the world. (1900/1958 p. 334) 
He explains in his review that Clark’s goal of pursuing science is not just good for the 
university or even just for science, but also for its students: “I believe it to be so much the 
better for the individual students” (ibid.). 
II. The University’s Dual Functions 
In the 1878 letter to Gilman that Peirce wrote while he was being considered for a 
Hopkins position, he explains that a university should have two types of students, each 
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type with its own distinct goals and thus each type requiring distinct treatment. Among 
the student body, there will be a subset of “special pupils” who ought to be treated as 
“apprentices in establishment” (1878/1958 p. 328). These, in other words, will be trained 
to be the next generation of scholars. There will also be “general students”: those who 
will return to the world after their few years at university (ibid., p. 329). It is presumably 
these types of graduates that Peirce sees “all of America” turning to “for the solutions of 
the most urgent problems of each generation” (1898, lecture 4, p. 172).89  
a. For Man’s Speedier Elevation to a Rational Animal 
Peirce’s acknowledgment of the different types of students proper to a university 
deepens our understanding of his conception of a university’s dual functions, as evident 
in his Century Dictionary definition discussed above. On the one hand it is a place where 
“rational ideas may be developed and the rationalization of things furthered” (1900/1958 
p. 334). This end is really “the only thing that makes the human race worth perpetuation,” 
and is best carried out through genuinely scientific investigation (ibid.). In his variation 
of Kantian thought—in which he tries to restore pure philosophy to its privileged 
position, from Kant’s having subordinated it to moral matters—Peirce explains that 
philosophy and science have the highest of ends: “the only thing that is really desirable 
                                                
89 That Peirce distinguishes these two types of students is ignored in the Peirce scholarship I 
have reviewed; see, for example, Strand (2005a); Midtgarden (2005); Garrison (2005); Colapietro 
(2005); D. Anderson (2005). This neglect is likely due to the fact that this acknowledgment cuts 
against the democratic manner in which most scholars read Peirce. For only by ignoring the 
distinction can Strand (2005a), for example, argue that Peirce intends for all university students to 
be nurtured to be true scientific men (p. 312). 
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without a reason for being so, is to render ideas and things reasonable” (ibid., p. 332).90 It 
is the resolution of the “theoretical problems” of such disciplines that further the 
“development of civilization” (1891/1952 p. 278). In the Cambridge Conferences 
lectures, Peirce expresses this end of the university thus: “for the speedier elevation of 
man onto that rational animal of [which] he is the embryonic form” (1898, lecture 4, p. 
172). In other words, a university ought to further the goal of philosophy and science that 
we examined in the last chapter, of “gradually uncovering one great Cosmos of Forms, a 
world of potential being” (1898, lecture 1, p. 121). This is the noble function of a 
university. 
Regarding this end, Peirce sees his age as that of the development of methods. It is 
an age where the methods of “even mathematics and astronomy” have changed; 
“chemistry and physics are on completely new tracks”; “linguistic, history, mythology, 
sociology, biology, are all getting studied in new ways”; and “jurisprudence and law have 
begun to feel the impulse” and will continue to be affected by the development of new 
methods (1882, p. 11). Without the right education, Peirce recognizes, an apprenticeship 
in science could amount to not being much more intellectually enlightening than would 
be an apprenticeship in a machine shop (ibid.). While the “scientific specialists,” the 
pendulum swingers and the like,” do important and “useful work,” they do not stand 
“intellectually much higher than an artisan” (ibid.). The more important places in science 
will be for those who “succeed in adapting the methods of one science to the 
                                                
90 Cf., what Kant says about the good will: “A good will is not good because of what it effects 
or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because . . . it is 
good in itself, and regarded for itself,” from Section 1 of the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals” (Kant 1785/1996 p. 50; 4:394).  
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investigation of another” (ibid.). This is the character of the progress of the previous 
generation of scientists: 
Darwin adapted to biology the methods of Malthus and the economists; Maxwell 
adapted to the theory of gases the methods of the doctrine of chances, and to 
electricity the methods of hydrodynamics. (ibid.) 
For such work, one needs a “general training of his mind,” and “such knowledge as shall 
show him how to make his powers most effective in a new direction” (ibid.). Training in 
logic is what provides this knowledge; “the theory of method will shed much light on all . 
. . other studies” (ibid.).  
b. Providing Intellectual Guidance for the People 
 It is the reason for the other function of a university—providing “intellectual 
guidance” for “the people” (1891/1952 p. 278)—that, on the surface, is less clear. 
Peirce’s thought, over decades of writing on the purpose of education, points to two main 
concerns when it comes to “general students”: it seems he thinks that a noble 
environment like that of a proper institution of learning can have a beneficial impact on 
men’s morals, especially in a modern democracy where men’s attentions are so often 
turned to lower things like making money and personal success; and, he thinks it is 
important for men who are to lead active lives to be able to think for themselves. In his 
1878 letter to Gilman, Peirce explains that one of the important lessons that a general 
pupil ought to carry with him after he leaves the university is what the soul of a scholar is 
about:  
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First, the moral lessons of physics and its logical lessons should be branded on the 
soul of the scholar. Second, [the pupil] should get an idea of what a physicist is: his 
purposes, his ideas, his methods, his life. (1878/1958 p. 329)  
Peirce elaborates on this point in his review of Clark University. There he explains the 
noble aspirations of the true scientist, who is motivated by “rational ideas” and the 
“rationalization of things” simply. He is motivated not by wealth or by personal ambition, 
but by an end beyond himself; pure science “strongly influences those who pursue it to 
subordinate all motives of ambition, fame, greed, self-seeking of every description” 
(1900/1958 p. 334).91  
Such qualities Peirce’s own students observed, and were attracted to, in him. 
Ladd-Franklin explains that Peirce “had all the air . . . of the typical philosopher who is 
engaged, at the moment, in bringing fresh truth by divination out of some inexhaustible 
well” (Ladd-Franklin 1916, p. 716). He inspired his students not with a charismatic 
personality in any usual sense, “but rather by creating the impression that we had before 
us a profound, original, dispassionate and impassioned seeker of truth” (ibid.). Peirce 
similarly expresses his views on such matters in a letter to Ladd-Franklin written 
sometime after 1903, in which he assures his former student that the lack of recognition 
he has received for the doctrine of pragmatism is not of concern to him:  
It is true that I have not received much credit either for pragmatism or any other 
part of my work. However, as it was not done for the sake of anything of that kind, 
                                                
91 While she does not speak explicitly about educating men’s souls in this regard, Strand 
(2005a) recognizes in Peirce’s thought the importance of the intellectual ethos of a university as 
compared with the utilitarian mentality of practical life outside of the university. 
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I have no reason to complain. (Peirce letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin, reproduced 
undated in Ladd-Franklin 1916, p. 718-719) 
Peirce explains that he published his work out of a combination of his own 
convenience—so he could refer to such explanations of his ideas in other publications—
and, more significantly, because “I thought it would be a gain to civilization to have my 
entire logical system” (ibid., p. 719).  
In his review of Clark University, Peirce expresses a similar disdain as he does in 
his Cambridge Conferences lectures for the state of American universities of his day, who 
promote themselves as being primarily concerned with furthering the welfare of their 
students. This is especially egregious when individual well-being is equated with wealth: 
Our scientific schools distribute circulars which dwell chiefly upon the handsome 
incomes their alumni are making, thereby calling up such images as a handsomely 
laid table with a pair of Havre de Grace ducks and a bottle of Chateau Margaux. 
(1900/1958 p. 333)  
Peirce claims that with such an outlook, these universities accomplish the opposite of 
their stated goal: “it may be doubted whether any teaching ever anywhere did less to 
make happy men and women” (ibid.). Individual well-being is not benefitted by being 
inward-looking—“Whoever makes his own welfare his object will simply ruin it 
utterly”—but by being in touch with something beyond oneself (ibid.). Modern German 
universities, Peirce claims, make the benefit of the state their explicit goals, and this 
“end” is “so constantly in view that the scholars are led to regard their own lives as 
having a purpose beyond themselves” (ibid.). By promoting ends above and beyond the 
well-being of the individual, these universities in fact do “great things for their students 
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personally” (ibid.). Lest we think that Peirce is overly Hegelian in this regard, he makes 
clear that the benefit of the state is not a sufficiently high standard in his view.  
Yet even this is a low view of learning and science. No reader of this Journal 
[Science] is likely to be content with the statement that the searching out of the 
ideas that govern the universe has no other value than that it helps human animals 
to swarm and feed. (bracketed note by editor; 1900/1958 p. 333–334) 
Rather, a properly noble standard is philosophy or science—the furthering of reason—
simply, as discussed above. By encountering men motivated by such a noble goal, 
ordinary pupils will have their sights raised—they will recognize there are goals beyond 
mere utility and individual success and comfort—and thereby be benefited. A university 
ought, in other words, to offer an important antidote to the sights and goals of practical 
life.92  
A proper encounter with the intellectual life is not simply desirable for the moral 
benefit of encountering the nobility of the philosopher or scientist; a proper education 
ought also to train men to be able to think for themselves. Writing in 1905 in a notebook 
for summer school lectures that were never delivered, Peirce explains that his goal while 
a professor at Hopkins was to teach his students to think for themselves:  
As I used to do at Johns Hopkins . . . I should do all I could to make my hearers 
think for themselves. . . . I should insist that they must not suppose that my 
opinions were bound to be correct, but must work out their own ways of thinking. 
(1905a/1952 p. 278)  
                                                
92 Strand (2005a) makes a similar observation about a university’s role in counterbalancing the 
focus on utility and personal ambition of practical life. However, she does not recognize the 
important distinction Peirce makes between those who work to benefit the state and those who 
work for the higher goal of reason simply; though she is right that Peirce holds up the European 
goal as higher than the goal of American universities who advertise their benefits to individuals 
simply.  
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Peirce makes clear he is not here simply referring to his “special students,” but rather has 
in mind benefit to, and thereby the appreciation of, students who were to go on to lead 
active lives: “by which I earned the gratitude of men who are useful to mankind” (ibid.). 
Peirce expresses a similar thought in a March 1910 letter to William James when, in 
arguing for the benefit of his courses on logic, he claims that his former Hopkins students 
recognize the beneficial impact his courses on logic had on their abilities to think: “My 
Baltimore class assures me of that; for I did something for them” (1910/1952 p. 278).93  
III. Peirce’s Curricular Recommendations 
These two goals—raising men’s sights and teaching them to think for themselves—
provide us with some insight as to the potentially practical function Peirce envisions for a 
proper university. Let us now examine the precise educational program and curricular 
recommendations Peirce makes in various places over the years, including in the 
Cambridge Conferences lectures. We will examine the educational regimen he 
recommends for both special and general students. We will then analyze these 
recommendations: we will try to understand their virtues while we ask whether they are 
sufficiently prudent—whether they sufficiently reflect Peirce’s conservatism and humble 
appreciation for the limits of theory in the practical realm.  
                                                
93 D. Anderson (2005) sees this concern—teaching men to think for themselves—as aimed at 
liberating individuals: “from manipulation by others”; “it empowers one to develop one’s own 
ideas,” which Anderson understands to be viewed by Peirce as “the essential human activity”; 
and it “allows one to become persuasive to others” (p. 286–287).  
 
 
250 
 
 
a. Special vs. General Students 
Peirce envisions the apprenticeship of the “special pupils” to be a hands-on 
educational experience, wherein they are treated as partners in learning. 
They should be made to feel that they were doing real and important work which 
was to appear in the digests of science and for the accuracy of which they were 
responsible. (1878/1958 p. 328) 
They should be left to work out on their own the solutions to mathematical problems, as 
well as to “study out new methods and make designs for new instruments” (ibid.). Such 
students should be subject to frank criticism that is not softened out of concern for their 
feelings (ibid.). Professors should share with these students their thought processes, as 
much as possible, as they embark on a course of research (ibid.). The apprentice should 
be given much responsibility, and not be spoon-fed his education; the apprentice, for his 
part, will have to “put forth a strong volition” in entering upon an investigation with a 
professor (ibid., p. 328-329).  
 In an article entitled “Charles S. Peirce as a Teacher,” Peirce’s former student 
Joseph Jastrow—a professor at the University of Wisconsin—shares his experience of 
being in a small band of Peirce’s apprentice students, those who were “admitted to his 
circle” (Jastrow 1916, p. 725). Jastrow explains that, along with a “refined shyness,” 
Peirce’s “nature was generously hospitable; he was an intellectual host” (ibid.). It was for 
this reason that “he was eminently fitted to become the leader of a select band of 
disciples”; for “he had the pedagogic gift to an unusual degree, had it by the dower of 
nature” (ibid.). Peirce’s students became “members of his ‘scientific’ fraternity”: 
“Greetings were brief, and we proceeded to the business that brought us together, in 
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which he and we found more pleasure than in anything else” (ibid.). He met his students 
on “terms of equality” that were, at the same time, “not in the way of flattery, for they 
were too spontaneous and sincere” (ibid.).  
Peirce’s practice of encouraging “cooperation and [the] delegation of 
responsibility” in research was one of his “pedagogical device[s]” (ibid.). Jastrow relays 
how, after having his “first real experience of intellectual muscle” in Peirce’s logic 
courses, his professor “stimulated my self-esteem by entrusting me, then fairly innocent 
of any laboratory habits, with a real bit of research” (ibid., p. 724). The results of their 
research project were published under both their names in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science and greatly influenced Jastrow’s own later book on The 
Subconscious (ibid.). In another instance, Peirce asked Jastrow to lecture for him during 
one graduate class on logic, as he was going to be absent; Peirce ended up joining the 
class halfway through, but “insisted upon” Jastrow’s “concluding the exercise” (ibid., p. 
725). Jastrow remarks:  
I know of no more enlightening comment upon the atmosphere of the place and the 
day than that the procedure was accepted naturally by all concerned except myself. 
(ibid.) 
For Jastrow, the “privilege of association in the cooperative spirit with a master mind” 
was inspiring and of utmost help (ibid., p. 726).94  
Peirce acknowledges in his letter to Gilman that the right education for the general 
student is more difficult to determine than is the education for the apprentices, the 
                                                
94 And was, moreover, why “the example of Charles S. Peirce will continue to remain a 
cherished memory” (Jastrow 1916, p. 726). 
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“special students” (1878/1958 p. 329). In this letter, Peirce voices more appreciation than 
he does in his 1898 lectures for the need for teaching at a university. As opposed to the 
scholar-apprentices, the general students will need “lessons” (ibid.). These lessons should 
be a combination of “recitation” and “lecture” (ibid.). The instructor should aim for 
“something attainable” for his students to carry with them once they leave university 
(ibid.). Peirce indicates here that matters like “the main laws of physics . . . in a hundred 
applications” ought to be taught; matters like the “calculations of vapor densities” need 
not be (ibid.). In other words, this education ought to promote experience with general 
scientific theories and their applications, rather than concern students with obscure 
derivations and calculations that will likely interfere with the general students’ 
comprehension of the big picture.   
b. The “Art of Reasoning” 
In his Cambridge Conferences lectures, Peirce presents a course of education that 
aims to strengthen men’s art of thinking. Peirce explains how his proposed education 
offers ideal training for those who will be able to address “the most urgent problems of 
each generation” (1898, lecture 4, p. 172). It is an education that will promote the 
“welfare of the commonwealth” (1898, lecture 5, p. 181). This education will also, of 
course, aid “the speedier elevation of man” (1898, lecture 4, p. 172). Thus it seems that 
Peirce’s curricular recommendations from the Cambridge Conferences lectures apply to 
the training of both groups of students. Both groups of students require a rigorous 
intellectual training that will strengthen the capacities that go into thinking clearly and 
well.  
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Peirce explains that the “very focus and centre” of a proper liberal education ought 
to be “the art of thinking” (1898, lecture 5, p. 181). Indeed, this used to be the focus of 
liberal education before “the vogue in this country of the Herbartian pedagogy” took hold 
(ibid.). The “trivium”—grammar, logic, and rhetoric—which was the “staple of 
instruction in the Roman and medieval schools,” bespeaks the understanding that the “art 
of reasoning is the very essence of education” (1887/2000 p. 30). In “Logic and a Liberal 
Education,” the outline of a lecture that was published in an 1882 issue of the Johns 
Hopkins University Circulars, Peirce explains that “a young man’s attention ought to be 
directed,” upon his arrival at university, to the “great end” of “improving his logical 
power and his knowledge of method” (1882, p. 11). He “ought to keep” sight of this end 
“during the whole period of his studies,” and use his training in logic to frame the rest of 
his studies: “he will do well to review his whole work in the light which an education in 
logic throws upon it” (ibid.).   
A training of the mind’s reasoning abilities makes the mind more versatile, 
stronger, and flexible. As the body needs exercise and training, so does the mind: “I do 
not know why a man should not devote himself to the training of his reasoning powers 
with as much assiduity as to corporal athletics” (1898, lecture 5, p. 181). Such 
strengthening is necessary to make the mind flexible and versatile, so that it can act with 
adroitness when it faces new circumstances, which it inevitably will. Training in logic 
gives the mind that strength and flexibility.  
Reminiscent of his views on the fitness of instinct, Peirce explains that intuitive 
knowledge—knowledge that we gain through our experience and know at the 
subconscious level—is sufficient in familiar circumstances. However, in what is also 
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reminiscent of Peirce’s remark that instinct is not reliable the further one is from 
primitive man’s existence (1905b/1998, p. 349), Peirce explains here that when we face 
new circumstances, assessing matters and judging the appropriate response requires a 
well-trained mind. Peirce explains in the outline of his 1882 lecture:  
The theory of any act in no wise aids the doing of it, so long as what is to be done 
is of a narrow description so that it can be governed by the unconscious part of our 
organism. . . . But when new paths have to be struck out, a spinal cord is not 
enough; a brain is needed, and that brain an organ of mind, and that mind perfected 
by a liberal education. And a liberal education—so far as its relation to the 
understanding goes—means logic. (1882, p. 11) 
For, “although a man needs not the theory of a method in order to apply it as it has been 
applied already,” the work of new circumstances requires that a man has a “general 
training of his mind and such knowledge as shall show him how to make his powers most 
effective in a new direction” (ibid.). “That knowledge,” which helps the mind in new 
circumstances, “is logic” (ibid.). Logic, in the sense Peirce intends here, is “the art of 
devising methods of research”; it “will tell you how to proceed to form a plan of 
experimentation” (ibid.; emphasis in original). 
 A flexible mind that can adapt well to new circumstances is crucial because 
change is inevitable. Both the “fortunes of the Rothschilds” and the “existence of the 
human race” will come to an end (1898, lecture 4, p. 174). Peirce sees chance and 
variation as inherent to the world—as that which drives evolution, which is necessary 
(e.g., 1898, lecture 7). A country’s elite will be best able to respond to the inevitable 
change if its minds are trained to be strong and versatile, rather than if it is simply taught 
that it must “assent . . . to any definite propositions”—for example, “the doctrine of the 
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independence of the executive, legislative, and judiciary functions” (1898, lecture 5, p. 
181).  
c. Training Men’s Powers 
An education that is properly interested in “training . . . men’s powers” focuses on 
perfecting the performance of each of the three “mental operations that enter into the 
business of inquiry”: observation, experimentation, and habituation (1898, lecture 5, p. 
181, 182). Doing logical exercises or reading logical texts—Peirce cites “the first book of 
the Novum Organum” and “Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding,” among others—will 
be of some use, but they alone will not “suffice to develop the reasoning powers” (ibid.). 
The mental powers will be best strengthened if each of the three components of inquiry 
are exercised in a variety of ways that encourage strength, stamina, and flexibility. As we 
will explore below, Peirce’s curricular recommendations aim to promote flexibility and 
agility by working through mathematical and chess problems, and practice viewing things 
and ideas from different angles and points of view. Resounding throughout Peirce’s 
curricular recommendations is his theme of anti-dogmatism, which is at the heart of his 
thought on science and philosophy in general, as well as his understanding of what a 
university ought to be. The “way of inquiry” ought not be blocked (1898, lecture 4, p. 
178). It is important that the mind be able to deepen and broaden its understanding, and 
not be hampered by its pre-established notions.  
To foster a flexible mind that can see beyond pre-established notions, Peirce 
suggests exercises that strengthen the mind in different but complementary ways. He 
recognizes it is important to see matters from different angles, and similarly to understand 
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how others think. Peirce recommends exercises that train one in being able to quiet down 
one’s consciousness and be more attuned to what the subconscious understands. He 
moreover recommends repetitive and rigorous practice of mental games to increase the 
mind’s stamina––math and chess are helpful to this end, as are rigorous note-taking and 
simply the exercise of making a great effort. Similarly, one’s powers of esthetic 
discrimination and powers of judging people’s characters are important to strengthen 
because of their reciprocal strengthening of other functions more clearly connected to 
rational thinking. Let us now turn to his specific recommendations. 
(1) Observation 
Peirce explains that observation occurs both consciously and subconsciously (1898, 
lecture 5, p. 182). These two parts of observation “are of almost contrary natures” (ibid.). 
Subconscious observation entails an induction, “by which upon repeatedly reviewing an 
object of perception a certain element of it acquires great associational potency,—that is, 
has a magnified tendency to call up other ideas” (ibid.). Conscious observation, by 
contrast, entails putting into concepts and words that which one observes; it “consists in 
moulding [sic] in the upper consciousness a more or less skeletonized idea until it is felt 
to respond to [the] object of observation” (ibid.; brackets by editor). Honing one’s 
observation skills entails focusing on that of which one is subconsciously aware, and 
suppressing “the egotism and conceit of the upper consciousness” (ibid., p. 182–183). For 
while one’s conscious observation “is quite indispensable if one is trying to form a theory 
of the object in hand,” such conceptualizing “goes a long way toward breaking down, 
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denying, and pooh-pooing away, all the fineness of the subconscious observation” (ibid., 
p. 182).  
Peirce’s suggestion seems to be that thinking well requires fine-tuned perception, 
where one’s preconceived notions do not blind one to accurately seeing what is in front 
of him. Observation is at its best the art of suppressing the conception that the mind 
imposes on what is around it, while tapping into that of which the mind is subconsciously 
aware.  
In observation, the most essential condition is passivity, the inhibition of the natural 
tendency to meddle, to conjecturally emend, the dicta of Nature. (ibid., p. 187)  
This type of perception thus requires both self-awareness and a flexible mind that can see 
beyond its conscious understanding. While good skills of observation do not necessarily 
translate into good reasoning, one can not reason well without them (ibid., p. 183). 
Observations are made of three distinct genera: the qualities of objects, the 
experienced facts of relation, and the “relations between the parts of an image one’s own 
phantasy [sic] has created” (ibid., p. 183). Training in observing each genera is needed. 
Mastering each type of observation strengthens the intellect—one can not begin to try to 
understand what one experiences if one does not have a firm grasp on just what one is 
experiencing.  
With regard to qualities of objects, there are three types of observational powers: 
sensible discrimination; emotional, such as esthetic, discrimination; and psychical 
discrimination (ibid., p. 183-184). Training in one of these types increases the mind’s 
power to observe the other types (ibid., p. 183). One’s “powers of observational 
discrimination” are “most important in reasoning”; they ought to be trained by “means of 
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systematic exercise”—such as, for example, “practice with a photometer or colorbox” 
(ibid.). When observing external “things,” it is important to examine them from different 
angles; “you can handle a thing, turn it over, view it from different sides, and even avail 
yourself of instrumental aids to observation” (ibid., p. 185-186).  
Observing the characters of men is different from observing things. If one is 
disciplined and systematic, as well as a keen observer of such matters, it can be possible 
to have a good reading on the people one comes across; to be able to “tell accurately how 
any important man would feel about any given matter” (ibid., p. 186). Great “literary 
artists” can showcase impressive “power[s] of discrimination” regarding men’s 
characters and psychology; Peirce mentions Theophrastus, Maupassant, and George Eliot 
as examples (ibid., p. 184). Their observations are that which the “not too fine reader” 
would recognize as familiar (ibid.).  
When observing one’s own character, Peirce advises against “a certain kind of 
fascinated introspection,” wherein you “look at yourself as nobody else will ever look at 
you, from a narrow, detached, and illusory point of view” (ibid.). Rather one ought to 
strive to see oneself as others do: “See yourself as others would see you if they were 
intimate enough with you” (ibid.). While it is “highly needful” for a man to “search his 
heart somewhat,” the “great [thing] is to become emancipated from oneself” (ibid.). 
Peirce thus appears to be cautioning against a psychoanalytical fixation on the 
subconscious, and promoting rather a healthy self-awareness wherein one understands 
how one comes across to others, or from a more objective point of view. 
Finally there is the matter of observing “objects of our own creative fancy” (ibid., 
p. 186). As with observing external things, the things of our imagination have different 
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elements: the sensuous; “relations between different parts of the object, whether as 
coordinate parts or as governing one another”; and, “the system, the form, and the idea of 
the whole” (ibid.). The sensuous imaginative power of artists and musicians is 
“conducive to good reasoning on the whole,” and is a power that can be strengthened 
with practice (ibid., p. 187; and footnote 4, p. 28695). Playing chess and solving math 
problems can help strengthen the mind’s power of “accurately dealing with the relations 
of parts of an image” (ibid., p. 187). Observing “systems, forms, and ideas,” the “highest 
kind of observation,” is best strengthened through “the study of pure mathematical 
theories” as well as “practice in making ourselves such theories” (ibid.). The “study of 
mathematics” is a great “discipline for the mind” (ibid.).  
(2) Experimentation 
Training in experimentation entails training in stamina: its “most essential 
ingredient is energy, perseverance, in short, strong work of the will, both external and 
internal” (ibid., p. 187). Strengthening the will power is important for strengthening the 
powers of reasoning (ibid.). Difficult activities that require much effort—including 
physically difficult activities, like lifting “a thousand pounds dead weight three times a 
week”—can do much to steel one’s will power (ibid., p. 187). “Do that and you will not 
dread this or that line of thinking as too difficult and mathematical” (ibid.). 
“Perseverance” is required in experimentation so that different suggestions are 
sufficiently examined and their “advantages and disadvantages” are sufficiently traced 
                                                
95 This latter citation refers to lines from a draft of the lecture that it seems to the editor of this 
volume of Peirce’s Cambridge Conferences lectures that Peirce crossed out, likely due to time 
constraints.  
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out (ibid., p. 188). Strength is not sufficient, however. Experimentation also requires 
flexibility and creativity: “an agility of creative imagination” as well as a “flair” for 
picking out “the suggestions probably best worth study” (ibid.).  
Peirce probably also has in mind here lessons in the economy of research—a topic 
about which he wrote often. For example, he explains in a 1901 article that it is “excellent 
economy” to first test a hypothesis that can be “disposed of by a single easy experiment” 
(1901b/1998, p. 73). Once a hypothesis has been provisionally adopted, “the effort ought 
to be to search out the most unlikely necessary consequence of it” and then bring it “to 
the test of experiment” (ibid., p. 73–74). In other words, every effort should be made to 
disprove hypotheses through experiment; for, the more a theory holds up to such testing, 
the stronger it can eventually be viewed: “If, notwithstanding its unlikelihood, the 
prediction is verified . . . one begins to doff one’s cap to the rising start that nature herself 
seems to favor” (ibid., p. 74).  
Such skills are best developed through “systematic experimentation” that engages 
an “active mind” (ibid., p. 188). “Detached exercises” can not teach anything (ibid., p. 
188). Only exercises in which one is invested are “potent instruments of learning’ (ibid.). 
In a parallel to passive observation, active experimentation is conducted upon “images of 
our own creation,” in other words, diagrams and equations; “outward things,” in what we 
consider traditionally scientific examinations; and “persons,” psychological and 
sociological studies (ibid., p. 188-189). Working out chess problems “makes a tolerably 
good practice” for training in the skills and proper mindset of experimentation (ibid., p. 
188).  
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(3) Habituation 
Being good at habituation means easily taking up and discarding mental habits—
mental habits being the association of ideas that the mind subconsciously makes as it 
experiences life (ibid., p. 189). Mental habits are generalizations, inductions we 
subconsciously make as we experience the world (ibid., p. 191). Peirce explains that the 
most “useful” of mental habits is being able to “easily [take] up and easily [throw] off 
mental habits” (ibid., p. 189). This requires the mental “plasticity of childhood”—in other 
words, keeping your mind flexible like that of a child, who is able to easily absorb new 
information as well as discard old conceptions (ibid., p. 191, 192). Thus we see in the 
power of habituation a theme similar to that of observation: the importance of training the 
conscious understanding to be nimble such that it can be open to new information, which 
it seems it will be often or best informed of by the subconscious.  
Such plasticity of mind is essential for learning new things: 
So far as a man is to be a learner, a philo-sopher, it is most essential that he should 
preserve [the plasticity of childhood]; and to do so he has to battle against a natural 
law of growth. To be a philosopher, or a scientific man, you must be as a little 
child, with all the sincerity and simple-mindedness of the child’s vision, with all the 
plasticity of the child’s mental habits. (ibid., p. 192; emphasis in original) 
This is directly at odds with the disposition required of “a teacher, or an exponent of a 
fixed idea, or a mechanic at any immovable trade, or a settled man in any respect” (ibid., 
p. 192). This continues, in other words, Peirce’s anti-dogmatic theme. For only a 
sufficiently open mind will be able to deepen its understanding and learn new things; 
only if one is aware of what one does not know can one be sufficiently motivated to 
learn. 
 
 
262 
 
 
“Extensive reading” promotes this flexibility of mind; Peirce suggests a hundred 
books a year if a hundred good books can be found (1898, lecture 5, p. 192). One must 
not read in a passive manner, but rather actively engage the texts by putting oneself in the 
mindset of the author and attempting to understand his way of thinking. Such a practice 
will help broaden one’s understanding: 
Real reading consists in putting oneself into the author’s position, and assimilating 
his way of thinking. Conversation with all sorts of people whom we do not 
altogether understand, freshens the mind. (ibid.) 
Yet again we see Peirce recommending exercises that entail examining matters from 
different angles, whereby the mind is both broadened and sharpened. If interesting people 
and sufficient numbers of good books can not be found, Peirce recommends setting aside 
time for personal reflection—“a suitable dose of rumination and solitude” (ibid.). This 
too is not passive, but ought to be filled with “intense and systematic activity of the most 
definite and diagrammatic thought” (ibid.). Exercises particularly suited to strengthening 
the power of habituation are those in “divisions and classifications,” “definitions and the 
logical analysis of ideas,” and “in compacting theories or trains of reasoning” (ibid.). 
 Here is a good time to remark on Peirce’s own reading habits. In explaining the 
development of his thought and the doctrine of pragmatism, Peirce explains that he read 
widely—and each text carefully and closely—among the great works of science and 
philosophy. He was first pulled into philosophy—and affected thereafter96—by his 
                                                
96 Young (1952) remarks: “Kant was the earliest and most persistent influence in [Peirce’s] 
development, with Schelling and Hegel running close seconds”; and, moreover, that Peirce refers 
to Kant as the “King of modern thought” (CP 1.369) (p. 275). 
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reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a teenager; he poured over the text so 
carefully and often that he “almost knew [it] by heart” (1907/1998, p. 424). He also 
dissected its arguments with his father: “my father, who was an eminent mathematician, 
pointed out to me lacunae in Kant’s reasoning which I should probably not otherwise 
have discovered” (ibid., p. 423).  
From his study of Kant, Peirce explains he was “led to an admiring study of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume,” and of Aristotle, his “Organon, Metaphysics, and psychological 
treatises” (1907/1998, p. 423). Josiah Royce and Fergus Kernan (1916) remark that 
“Aristotle, Peirce read in the original carefully and for many years” (p. 708). They also 
comment on Peirce’s “very great interest” in scholastic philosophy (ibid.). Peirce himself 
explains that he conducted a “deeply pondering perusal of some of the works of medieval 
thinkers,” from which he “derived the greatest advantage”: “St. Augustine, Abelard, . . . 
John of Salisbury, . . . St. Thomas Aquinas, . . . John of Duns, the Scot, . . . and from 
William of Ockham” (1907/1998, p. 423–424). Young (1952) remarks on the important 
influence that other thinkers had on Peirce’s thought as well: Hegel and Schelling most 
prominently; the “British mathematical logicians, Boole, De Morgan, and Venn”; as well 
as others in the British and German philosophical traditions, from “Locke through 
Spencer” and “Leibniz through Schelling” (p. 275–276).  
That Peirce both read extensively and included extensive reading in his curricular 
recommendations is especially striking in today’s context, in which “laboratory-men” and 
“experimentalist type[s]” (as he describes himself, 1905c/1998 p. 332) are at best 
indifferent to and at worst disdainful of philosophy broadly understood, as comprising 
not only science but also the foundations of science. Similarly noteworthy is the fact that 
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Peirce thought important insight could be found in the nonscientific texts of great 
“literary artists” with impressive “power[s] of discrimination” regarding men’s characters 
and psychology (1898, lecture 5, p. 184), as discussed above. Peirce’s suggestions make 
sense in his own context, of course, given the intellectual—as opposed to practical—goal 
of his philosophical project.  
(4) Summary 
Peirce’s recommendations for the training that ought to be at the center of a liberal 
arts education, in total, aim at developing the art of reasoning so that students can learn to 
“think for themselves” (1905a/1952 p. 278).97 His recommendations concern three key 
elements of thinking: observation, experimentation, and habituation. Observation is a 
passive endeavor, and fine-tuning one’s skills involves quieting down the consciousness 
and paying attention to that of which the subconscious is aware. Experimentation is 
active, and requires strength, stamina, and creative thinking. Habituation seems to 
involve consciously taking control over that which generally occurs subconsciously. 
From Peirce’s advice that objects be examined from different angles, to his suggestion 
that it is useful to read many books actively and get into the mindset of each author, we 
see an emphasis on comprehending various viewpoints and expanding one’s initial 
understanding of a matter. We also see the importance of mental exercises involved in 
games of chess and the working out of mathematical problems for training the mind to be 
                                                
97 D. Anderson (2005) explains that Peirce is interested in teaching the art of reasoning, not 
merely “a mechanical operation”: “One has to learn how to ask appropriate questions, how to 
doubt, how to identify anomalies, how to imagine solutions, how to generalize, how to conduct 
experiments, and so forth. . . . One must learn to recognize sources of genuine doubt that call us 
to inquiry” (p. 283). 
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sharp and versatile. The themes this education plan aims at are mental strength and 
versatility, as well as intellectual openness.98  
IV. Practical Benefits of a Liberal Arts Education 
As we have seen, Peirce thinks that it is important to train future scientists—the 
apprentices—in critical thinking and logic so that they will have the capability to apply 
the methods of one area of study to another. It seems the suggestions given here would 
indeed further that goal. We also saw the important moral impact Peirce envisioned being 
around true scientists would have on general students; that men motivated by the noble 
pursuit of truth for its own sake would be a healthy counterbalance to the career, 
financial, and social ambitions of practical life. We can see how general students would 
be benefitted in this regard by observing true scholars and scientists. 
The question we are left with is how the liberal arts education Peirce proposes will 
be a benefit in the practical ways Peirce also claims. How will it train an elite who can 
come up with solutions to the country’s “most urgent problems”(1898, lecture 4, p. 172)? 
How will it benefit the “welfare of the commonwealth” for men to have the “power of 
recognizing the sort of methods in which it will be well for the government and public 
opinion to put their trust” (1898, lecture 5, p. 181). And indeed, what are these methods?  
To better comprehend Peirce’s understanding of the practical benefits of his 
proposed curriculum, we will explore the matter from different angles. We will first 
examine what is deficient about the alternative: what is problematic about teaching 
                                                
98 Strand (2005b) emphasizes the importance of anti-dogmatism in Peirce’s views on 
knowledge and education. 
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doctrine rather than critical thinking skills? Why would institutions of teaching not be a 
help to either students or country? We will then have to try to answer why institutions of 
learning might be more beneficial. Finally, we will analyze whether Peirce’s presentation 
is indeed adequate. To aid our evaluation of Peirce’s proposals we will look at John 
Dewey’s writings on education, as Dewey in certain respects attempts to fill in apparent 
deficiencies in Peirce’s proposals. A comparison of Peirce’s and Dewey’s positions that 
brings out their respective strengths and weaknesses will shed light on Peirce’s 
recommendations and his likely underlying motivations and concerns. Through this we 
will gain a greater understanding of the value for a modern republic of a liberal arts 
institution that has as its primary goal promoting the art of reasoning.  
a. Problem with Teaching Doctrine and the Goal of Social Stability 
When making the case for a proper liberal arts education in his Cambridge 
Conferences lectures, Peirce hints at one reason why merely accepting doctrine 
uncritically is not good for the “welfare of the commonwealth.” When remarking that it 
would be better for “all the citizens” to recognize in which methods it would be “well for 
the government and public opinion to put their trust,” rather than simply “assent . . . to 
any definite propositions” such as “the doctrine of the independence of the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary functions,” Peirce adds that the different branches of 
government are “after all . . . easily made handles for bosses” (1898, lecture 5, p. 181). 
By bringing the reader’s attention to the fact that the political machines of his day belied 
the Constitution’s separation of powers, Peirce points out the very important difference 
between the ideal and the real. This, it seems, is in effect a practical application of his 
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pragmatic maxim: do not simply understand a matter by what it purports to be, but by 
how it is in practice—by its practical effects.  
Peirce does not dwell on the example he here raises; he only mentions it as an aside 
and thus leaves his full thoughts ambiguous. The example points to the suggestion, 
though, that a political system might become more in line with its ideals if there was an 
elite who questioned the status quo and pointed out the discrepancy between a country’s 
principles and its practices. This could be understood as a quietly radical suggestion—
one that seeks to upend the political order in order to make practice align with our ideals. 
At the same time, in this same lecture Peirce echoes a point he made in his first lecture of 
the series: that it is unwise to “carry an idea to extreme lengths” in “practical matters” 
(ibid., p. 192–193). This is, importantly, in contrast to the realm of “speculative thought,” 
where carrying an “idea to extreme lengths” is “the greatest of locomotives for advancing 
upon the road to truth,” for it is “the extreme cases which alone” can “teach . . . anything 
new” (ibid., p. 193). The suggestion is further qualified by Peirce’s discussion, explored 
in the previous chapter, of the way in which our ideals are themselves moderated through 
our experiences (1903a, CP 1.599). Thus we see that on the one hand, Peirce speaks 
about the importance of teaching those methods in which government should put its trust 
and points out the discrepancy between the ideal and real in the practical realm; yet on 
the other hand, he calls for prudence in practical matters, and reaffirms the distinction 
between what is appropriate for theoretical inquiry and what is prudent for practical 
action.  
Peirce’s recognition of the difference between the theoretical and the practical and 
the importance of moderation and caution in practical action suggests that wise practical 
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judgment is needed to understand how to respond to the political situation he identified in 
which reality does not line up to our ideals. Why then does he not incorporate more 
explicitly moral instruction in his curriculum in order to cultivate that prudence in 
students? One would similarly expect a civic component—teaching such constitutional 
principles as that which we saw Peirce dismiss, namely the separation of the three 
branches of government—to be part of the education plans of someone who recognizes 
the need for cultivating prudence in men of action. Such principles in the American 
context reflect, after all, the insight of the American founders on the best way to structure 
a liberal government, with which it would seem useful for statesmen to be familiar. It is 
all the more puzzling, therefore, that Peirce does not include a moral nor civic component 
to his curricular recommendations, and even explicitly denounces inculcating students 
with “any definite propositions.”  
As we examine the lack of a moral and civic component in Peirce’s curricular 
recommendations, there is another important aspect of his thought to note: Despite 
Peirce’s apparent practical conservatism, he does not think social stability is a valid goal 
for scientists to pursue. Peirce lumps such a goal in with efforts that close men’s minds 
and entrench an arbitrary social situation. In his review of Clark University, for example, 
he points out how very un-American the goal of “‘the stability of society’” indeed is: 
“This is truly a British phrase, meaning the House of Lords and vested rights and all that” 
(1900/1958 p. 332). In a disparaging review of a work of British scientist and advocate of 
eugenics Karl Pearson—whom, Peirce explains, makes the stability of society and the 
promotion of its welfare the summum bonum of his Darwinian ethics—Peirce explains 
that the goal of social stability simply aims to maintain the traditional standards of society 
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against those that are innovative or unconventional (1901a/1998, p. 57–58). Peirce sees 
Pearson’s call for “’the stability of society’” to be nothing but the British professor’s 
“narrow British patriotism” (ibid., p. 60).  
In his criticism of Pearson, Peirce admits that Britain has been an important center 
of civilization in recent history: “I am willing to grant that England has been for two or 
three centuries a most precious factor of human development” (ibid., p. 60). The goal of 
permanent social stability is nonetheless both impossible and unworthy:  
To demand that man should aim at the stability of British society, or society at 
large, or the perpetuation of the race, as an ultimate end, is too much. The human 
species will be extirpated sometime. (ibid., p. 60) 
For one thing, England’s facilitating human development was not due to anything that 
was particularly British. England’s success was not, after all, simply due to its 
Englishness; “there were and are reasons for” it (ibid., p. 60). Rather, such development 
can and will occur in other places at other times. The society as it stood in its current 
form was thus not worth preserving simply.  
 Peirce’s concerns about the goal of preserving social stability appear to be at least 
partly founded on his desire to promote true science and protect it from lower, corrupting 
motives. The “doctrine that social stability is the sole justification of scientific research” 
is insufficient to “[animate] the labors of scientific men”; in addition to it being “bad 
ethics,” it would also “retard the progress of science” (ibid., p. 58). Pearson’s goal of 
social stability is, moreover, harmful because it bolsters those who make up the “great 
majority of the members of many scientific societies”: those who are chiefly concerned 
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with their own self interest—“gaining money”—and who hold pure science in contempt 
(1901a/1998, p. 61).  
Now, to declare that the sole reason for scientific research is the good of society is 
to encourage those pseudo-scientists to claim, and the general public to admit, that 
they, who deal with the application of knowledge, are the true men of science, and 
that the theoreticians are little better than idlers. (ibid.) 
Thus we see that Peirce is ultimately concerned with protecting pure science, and 
avoiding its popular corruption with goals that are almost certainly going to interfere with 
its pursuit.  
Science needs to be able to attract able men, as well as examine potentially ugly 
truths. The goal of social stability of course interferes with this latter function. If social 
stability is the goal, beliefs that appear to interfere with the status quo will be considered 
off-limits. In his review of Pearson, Peirce explains: 
We are told that we must not believe a certain purely theoretical proposition 
because it is “anti-social” to do so, and because to do so “is opposed to the interests 
of society.” (ibid., p. 61) 
Truth can very well be against the interests of society: 
Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society to admit it or not,—
and that the notion that we must deny what . . . is not conducive to the stability of 
British society to affirm is the mainspring of the mendacity and hypocrisy which 
Englishmen so commonly regard as virtues. (ibid., p. 61) 
Peirce identifies himself as belonging “to that class of scallawags who purpose, with 
God’s help, to look the truth in the face, whether doing so be conducive to the interests of 
society or not” (ibid.). 
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Peirce’s arguments here reviewed point to the needs of philosophy: the political 
goal of social stability will interfere with the dispassionate search for the truth. In turn, 
however, Peirce also applies his intellectual understanding—his fallibilism—to 
considerations regarding the practical realm. He points out that it is not so obvious or 
clear what is in fact in the best interest of society. Being able to think clearly and 
critically, moreover, can only help in determining such a difficult thing: 
If I should ever attack that excessively difficult problem, “What is for the true 
interest of society?” I should feel that I stood in need of a great deal of help from 
the science of legitimate inference. (1901a/1998, p. 61) 
In other words, what is best in any given situation—what is in the public interest—cannot 
be derived from any orthodox doctrine or established formulas. It requires a flexible and 
well-trained mind to understand what is best in a given situation. Peirce apparently 
expects that good intellectual training will train the same faculties that are needed in 
practical judgments even if the methods of practical decision making and theoretical 
inquiry differ, and even if moderation reigns in one when the extreme reigns in the other. 
In addition to applying fallibilism—a humility in what we can say we know—to practical 
matters, this position also bespeaks Peirce’s views on evolution and the necessity of 
change and growth, as well as his limited practical application of pragmatism, as 
discussed above.  
As we have seen in both the first Cambridge Conferences lecture and Peirce’s 
excerpted lecture in the Johns Hopkins Circular, rote knowledge, or rules of thumb, are 
important in everyday acting—in acting in circumstances you have come across before. 
But when it comes to new situations that we have not experienced, a nimble, deciphering, 
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discriminating, searching, creative intelligence will be of important help for 
understanding the new situation at hand, as is approaching it with both humility and 
mental flexibility. Peirce’s position thus seems to be that the best education will aim to 
produce leaders who can use their brains—who can think critically—in order to 
appropriately guide the country in the uncertain future, where old truths might not be 
helpful. As with applying the methods of one field to that of another, a versatile mind will 
have the capabilities and judgment to also know when and how to adapt old truths to new 
circumstances. Ellery Davis, a University of Nebraska professor who was Peirce’s 
student at Hopkins, writes that in fact a main virtue of Peirce’s pragmatism is to help one 
distinguish between that knowledge one knows from experience, and understandings we 
have that are not based on experience (Davis 1914, p. 49–50); this distinction allows for 
the apt application of the knowledge we do have, as well as awareness of what we do not 
understand. Let us also not forget that on top of the intellectual virtues developed through 
such a training, political leaders and active men need raised sights—they can not be 
primarily concerned with their own well-being, or with ends of mere utility—and will 
benefit morally from being around true scientists.  
Thus we see why Peirce was not interested in an educational system that would try 
to pound into its students’ heads certain eternal moral or political truths: not only would 
doing so harm pure science, but it would also interfere with the cultivation of the 
intelligence needed for assessing and responding to the problems of the practical realm. 
Below we will ask whether there is room in Peirce’s thoughts on education for a civic 
component. I argue there is, in at least three respects. Before we address that point, 
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however, let us examine John Dewey’s views on civic education as an example of what 
Peirce was concerned about.  
b. Dewey’s Alternative 
John Dewey, Peirce’s student at Johns Hopkins, does not recognize Peirce’s 
distinction of a university’s two sets of students, each with its own goals and virtues.99 
Indeed, Dewey conflates Peirce’s two goals and advocates employing the scientific 
method to the practical realm—not in the pursuit of pure knowledge, and without the 
prudence appropriate to the recognition of the limits of science or the difference between 
theoretical and practical needs. Dewey’s writings on the education fit for a democratic 
society interweave Peircean ideas with a progressive agenda that seeks the tools of 
science solely for the utility of society—what, in other words, Peirce warned against. 
                                                
99 In the scholarship there is generally thought to be much similarity in the two thinkers’ views 
on education: Liszka (2013) remarks on the similarity between Peirce and Dewey on the 
importance of active learning. D. Anderson (2005) argues that Peirce “believed in a multiplicity 
of learning styles and anticipated John Dewey’s claim in Democracy and Education that because 
of their diversity, students need to be dealt with, so far as possible, individually” (p. 279). He also 
sees in Peirce the “Deweyan . . . belief that teaching and learning are melioristic. That is, they 
improve the student, putting her or him in a better position to act successfully in the world” (p. 
280). 
With regard to their views more broadly, there is greater acknowledgment of the difference in 
their thought: D. Anderson (1997) explains that while Peirce and Dewey share a “common belief: 
that philosophy-science, whatever its aim, needs to be relatively free from traditional forms of 
authority in order to carry out its work,” Dewey “seems to argue for a wider freedom” than does 
Peirce; he demands a “thorough-going experimentalism” in practical matters that Peirce reserves 
only for the theoretician (D. Anderson 1997, p. 229-230). Putnam (1992) similarly remarks on the 
disagreement between Peirce and Dewey on this matter, with Peirce calling for a wide distance 
between theory and practice, and Dewey maintaining that “science is and ought to be a guide to 
practice” (p. 57). Dewey (and James) moreover, does not hold with Peirce that there is any “such 
thing as Nature’s own language; we make languages, guided by our interests, ideals, and by the 
particular ‘problematic situations’ . . . that we find ourselves in. . . . Neither [Dewey nor James] 
supposed that that to which inquiry would converge is independent of us, of what interests and 
ideals we have, and what questions those interests and ideals lead us to formulate” (p. 73).  
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Examining Dewey’s thought on the education fit for a modern democracy sheds light on 
the virtues of Peirce’s recommendations.  
As we saw in the introduction to this dissertation, Dewey likes democracy because 
it is a tool for “social engineering” (1944a/1958 p. 33) and “social control” (1938/1958 p. 
35). Democracy applies the scientific method to the practical and social realm; it is the 
political institution whose methods most resemble those of scientific inquiry. The 
exchange of viewpoints that takes place in a democratic system acts as a dialectic that 
parallels the empirical experimentation and testing of science (1944b/1958 p. 157). 
Because its decision making process consists of weighing all its citizens’ wants and 
needs, democracy yields the best solution to a problem, and thus ultimately serves the 
“dignity and the worth of the individual” (1938/1958 p. 44).  
It is the input of citizens’ opinions wherein the link between democracy and 
education lies. A citizenry needs to be sufficiently educated to know what it is that it—as 
individuals—wants (ibid., p. 35). There is in fact a reciprocal relationship between 
democracy and education: political campaigns serve the purpose of informing the 
citizenry (ibid., p. 34) and education serves the function of empowering the citizenry with 
“knowledge and understanding” that aids its political functioning (ibid., p. 37). 
 Like philosophy, the educational system also has the task of breaking down the 
separation of theory and practice. The humanization of science requires that technical and 
vocational education be supplemented with a scientific education, such that “all who go 
to school” are made “aware of the scientific basis of industrial processes” (1944b/1958 p. 
146). Separating such educations “is the sure way to perpetuate the confusion and 
conflicts of the world in which we now live” (ibid.). “The great advance in industry” and 
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the “marvelous advance in natural science” of modernity are due to this barrier’s being 
broken down (ibid., p. 154). 
Educational theory or philosophy has the task and the opportunity of helping to 
break down the philosophy of fixation that bolsters external authority in opposition 
to free cooperation. (ibid., p. 159) 
Educational institutions must work against the notion that morals ought to be separate 
from “science and the scientific method” (ibid.). Similarly, it must work to “banish the 
conception” that there is anything superior in intellectual pursuits and inferior in “the 
daily work and vocation of man”; or that “human dignity here and now is of slight 
importance in comparison with some supernatural destiny” (ibid.). Finally, the 
educational system must accept and promote the “scientific way . . . of life” so that the 
“promise of modern democratic ideals” can be achieved (ibid.). 
 Dewey criticizes those like Ralph Maynard Hutchins who attempt to put belles 
lettres at the heart of the liberal education (ibid., p. 149). Doing so  
ignores and in effect denies the principle of experimental inquiry and firsthand 
observation that is the lifeblood of the entire advance made in the sciences—an 
advance so marvelous that the progress in knowledge made in uncounted previous 
millenniums is almost nothing in comparison. (ibid., p. 149–150) 
It assumes “fixed and immutable” moral beliefs (ibid., p. 150). Such a view is held 
precisely because persons with a predominantly literary education have not been 
impacted by the scientific method (ibid., p. 151).  
The issue of the immutable versus the changing involves the question of whether 
the method of inquiry and test that has wrought marvels in one field is to be applied 
so as to extend and advance our knowledge in moral and social matters. (ibid., p. 
156) 
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Dewey here, in other words, voices the precise opposition to gaining insight from texts 
that we attributed to “laboratory-men” and “experimentalist type[s]” above. He argues 
that the “principles and general truths in morals” ought instead to be considered as 
scientific propositions, as 
working hypotheses that on one hand condense the results of continued prior 
experience and inquiry, and on the other hand direct further fruitful inquiry whose 
conclusions in turn test and develop for further use the working principles used. 
(ibid.)  
Such is the only way the matter can be dealt with with “intelligent observation guided by 
the best wisdom already in our possession, which is the heart of the scientific method” 
(ibid.). It is dogmatic, Dewey explains, to think about morality is any other way (ibid.). 
In contrast to Peirce, who does not explicitly include civic content in his curricular 
recommendations, Dewey suggests a way in which a civic education can be included: 
“We should take . . . seriously the preparation of the members of our society for the 
duties and responsibilities of democracy” (1938/1958, p. 37). He thinks this can be done 
by using “democratic methods in the schools” and educating “the young and the youth of 
the country in freedom of participation in a free society” (ibid., p. 38). Our schools ought 
to be “more completely the agents for preparation of free individuals for intelligent 
participation in a free society” (ibid., p. 38).  
Dewey recognizes what Peirce understood, that change and growth are inevitable:  
Every generation has to accomplish democracy over again for itself; . . . its very 
nature, its essence, is something that cannot be handed on from one person or one 
generation to another, but has to be worked out in terms of needs, problems and 
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conditions of the social life of which . . . we are a part, a social life that is changing 
with extreme rapidity from year to year. (ibid., p. 39–40)  
Because of this change, “the problem of maintaining a democracy becomes new” (ibid., 
p. 40). What it means to be American can be “transmitted as an emotion and as an idea 
from generation to generation” only if its tradition is “embodied by active effort in the 
social relations which we as human beings bear to each other under present conditions” 
(ibid., p. 40). The school must thus educate not only regarding the ideas of the founders, 
but with regard to what democracy means today “under existing conditions” (ibid.). 
Schools ought to teach racial toleration, and not simply in a passive manner; rather it 
ought to “positively and aggressively and constructively . . . cultivate understanding and 
goodwill which are essential to democratic society” (ibid., p. 42). They must also work to 
diminish class snobbishness (ibid., p. 43–44).  
Dewey’s position thus seems to be that a democracy requires educating citizens to 
be inclined to democracy and, what is connected, social equality. Democracy is good in 
turn because it reflects the desires of its citizens. In this way, the method and desirability 
of democracy is predetermined by the philosopher, and is therefore outside of the 
democratic system itself. Social engineering is thus at the heart of the democratic political 
order, with the ultimate aim of having men live together peacefully.  
c. Evaluating Dewey’s Alternative 
Like Peirce, Dewey points out the discrepancy between our ideals and reality: 
We have in many schools a wonderful school pledge where the children six years 
old and up probably arise and pledge allegiance to a flag and to what that stands 
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for—one indivisible nation, justice and liberty. How far are we permitting a symbol 
to become a substitute for the reality? (ibid., p. 43) 
Allegiance and loyalty are not instilled through the simple recitation of a pledge. Practice 
means more than words.  
What are we doing to translate those great ideas of liberty and justice out of a 
formal ceremonial ritual into the realities of the understanding, the insight and the 
genuine loyalty of the boys and girls in our schools? (ibid., p. 43) 
Dewey, like Peirce, thus thinks that the best way to teach is through experience; that 
conditions will always be in flux and will require increasingly new solutions; and that we 
should recognize the discrepancy between our ideals and practice—an observation of a 
characteristically pragmatic nature.  
Dewey is not quite as humble as Peirce when it comes to knowledge, however. 
Peirce’s recognition of man’s fallibility resulted in his recommendation that a liberal arts 
education ought to focus on cultivating the art of thinking in students so that nothing 
would be considered orthodox and minds would be trained to be versatile and think 
rigorously. Dewey, less interested in pursuing knowledge but more interested in 
democracy, wants instead to train individuals to be good liberal democrats, to get beyond 
racism and classism. Indeed, for Dewey, the good of society trumps the goal of 
understanding, as Peirce predicted would be the case if theory and practice were to not be 
adequately separated.  
From a political point of view, Dewey’s suggestions are attractive; from a 
philosophical point of view, they will interfere with the majority of men reaching truth. 
But, given that Peirce does not think that the majority can obtain true knowledge anyway, 
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perhaps there is no Peircean objection to Dewey on this front—so long as there also exist 
small enclaves of true liberal arts institutions where genuine learning can take place. 
However, whether Dewey’s socially engineered democracy could in practice make room 
for truly open institutions of higher learning is at best a question. The concern that it 
could not is supported by both theory—the concerns Peirce raised above—and the history 
of societies that aim at social engineering. This observation supports Peirce’s fears 
regarding the threats political doctrine poses to true science; though simply recognizing 
the tension between philosophy and politics does not answer the question as to which end 
ought to be viewed as superior from the political point of view. A political community 
could understandably choose a policy that benefits it over the intellectual pursuit of truth.  
We will return to this point.  
A more dramatic difference between Dewey and Peirce concerns their views on the 
proper relationship between theory and practice. Peirce’s fallibilism leads him to call for 
the separation of theory and practice, for the sake of each; similarly, he recognizes the 
importance of tradition and received wisdom in the practical realm, and calls for 
proceeding in that realm only with the utmost caution. Dewey, as we see, turns this on its 
head: he wants theory to instead serve practice, and thinks looking to the received 
wisdom of the past can only be understood as dogmatic. He thinks the social science 
methods should be looked to for guidance—that is where wisdom lies—and that these 
methods and the desires of citizens should reciprocally inform one another. At least in the 
elements of his thought reviewed here, Dewey does not appear exhibit the humility Peirce 
thinks is proper of a true scientist.  
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V. A Peircean Civic Education 
Peirce does not include civic content in his curricular recommendations. His 
writings nonetheless point to three main conclusions concerning civic education: (1) 
Primary and secondary education should instill in students the ideals of a nation. (2) A 
proper civic education at the university level consists of critically examining a nation’s 
institutions. (3) A proper liberal arts education will also explain the limits of applying 
reason in the practical realm, which points to the important place of traditional morality 
and prudence in the practical realm.  
(1) Peirce explains that the education received in childhood helps shape our 
sentiment (1885b/1992, p. 237–238; 1903a, CP 1.591–1.592). Peirce, then, ought to agree 
with Dewey that the young ought to receive a civic education that inculcates in them the 
ideals of the nation. A Peircean civic education at the primary and secondary levels 
would aim to shape the morals, tastes, and dispositions of the country’s citizens. This 
education would not, however, follow Dewey’s suggestions of applying the scientific 
method to the social realm and rejecting an education in belles lettres. It would instead be 
interested in promoting respect for tradition and received wisdom. This would entail 
promoting those things America finds best about itself: ideals like the equality of its 
citizens, noted by Dewey above, or the separation of its branches of government, to 
which Peirce brought our attention. For, only once these lessons are absorbed can they be 
critically examined (see, e.g., 1905b/1998, p. 349–350). As to how to identify which 
features America finds best about itself: for that it would be wise to look to our founding 
documents—like the Declaration of Independence—and our greatest statesmen—men 
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like Abraham Lincoln—who, through their words and deeds, have helped shape 
America’s understanding of itself. 
(2) While Peirce does not explicitly include a civic component to his university 
curricular recommendations, I would like to argue that his brief remarks on the subject—
that it is better to train students in the art of thinking than to ensure the “assent of all the 
citizens to any definite propositions,” especially if practice belies those propositions 
(1898/1992, lecture 5, p. 181)—indeed are a civic education: It is important is to analyze 
and criticize our institutions. Similarly, it is not helpful to treat propositions as sacred, 
incapable of being criticized. Only with full criticism and analysis can our institutions be 
understood or improved upon. Civic education and intellectual openness walk a fine 
balance; suggesting a more robust education would likely interfere with both intellectual 
and civic ends, as we see in the example of Dewey’s thought. 
A university education aimed at grooming statesmen and men of action to lead a 
nation, then, ought to include exercises in the critical examination of the nation’s ideals 
as well as governing principles. Peirce has explained that our ideals are open to revision 
and modification based on our reasonable reflections and our experiences in the world 
(1903a, CP 1.591–1.592; 1905b/1998, p. 349–350). Education at the university level 
would be the proper place for the moral sentiments and principles of government 
inculcated in youth to be critically examined. As we saw, when reasonable doubt sets in, 
a sentiment—or culturally ingrained norm—is open to the review of reason (1905b/1998, 
p. 350).  
Strengthening reason’s ability to navigate between old truths and the needs of new 
situations that arise is then, presumably, a main reason Peirce recommends that men of 
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action receive a liberal arts education. Peirce’s logical tools and philosophical 
understanding have a limited but important role to play in this regard. While Peirce’s 
logical maxim100 aims at understanding, simply, he did quietly point out to us how it 
might be invoked in the practical realm when he noted that the ideal of the separation of 
the branches of government is belied by practice. Thus, recognizing the difference 
between an ideal or how something purports to be, and how it really is, is one practical 
consequence of a training in logic. In addition, it seems appropriate to conclude from 
Peirce’s recommendations that he would understand other tools of scientific observation 
to similarly be useful to the man of action. For example, scientific tools of observation 
and analysis—tools like econometrics and statistics—can help isolate consequences of 
public policies, and thus provide useful information to the statesman in their decision 
making.  
(3) These logical tools must be applied with appropriate humility and prudence, 
however. Understanding how this is to be done is the complicated thing, of course. A 
theoretical education can aid the development of prudence by making clear the theoretical 
reasons why the conclusions of science must be applied cautiously and with humility, and 
why traditional morality ought in many circumstances to trump scientific conclusions. 
For one thing, a proper education in science and philosophy will make clear the 
limitations of science—the fallibility of any particular theory—and the fact that the whole 
enterprise rests on regulative hopes (1898/1992, lecture 4, p. 176–177; 1869/1992, p. 82). 
                                                
100 “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.” (1878/1992, p. 132) 
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It will also acknowledge the rigidity of instinct and human nature—recognize, in other 
words, the limits to which man can be shaped (see, e.g., 1905b/1998, p. 349–350). 
Finally, it will recognize, as Peirce does, that instinct, moral sentiment, and cultural 
norms summarize lessons gleaned from man’s experiences over time (1898, lecture 1, p. 
111).  
Sentiments and norms must be critically examined before they can be discarded or 
changed, as Peirce explains; this means that one must attempt to understand their virtues 
and the possible reasons for their development before one can deem them no longer wise 
or necessary.101 Fully appreciating tradition requires that it be examined from different 
angles. Reading texts that both embody and raise questions about such matters aids this 
examination; this suggestion indeed works nicely with Peirce’s recommendation for 
extensive reading (1898, lecture 5, p. 192). Works of political theory, literature, religion, 
and history102 are among those that can help shed light on matters of practical decision 
making. They can provide insight into the human condition and the extent and limits of 
human nature’s malleability. They can moreover provide insight into the principles by 
which our political system operates, and the understanding of justice on which it rests. 
The American statesman who is grappling with how to deal with the discrepancy between 
                                                
101 C. Anderson (1990) includes a similar suggestion as part of his recommendation for a 
“political education that would be compatible with the basic presuppositions of pragmatic 
liberalism”: “Thorough understanding of the rationale of prevailing practice is the precondition 
for critical analysis. Granted, the fashionable pedagogy today is to encourage criticism before 
students have mastered the case for existing institutions and techniques, ideas and procedures. 
But that is putting the cart before the horse. . . . It is essential to understand why something was 
put there in the first place before one tries to change it or tear it down.” (p. 196–197)  
102 In a 1901 essay, Peirce in fact endorses studying history because it can help broaden one’s 
understanding: “One of the main purposes of studying history ought to be to free us from the 
tyranny of our preconceived notions” (1901e, CP 7.227). 
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our constitutional principle of the separation of the branches of government and the way 
politics is in fact practiced, for example, will benefit from understanding the arguments 
behind the separation of powers as explained in the Federalist; this understanding would 
inform, though not determine, his response.  
VI. Concluding Thoughts 
 Peirce understands a man of action to benefit from a liberal arts education that 
teaches logic and aims at strengthening his powers of reasoning. To act wisely, the man 
of action must approach situations with prudence—a virtue in the practical realm, though 
not in the theoretical realm. Extremism is a virtue in the intellectual realm, but reason 
taken to the extreme would be disastrous in the practical realm. Peirce has provided us 
with clues as to how and when reason ought to intervene in the practical realm.  
Fallibilism, or a modest skepticism, and the inevitability of change are at the heart 
of Peirce’s education recommendations. In both the practical and political realms, truth or 
right judgment is not easily known. Both pure inquiry and practical decision making 
benefit from agile, discriminating, open minds. The scientist can never be certain that a 
proposition will forever remain unturned, though logical tools and the scientific method 
can help him approach truth. The man of action can similarly not be certain of the best 
judgment in any given situation, and must rely on a combination of lessons learned from 
experience, ideals instilled in him in his youth, and his reasonable reflections. This is why 
Peirce would agree with Dewey that a nation’s ideals ought to be instilled in the young; 
but, at the level of the university, these ideals, along with a nation’s institutions, must be 
critically examined. At the least, the experience of critiquing received wisdom will train 
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the mind’s powers—strengthen its art of reasoning—aiding it in future practical decision 
making. It is thus for both intellectual and practical reasons that Peirce is against 
promoting any particular doctrine at the level of the university. On this point Peirce and 
Dewey diverge significantly.  
Finally, as we conclude, let us also recall that Peirce’s primary interest was in the 
noble pursuit of truth for its own sake. We saw in this chapter that Peirce thought it an 
important moral lesson for general students to observe a true man of science, who was 
attached to a noble goal that was completely detached from a concern for utility and any 
self-serving ends. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, moreover, a main 
purpose of Peirce’s entire philosophic project is to provide a framework that would 
ensure the intelligibility of the scientific project while motivating students to embark on 
it. For that is the job of philosophy:  
In every age, it can only be the philosophy of that age, such as it maybe, which can 
animate the special sciences to any work that shall really carry forward the human 
mind to some new and valuable truth. Because the valuable truth is not the 
detached one, but the one that goes toward enlarging the system of what is already 
known. (1898, lecture 4, p. 171) 
This required first and foremost providing an intelligible notion of truth that would make 
sense in a post-Kantian world. It meant rescuing philosophy and science from an extreme 
skepticism that seemed to have forgotten its original goal of striving toward universal 
agreement. Understanding the importance of this noble activity—the pursuit of truth—
ought to be the starting place of students of Peirce who are interested in understanding 
what, if any, practical application his thought might warrant. 
 
 
 
286 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
My dissertation has explored Charles S. Peirce’s epistemological and political 
thought. The first three chapters examined Peirce’s pragmatism and related features of his 
thought: his Critical Common-Sensism, Scholastic Realism, semeiotics, and a part of his 
metaphysical or cosmological musings. The fourth chapter explored Peirce’s warning that 
theory and practice ought to be kept separate, for the sake of each. The fifth chapter 
aimed to shed light on the claims of the fourth by exploring the liberal arts education 
Peirce recommends for educating future statesmen.  
This dissertation makes clear that Peirce was not a crude utilitarian or simply 
concerned with “what works.” He was, moreover, not anti-metaphysical. This dissertation 
is ultimately sympathetic to the position of those who separate Peirce from the other 
pragmatists—though those who do so do so dismissively. In fact, Peirce has much to 
instruct contemporary thinkers. His is an anti-skeptical but modest theory of reality that is 
still potentially attractive to contemporary readers. His message of caution in the practical 
realm is sound. Finally, his call for what a university ought to be and the liberal arts 
education that will best groom students for the active life is still fitting.  
I. Overview of Pragmatism and Related Doctrines 
Pragmatism is a logical doctrine. It is not intended to reveal all truth about 
existence, but rather the intellectual—objective, what is verifiable and accessible to all—
content of a matter. Peirce initially framed its maxim as  
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Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we 
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects 
is the whole of our conception of the object. (1878/1992, p. 132) 
If a body is “hard,” it “will not be scratched by many other substances” (1878/1992, p. 
132). “Weight” means that “in the absence of opposing force,” a body “will fall” (ibid., p. 
133). “Force” enables us to “account for changes of motion”: “without the intervention of 
forces, every motion would continue unchanged both in velocity and in direction” (ibid.).  
Peirce ultimately clarifies that it is not the “conception of these effects” but the 
habits of action themselves that are the ideal logical interpretant of a concept. 
“Acceleration” ought to be understood as the “habit of the person who predicates an 
acceleration” (1907/1998, p. 433). This shift is connected to pragmatism’s re-
grounding—from one based on assertions about the essence of the psychological states of 
belief and doubt, to one based on Peirce’s semeiotic theory of mind. By identifying the 
intellectual meaning of a concept, pragmatism aids modern science in its journey of 
uncovering reality—knowledge to which all inquirers would assent, and which future 
experience will not bring into doubt. 
Connected to pragmatism are the doctrines of Scholastic Realism and Critical 
Common-Sensism. Peirce’s realism recognizes the existence of law and generals, and of 
the existence of both the potential and the actual. Critical Common-Sensism holds that 
we must start inquiry from the point of view of common-sense and that we ought not to 
doubt what we do not in truth doubt; however, it is not a doctrine that is simply satisfied 
with the common-sense understanding, but rather welcomes doubt—attempts to devise 
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ways to doubt—so as to better refine understanding. Both point to the reality of the world 
as we experience it.  
Similarly intimately connected to pragmatism is the modestly skeptical doctrine of 
fallibalism. Fallibalism holds that while truth—knowledge of reality—is available, we 
can not be certain at any particular time that we have hold of reality. Claims of 
knowledge must be modest. Knowledge is possible, but mistakes at any given point are as 
well.  
II. The Nature of Peirce’s Realism and the Anti-Skeptical Motivation behind 
Peirce’s Philosophical Project 
My thesis throughout this dissertation has been that Peirce’s main motivation 
behind his philosophical project was to articulate a theory of reality in a post-Kantian, 
skeptical age—an age that “believe[d] in nothing” (1871, EP1 p. 86)—to motivate 
inquirers to inquiry. In the face of the Kantian position that there exists a true reality to 
which we do not have access, Peirce proposed an anti-skeptical theory of reality. The real 
is what exists independently of any particular human mind—though not of thought in 
general—and constrains the understanding. Pragmatism and the scientific method aid in 
homing in on this reality.  
The reason for Peirce’s anti-skeptical project was to motivate inquiry. It is the job 
of philosophy to motivate the sciences to further knowledge (1898/1992, lecture 4, p. 
171). In past ages, the belief in God motivated impressive feats (1871/1992, p. 86). Peirce 
attempts to put forward an understanding of reality that will similarly motivate scholars 
to great accomplishment. His assertion of the ultimate agreement of investigators is 
justified because rational inquiry requires it. Toward the end of his life Peirce even enlists 
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God in his project: he couches his argument in religious terms, hypothesizing a 
philosophical God—the existence of Nature, I argue—that aims to motivate scholars to 
pursue knowledge.  
a. Peirce’s Theory of Reality: An Analysis 
Truth—the reality that is ultimately knowable103—is what would be agreed to at the 
end of inquiry by qualified inquirers, should inquiry be “pushed to its ultimate and 
indefeasible issue” (1908a/1998, p. 450). For something to be considered truth, it must be 
available to other inquirers—it can not be held privately (1871/1992, p. 88–89). It must 
be communicable to and understandable by other minds. But what is true will remain true 
regardless of whether it is uncovered: “The real is that which is such as it is regardless of 
how it is, at any time, thought to be” (1905b/1998, p. 356). A true understanding might 
indeed never be reached—the world might be destroyed beforehand, for example 
(1869/1992, p. 82).  
Truth can not be determined based on the opinions of any particular community at 
any particular time. The “community” that is the “ultimate” standard of reality, for 
Peirce, is the “community of philosophers,” not of all minds simply (1869b/1992, p. 54, 
29). Peirce does not expect universal enlightenment: he explains that the “mass of 
mankind” is destined to “remain intellectual slaves” (1877/1992, p. 118). With social 
pressure being as great as it is, the method of authority will always govern the many 
(ibid.). It is most likely that the community of philosophers will be disconnected by both 
                                                
103 While commenters have argued that “truth” and “reality” are no longer synonymous for 
Peirce after 1880 (see, e.g., Hookway 2004), I do not think the distinction is relevant to this 
dissertation.  
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time and place; the thinkers Peirce holds up as independently arriving at similar 
conclusions—as independently uncovering the same eternal forms—is an instructive 
example (1898/1998, lecture 1, p. 120–121). Peirce’s theory of truth is not, in other 
words, democratic or relativistic.104 
Has Peirce’s theory of truth and knowledge provided an answer to Kantian 
skepticism, however? Careful consideration of Peirce’s theory of reality reveals its 
inherent circular reasoning: We can know reality because reality is what we can know. 
Peirce moreover understands reality to be mind-dependent.105 Understanding reality to be 
synthesized by the mind, Peirce’s realism shares similarities with Kant’s epistemology, 
despite his claim that his “theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in 
itself,—a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind’s conception of it” 
(1871/1992, p. 90). Peirce even acknowledges his theory of reality involves a 
phenomenalism that is akin to Kant’s (ibid.).  
Peirce indeed appears to have simply reframed Kant’s epistemology. The noumena 
is no longer an unknowable thing-in-itself, but rather that which is ultimately understood 
and agreed to at the end of inquiry (ibid.). Redefining “noumena” as that which is 
ultimately understood is fitting for a term with roots in the Greek “nous.” 
                                                
104 This presentation of Peirce’s theory of truth and the community of inquirers challenges the 
appropriation of Peirce’s thought by democratic theorists who understand Peirce’s philosophic 
community to include everyone and universal enlightenment to be both possible and desirable, as 
discussed in the Introduction (e.g., Misak 2000, Talisse 2005, Talisse 2012).  
105 Because knowledge of reality must consist in ideas, many commenters regard Peirce’s 
realism to be an “objective idealism” (Boler 2004; Smith 1978). Boler (2004) explains it thus: “If 
knowledge is possible, the real as the object of knowledge must be idea-like” (p. 76). 
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But if Peirce’s realism is simply a reframing of Kant’s epistemology, how is it an 
antidote to extreme skepticism, the position that knowledge of reality is impossible? 
Peirce answers Kantian skepticism with the following points: (1) We can not mean 
anything that we have no experience of—there is no reality beyond the reality to which 
we have access (1868a/1992, p. 24). To speak of something of which we have no 
experience and therefore no knowledge is nonsense. (2) Reality is mind-dependent but is 
not constructed by the mind. There is something external to the mind that constrains 
understanding. “We find our opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which 
influences our thoughts, and is not created by them” (1871/1992, p. 88). Pragmatism aims 
to uncover the mind’s understanding of this external, constraining reality. While the mind 
plays a role in the ultimate understanding, it can not decide what that understanding will 
be.   
b. The Role of Peirce’s Metaphysics: Beauty and Religious Awe in Peirce’s Philosophy 
Peirce’s hypothesis for the existence of God accounts for how knowledge of 
external things—how the ultimate agreement of all sufficiently inquiring minds—is 
possible. “Man’s mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover 
what he has discovered. It is the bedrock of logical truth” (1908/1998, p. 444). Peirce 
presents a philosophical God: an unembodied God of necessary character, this God is the 
creator of the three universes of experience—that of pure ideas, the external world, and 
the connection between signs, in other words, our knowledge of the external world (ibid., 
ibid., p. 447, 434–435). With this God’s philosophical nature, Peirce’s metaphysical 
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musings are, I have argued, a religiously flavored way of speaking of the hypothesis of 
nature’s existence.  
Peirce has not entirely answered Kant’s skepticism. Peirce argues that it does not 
make sense to speak of a reality that is beyond cognition, and our opinions are 
constrained by something external to our minds. These are compelling points, consistent 
with how we experience the world. In our daily existence, we gather that we do know 
some things—for example, that fire will burn flesh—and, moreover, that we have no 
control over these things. But Peirce also acknowledges that our knowledge of the 
external world is mediated by the mind. We have no access to the external world as 
unmediated by the mind. Peirce is then in the position wherein he must persuade others 
that the knowledge available to humans—this mediated reality—is worth pursuing.  
To do this, Peirce seeks to instill religious awe in his readers.106 In past ages, belief 
in God inspired the accomplishment of great things. Both “scholastic commentar[ies]” 
and “Gothic cathedral[s]” bespeak a “truly heroic” “religious devotion” (1871/1992, p. 
86). Peirce understood those of his day, in contrast, to “believe in nothing” (ibid.). I have 
argued that Peirce seeks to replace this belief in nothing with a belief in something noble, 
to inspire the pursuit of knowledge. The hypothesis of the existence of a philosophical 
God—Nature—is intended to be “full of nutrition for man’s highest growth,” to supply 
                                                
106 This is an original suggestion, as far as I can tell. It makes sense of aspects of Peirce’s 
writings that are overlooked in the scholarship. Hookway (1985) explains that many 
commentators do not take Peirce’s metaphysics seriously, or do not understand his metaphysics to 
be consistent with his philosophical thought (p. 263). Hookway takes Peirce’s metaphysical and 
cosmological thought seriously and understands it to work in conjunction with his logic; however, 
Hookway is interested simply in evaluating the internal coherence and ultimate persuasiveness of 
Peirce’s system. I have not seen others note Peirce’s efforts to inspire religious awe or scientific 
Eros; or connect these efforts to his metaphysical musings or overall philosophical project.  
 
 
293 
 
 
“an ideal of life” (1908/1998, p. 435, 439). “Every heart will be ravished by the beauty 
and adorability of the Idea” of the reality of God (ibid., p. 446). “Nature is something 
great, and beautiful, and sacred, and eternal, and real”; it is the “object” of science’s 
“worship” (1898/1998, lecture 4, p. 177). True ideas make up the “dignity of man” 
(1878/1992, p. 140).  
Uncovering knowledge requires religious devotion—the investigator’s “whole 
heart and soul” (ibid., p. 113). Galileo was a “truly inspired prophet” (1908/1998, p. 444). 
A concern for utility will only obfuscate the search; “practical utilities . . . should be put 
out of sight” (1898/1998, lecture 1, p. 113). Like Kant’s good will, the pursuit of reason 
is a good that might interfere with our well-being—it might “[cost] us dear” (1897/1992, 
p. 123), but such is the case with all that we “cherish” (ibid.). The noble nature of truth 
justifies these costs. Peirce praises the intellectual virtue—especially courage—required 
for this feat (ibid.). In contrast, those who are satisfied with the opinions of the 
community are cowardly for choosing peace over truth (ibid., p. 116). Peirce’s 
presentation of the beauty of Nature and the noble activity of philosophy aim at inspiring 
the philosophic Eros that pure science and philosophic pursuit require (1898/1998, lecture 
1, p. 107).  
III. Practical Consequences of Peirce’s Thought  
Peirce explains that theory and practice must be kept separate. This is for the sake 
of each: a concern with practical utility will interfere with the pursuit of truth; pure 
scientific propositions are, moreover, tentative, and not fit for application in the practical 
realm. Instinct and tradition are sounder guides than is reason in practical decision 
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making—they reflect the wisdom of experience—and ought to reign supreme in the 
practical realm.  
However, in the same lecture series, Peirce also argues that the “good of the 
country” and the “welfare of the commonwealth” require that universities train students 
to be able to think for themselves, and warns against simply teaching them received 
wisdom. Thus we appear to have this tension: If tradition ought to reign supreme in 
practical decision making, why not simply teach men of action traditional wisdom? To 
what end does training in logic and strengthening the mental powers serve the practical 
life, given Peirce’s admonition against mixing theory and practice?  
To understand Peirce’s answer to these questions, I first explore in detail his 
curricular recommendations. I then suggest that there are two important insights 
regarding practical matters that are behind Peirce’s recommendations, which should be 
understood as amendments to his admonition that theory and practice be kept entirely 
separate.  
a. Curricular Recommendations 
Peirce calls for returning to the traditional liberal arts education: to an education at 
whose center is the trivium—the study of grammar, logic, and rhetoric—and that is 
focused on training students’ intellectual powers. The aim of this education is to teach 
students to think for themselves. To foster a flexible mind that can see beyond pre-
established notions, Peirce suggests exercises that strengthen the mind in different but 
complementary ways. He recognizes it is important to see matters from different angles 
and to have an open mind that is not hampered by pre-established notions.  
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Peirce includes extensive reading in his curricular recommendations; this is striking 
in today’s context, in which “laboratory-men” and “experimentalist type[s]”—as he 
describes himself—are at best indifferent to and at worst disdainful of philosophy broadly 
understood. Dewey, for one, exhibits this disdain. It is similarly noteworthy that Peirce 
thinks important insight can be found in the nonscientific texts of great “literary artists” 
with impressive “power[s] of discrimination” regarding men’s characters and 
psychology. Resounding throughout Peirce’s curricular recommendations is the theme of 
anti-dogmatism. Learning requires being aware of one’s own ignorance.  
b. The Art of Thinking and the Active Life 
Why is critical thinking needed for the active life? Why not simply teach traditional 
wisdom and morality? A close reading of various texts reveals two important insights 
into practical matters that I argue are behind Peirce’s education recommendations. (1) 
The first is that change is inevitable—new situations arise, for which old traditions can 
not simply be relied on. Peirce understands chance and variation to be inherent to the 
world. It is this which drives evolution. In recognizing that change at the social level is 
inevitable, Peirce is in agreement with Dewey. Unlike Dewey, however, Peirce does not 
think this means that all inherited wisdom ought to simply be discarded and replaced by 
scientific experiment. Rather, what is needed is honed practical judgment—judgment that 
is capable of recognizing what a given situation requires.  
While instinct, tradition, and our own practical knowledge are sufficient in familiar 
circumstances, the minds of practical men need to be trained to adapt old lessons to new 
situations. It is often not obvious or clear what is in the best interest of society. One must 
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be able to think clearly and critically in order to determine what new circumstances 
require. This cannot be simply derived from an orthodox doctrine or established formula. 
A flexible and well-trained mind is needed to understand what is required in a given 
situation. The best education will aim to produce leaders who can use their brains—who 
can think critically—in order to appropriately guide the country in the uncertain future, 
where old truths might not be helpful. 
(2) Peirce’s second insight is that tradition is fallible. While this is not a unique 
insight by itself, what is remarkable—what sets Peirce apart from the other pragmatists—
is his response to this recognition. Peirce acknowledges that traditions like that of suttee 
raise doubts regarding the soundness of the conservatism he has expounded. His explicit 
teaching in his 1898 talk is that adherence to tradition and sentiment is nonetheless the 
most prudent plan of action. This conservative advice is not Peirce’s final word on the 
matter, however. At the end of this lecture, he explains that reason can influence instincts, 
but only slowly and indirectly. I suggest another benefit Peirce understands a proper 
liberal arts education will have on men of action will be of enlightening their instincts 
such that they will be in a better position to respond to the fact that tradition is fallible—
so that they will be better able to judge which traditions to abide by, and which to 
discard.  
There are two principal ways in which this will be done: (A) The first is that by 
encountering genuine scholars, students’ sights will be lifted. A noble environment like 
that of a proper institution of learning can beneficially impact students’ morals, especially 
in a modern democracy where men’s attentions are so often turned to lower things like 
making money. Peirce explains that one of the important lessons that a general pupil 
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ought to carry with him after he leaves the university is what the soul of a scholar is 
about. The true scientist’s aspirations are noble; he is motivated by “rational ideas” and 
the “rationalization of things” simply. Neither wealth nor personal ambition drives him. 
By encountering scholars motivated by this noble goal, students’ sights will be raised—
they will recognize there are goals beyond mere utility and individual success. A proper 
university can thus offer an important antidote to the sights and goals of practical life. 
(B) The second way in which a proper education will enlighten and enlarge 
students’ instincts is through encountering the “ideal and eternal verities,” which, because 
they are true, will bring instincts closer in line with the good. Though it does not produce 
simple formulas for acting, philosophy influences the instincts, slowly and indirectly, 
according to what is universal. Throughout his writings, Peirce hints at the overall effect 
he understands these truths to have: Acquaintance with knowledge of the whole reveals 
human beings’ mutual dependence. This understanding has a liberalizing effect on the 
scholar’s soul.  
Peirce explains that his logical investigation reveals that men are highly dependent 
on one another for knowledge. Man as an individual is marked by his ignorance; it is only 
as a member of a community that he can hope to be part of the uncovering of eternal 
truth. Peirce similarly understands in his defense of scholastic realism and the existence 
of generals an argument for the existence of something higher than individual man, 
capable of elevating his particular existence. It is arguably Peirce’s understanding of the 
mutual dependency of people that prompts him to frequently minimize the difference 
between different peoples and cultures and instead emphasize individuals’ common 
membership in the human race.  
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The scholar’s recognition of his dependency on other men is connected to the 
generosity inherent in his investigations. The true investigator recognizes that he can only 
play a small role in the discovery of truth. His actions aim at benefitting future inquiry 
and inquirers—at benefiting the development of knowledge in the long run. By exposing 
students who will go on to live lives of action to both genuine scholars and pure 
theoretical study, a proper liberal arts education has the potential to both raise men’s 
sights and liberalize their sentiments. These are significant moral lessons, benefitting 
students as individuals and as citizens.  
c. Peirce’s Practical Conservatism 
That there is this role for reason and pure science in the active realm does not 
obviate Peirce’s message of practical conservatism. His claim that it is unwise to upend 
one’s instincts or traditional morality based on a newly arrived-at logical proposition still 
holds. His warnings caution against experimentation in social arrangements and directly 
applying philosophical ideas to the practical realm—as advocated for by such thinkers 
associated with pragmatism as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey.  
The recognition that tradition is flawed and ought to be approached with prudential 
criticism bespeaks a conservatism that is very American in nature. It does not accept 
tradition simply. It is distinguished from “false conservatism” like that which “looks to 
see on which side bread is buttered,” or which is concerned with simply maintaining the 
social status quo. It seeks rather what is good in the past, and to discard what is bad in it. 
This requires recognizing the limits of reason, the wisdom inherent in tradition, and well-
honed practical judgment. 
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Finally, in conclusion, it is important to recall that Peirce’s primary interest is in the 
noble pursuit of truth for its own sake. A main purpose of Peirce’s philosophic project is 
to provide a framework that would ensure the intelligibility of the scientific project while 
motivating students to embark on it. For that is the job of philosophy. Understanding the 
importance of this noble activity—the pursuit of truth—ought to be the starting place of 
students of Peirce who are interested in understanding what, if any, practical application 
his thought might warrant. 
IV. Evaluation 
Peirce’s forward-looking theory of reality and the nature of the knowledge that is 
available to the human mind is less skeptical than is that of post-modern theorists like 
Thomas Kuhn, who understand knowledge to be paradigm-dependent (Kuhn 1962). 
Peirce recognizes that our context determines the level of knowledge at any particular 
time (1871/1992, p. 89). But actual knowledge is that which will be purified of the 
particular biases of a specific time and place; his framework for knowledge, reality, and 
fallibalism, helps us understand and articulate how knowledge is possible though we may 
not have certainty about any particular knowledge at any particular point. His doctrine of 
modest skepticism is a more compelling guide to knowledge in a post-Kantian age than 
are those of extreme skepticism.   
In many important respects Peirce’s philosophical project is an intentional 
inversion of Kant. Kant employs theory in the service of morality: the Critique of Pure 
Reason shows the limitation of pure theory in order to elevate morality. Peirce, in 
contrast, aims to protect the pursuit of pure knowledge from morality. For Kant, human 
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dignity is the result of acting according to the dictates of reason, according to the moral 
law that one sets for oneself; this behavior entails losing sight of one’s individual needs. 
For Peirce, human dignity is the result of “render[ing] ideas and things reasonable” 
(1900/1958, p. 332); this pursuit also entails losing sight of one’s individuality. The 
pursuit of pure knowledge for Peirce takes the place of Kant’s good will: it is “the only 
thing that is really desirable without a reason for being so” (ibid.).  
Peirce merely asserts, however, that the pursuit of pure knowledge is man’s highest 
end without attempting to prove it. He claims it is beautiful and desirable, and attempts to 
ignite an erotic longing or religious awe for it among his readers. He does not make an 
argument for it being worthy of pursuit, however.  
What Peirce does do is attempt to undermine the alternative options: He attempts to 
undermine Kant’s own undermining of pure theory by ridding his audience of the concept 
of a thing-in-itself behind the phenomena, and by explaining that reason is not a fit guide 
for morality. He moreover chimes in with a Kantian critique of the other goal of 
modernity: that of using reason to make life more secure—the goal of thinkers like Bacon 
and Locke, and the focus of Peirce’s student Dewey. Peirce’s response to these modern 
goals is three-pronged. 1. Reason is not a fit guide for morality. Reason is indeed the tool 
of immorality, of justifying what one knows to be bad behavior. 2. The concern with 
utility is a fleeting goal: this world, too, shall end. The pursuit of philosophy, in contrast, 
is more permanent, and thus more noble. His efforts at proving knowledge to be possible 
and laying out the nature of this knowledge speak to this goal. 3. Because knowledge is 
fallible, the proper role for reason is to play a part in uncovering knowledge in the long 
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run, not to attempt to improve man’s condition in the short term, where instinct is a 
sounder guide.  
Peirce does not, however, offer an argument as to why the pursuit of pure 
knowledge is the highest human pursuit. The nature of the knowledge available to man 
and the activity of inquiry itself, as Peirce has explained it, require such an argument. The 
pursuit of pure knowledge, we have learned, depends on the regulative hope that 
inquirers will reach agreement when inquiry has been exhausted. This agreement is, 
moreover, all that is meant by reality. The beauty of this knowledge—which amounts to 
the limits of what is available to the human mind—is not obvious on its face. Pure 
scholarship, moreover, consists of one living one’s life as a cog in the wheel: the scholar 
does not expect to obtain this final knowledge for himself, but rather to help in its 
ultimate uncovering. These rewards are watered down, weaker versions of the truth about 
the world that ancient philosophy promised. Given this, it is understandable why many 
would be more attracted to Dewey’s modern goal of making life more secure than 
Peirce’s noble goal of pursuing knowledge for its own sake. While there will still be 
scholars who choose to devote themselves to the pursuit of pure knowledge because this 
goal suits their preferences, Peirce has not made a persuasive case as to why it is the 
worthiest of goals. Elements of Peirce’s teaching can still benefit those who are attracted 
to the modern goal of security, however: pragmatism as a logical doctrine can help men 
more clearly understand their ideas, and Peirce’s practical teachings about the need for 
prudence in the practical realm and his hope for the role of the university in a modern 
republic remain instructive.  
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